EAP-TLS Smartcards, from Dream to Reality Pascal Urien, Mohamed - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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EAP-TLS Smartcards, from Dream to Reality Pascal Urien, Mohamed - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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EAP-TLS Smartcards, from Dream to Reality Pascal Urien, Mohamed Badra, Mesmin Dandjinou 4th Workshop on Applications and Services in Wireless Networks Boston University Massachusetts, USA August 9th, 2004 1 Pascal URIEN, Boston University,

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1 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

EAP-TLS Smartcards, from Dream to Reality

Pascal Urien, Mohamed Badra, Mesmin Dandjinou

4th Workshop on Applications and Services in Wireless Networks Boston University Massachusetts, USA August 9th, 2004

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2 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Wi-Fi Security Model

User is authenticated according to the IEEE 802.1X model, based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP, RFC 2284bis) Authentication is performed between the supplicant (user’s PC) and the (RADIUS) authentication server. The link between the users’ database (LDAP, GSM HLR;..) and the RADIUS server is not specified. At the end of this process, a Master Session Key (MSK) is computed by the supplicant and the authenticator As specified in 802.1X-REV-d8, MSK is a couple of two 32 bytes key named MS-MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key. These keys are securely sent (by the RADIUS server) to the access point as described in RFC 2548 (Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS attributes). A key exchange protocol (IEEE 802.1X, IEEE 802.11i) is used in order share a session key SK (for example a WEP key or a PTK key) between the Access Point an the Supplicant. According to the radio security protocol used between the Access Point and the Supplicant (WEP, TKIP, CCMP) various key are deduced from SK in in order to realize, 802 Frames privacy (data encryption) 802 Frames integrity 802 Frames authentication (data encryption + data integrity symmetric signature).

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3 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Wi-Fi Security Model (suite)

Access-Accept/EAP+MSK EAP-Success Master Session Key MSK EAPoL-Key/ANonce EAPoL-Key/SNonce EAPoL-Key/Install EAPoL-Key RADIO security protocol WEP-TKIP–CCMP EAP-Request/Identity EAP-Response/Identity Access-Challenge/EAP Access-Request/EAP EAP-Request/Type EAP-Response/Type Access-Request/EAP WEP Key EAPoL-Key (WEP-Key) 802.11i Key Exchange Protocol 802.1X Key Exchange Protocol

LDAP/ODBC/MAP EAP over RADIUS EAP over 802 LANs EAP over 7816

Supplicant Smartcard Authenticator Access Point Authentication Server Users’ Database EAP MSK SK (PTK) Derivation WEP Key AAA Link PC/SC SK (PTK) Derivation PTK Key WEP Key

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4 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

THE EAP smartcard

What is the EAP smartcard ? A smartcard that processes EAP messages It supports multiple authentication methods

EAP-SIM, EAP-TLS, EAP-MSCHAPv2, others First EAP-TLS smartcard is operational since June 17th 2004.

What doest it look like ? It is an application written for Javacards. Specified by an IETF draft “EAP-Support in smartcard”

draft-urien-eap-smartcard-05.txt

The EAP smartcard won two awards Sesame 2003, “Best Technological Innovation”, cartes’2003 exhibition, Paris, November 2003 Card Technology Magazine, Breakthrough Awards 2004, “Innovation”, CardTech/SecureTech exhibition, Washington DC, April 2004. Are smartcards performances sufficient ? Usually smart cards include crypto-processors that compute the RSA 2048 bits algorithm in less than 0,5s. Commercial Javacards memory size are around 32-64 Kb (available for code byte storage).

The size of an X509 certificate is about 1kb As an illustration EAP-TLS applet size (processing EAP and TLS protocols) is around 20Kb.

New generation of smartcards based on FLASH technology, supports one megabyte

  • f memory.
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5 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

EAP-TLS Cryptographic costs for RC4-MD5 crypto suite

N = PRF, i= N/16, j=N/20 PRF(2i+1 x HMAC-MD5, 2j+1 x HMAC-SHA-1) HMAC-MD5 = 2 x MD5 (5 x blocks) HMAC-SHA1 = 2 x SHA1 (5 x blocks) Server Hello Message Processing Cost: 3xRSA, 500 x MD5-blocks, 500 x SHA1-blocks, 1xRC4

3 x RSA 3 x PRF = 20 x HMAC-MD5 (10 blocks) 3 x PRF = 20 x HMAC-SHA1 (10 blocks) 3 x MD5 (100 blocks) 3 x SHA-1 (100 blocks) 1 x RC4 (32 bytes)

Server Finished Message Processing Cost: 130 x MD5-blocs, 130 x HMAC-blocs, 1 x RC4

2 x PRF = 13 x HMAC-MD5 (10 blocks) 2 x PRF = 13 x HMAC-SHA1 (10 blocks) 1 x RC4 (32 bytes)

Device A </block> = 23,5 ms Server Hello Processing > 1000 * 23,5 = 23,5s Device B </block> = 11ms Server Hello Processing > 1000 * 11,0 = 11,0s

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6 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

EAP Smartcard Services

The operating system interface. Identity is a pointer to an authentication triplet (EAP-ID, EAP-Type, Credentials) stored in the EAP-Smartcard. Smartcard may manage several network accounts, the OS performs an identity discovery process in order to browse its content. A profile is a collection of information, such as EAP-ID, EAP-Type, protocol version, list of preferred SSIDs, root certificates, user’s certificates, or every data meaningful for operating systems in order to interoperate with the card or to select the right access point when multiple wireless networks are available. The network interface. EAP messages are processed by the smartcard. At the end of the authentication method, a Session Key (PMK) is computed. The user/issuer interface. The smartcard is protected by two PIN codes (Personal Identification Number), one is managed by the card bearer and the other by the card

  • issuer. For example if the user’s PIN is activated, the smartcard is

locked (and can’t be used) after three wrong PIN values presentation. The management/personalisation interface. This service updates information (identities) stored in the smartcard.

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7 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Integrating EAPSC in Operating Systems

EAP implementation conceptually consists of the three following components Lower layer. The lower layer is responsible for transmitting and receiving EAP frames between the peer and authenticator EAP multiplexing layer. The EAP layer receives and transmits EAP packets via the lower layer, implements duplicate detection and retransmission and delivers and receives EAP messages to and from EAP methods. EAP method. EAP methods implement the authentication algorithms and receive and transmit EAP messages via the EAP layer. Since fragmentation support is not provided by EAP itself, this is the responsibility of EAP methods. An EAP smartcard implements an EAP method and works in cooperation with a smartcard interface entity, which sends and receives EAP messages to/from this

  • component. The simplest form of this interface is a software bridge that

transparently forwards EAP messages to smartcard. According to EAP methods complexity and smartcard computing capacities, protocol sub-sets, which do not deal with security features may be computed by the smartcard interface entity.

EAP Multiplexing Layer Lower Layer Smartcard Interface Type=X EAP Method Type=Y EAP Smartcard EAP Multiplexing Layer Lower Layer EAP Method Type=X EAP Method Type=Y Authentication Server Supplicant

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8 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Double Segmentation

According to a TLS record may be up to 16384 bytes in length, a TLS message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message may in principle be as long as 16MB. Furthermore the group of EAP-TLS messages sent in a single round may thus be larger than the maximum LAN frame size. Therefore EAP-TLS [6] introduces a segmentation process that splits TLS messages in smaller blocs, acknowledged by the recipient. The RADIUS server generates acknowledgement requests and the supplicant acknowledgment responses. A double segmentation mechanism is necessary in order to forward TLS packets to smartcard. These messages are divided in smaller segments, whose size is typically 1400 bytes, and than encapsulated in EAP-TLS packets.

Recv: TLS Message#1 EAP-TLS fragment #1 (1400 bytes) EAP-TLS fragment #1 240 bytes EAP-TLS ack#1 Send: TLS Message#1 EAP-TLS fragment #2 EAP-TLS fragment #2 Authentication Server Supplicant Smartcard Interface EAP-TLS Smartcard Send: TLS Message#2 EAP-TLS TLS EAP-TLS ack#1 Recv: TLS Message#2 APDU fragment#1 (240 bytes) ack#1 APDU fragment#1 ack#1 APDU fragment#n ack#1 EAP-TLS TLS APDU fragment#n ack#1

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9 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

EAP-TLS Javacards

JavaCard 2.x platform natively provides essential cryptographic services that are required by the TLS protocols; in particular: Random number generation. MD5 and SHA1 digest functions. RSA public key encryption and decryption. RSA private key encryption and decryption. DES or 3DES ciphering. However some additional facilities that are not currently available in JC platforms are provided by the EAP-TLS application. For example: Keyed-hashing procedures (HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1). The pseudo random function (PRF) defined by the TLS protocol. The RC4 algorithm, which is often used by the TLS record layer. An X509 certificate parser required for signature analysis and public key extraction. Total code size, #22KB (8 KB of data)

IETF eap-smartcard APDU-Fragmentation Smartcard Interface Supplicant EAP Method Layer EAP-TLS EAP-TLS Fragmentation TLS Certificates Management TLSUtil.class Client CA PUB PRIV EAP.class Record Layer Handshake Protocol

Cryptographic library Security Management IO Management Smartcard OS JAVA Virtual Machine Java Card Run time Environment JCRE JC2.2 Framework MD5 SHA1 RSA EAP-TLS Java Application HMAC-MD5(key,msg) HMAC-SHA1(key,msg) PRF(key,seed,msg) HMAC-MD5 X509 Certificate Parser ISO 7816 APDUs RC4(key,msg) RNG

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10 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Performances Issue

What performance is needed ? IEEE 802.1x, 2001, 8.5.4.1.2 “txPeriod. The initialization value used for the txWhen timer. Its default value is 30 s; it can be set by management to any value in the range from 1 to 65535 s.” Target. Computing each sub-part of the EAP-TLS protocol in less than 30 seconds !

EAP-Request EAP-Response

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11 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Tamper-Resistant Microcontrollers

RAM E

2PROM

ROM CPU

5 mm

no 4032 bits 1000 kbit/s 8 MHz 34 96 4096 8 bits B yes 1088 bits 424 kbit/s 10 MHz 32 96 2304 8 bits A RNG RSA Processor Max Data Rate

  • Max. Clock

E2PROM Kbytes ROM Kbytes RAM bytes CPU Device

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12 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

RSA computing time

RSA Computing Times

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 PrivEncrypt_1024 PubDecrypt_1024 PubEncrypt_1024 PrivDecrypt_1024 CAPubEncrypt_2048 Time (mS) A B

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13 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004. MD5 & SHA1 computing time 1000 2000 3000 4000 2000 4000 6000 8000 input length (bytes) time (second) A-MD5 A-SHA1 B-MD5 B-SHA1

A: 23,5ms/block B: 11,0ms/block

MD5 & SHA-1 Performances

From “SSL and TLS”chapter 1,p32 OPENSSL FreeBSD Pentium II 400 MD5…. 65 MB/s SHA1…31 MB/s

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14 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Version 1 performances

a : S e r v e r H e l l

  • T

r a n s f e r b : S e r v e r C e r t C h e c k i n g c : R S A ( p r e

  • m

a s t e r

  • s

e c r e t ) d : S H A 1 + M D 5 ( v e r i f y ) e : R S A ( v e r i f y ) f : P R F ( m a s t e r _ s e c r e t ) g : P R F ( k e y _ b l

  • c

k ) h : M D 5 + S H A 1 + P R F ( c l i e n t _ f i n i s h e d ) i : M D 5 + S H A 1 ( s e r v e r _ f i n i s h e d ) j : M A C _ R e c

  • r

d k : R C 4 . i n i t l : R C 4 . e n c r y p t i

  • n

m : R e s p

  • n

s e _ T r a n s f e r a : R C 4 . i n i t + R C 4 . d e c r y p t i

  • n

b : C h e c k _ M A C _ R e c

  • r

d c : P R F ( f i n i s h e d ) d : P R F ( P M K ) e : E A P

  • T

L S

  • A

C K

B 10000 20000 30000 40000

Time (mS) EAP-TLS Processing Time B A

166s – 97s 100s – 54s Server Hello Processing Server Finished

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15 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Version 1 performances

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16 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Version 2 optimization

Server Hello Message Transfer to SC…….. 10,0s Server Hello Message Processing................24,0s SC Response Transfer……………………..….2,5s Server Finished Message Processing ….…8,5s Total…………………………………...............45,0s

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17 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Version 2 optimization

97s – 26,5s 54s – 8,5s

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18 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Real performances with 1024 RSA keys

EAP-TLS-Start / Client-Hello…….…………………...1,5s Server- Hello 1st frag / EAP-TLS-ACK…………….….2,0s Server Hello 2nd frag / Client Response 1st frag…. .26,0s Server EAP-ACK / Client Response 2nd Frag…..…..1,0s Server Finished / EAP-TLS-ACK..……………….…..7,0s

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19 Pascal URIEN, Boston University, August 9th 2004.

Conclusion