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Ireland: Steady progress amid external risks Employment growth driving economy as Government is nearing EU fiscal target October 2017 Index Page 3: Summary Page 7: Macro Page 27: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 46: Brexit Page 53:


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SLIDE 1

Ireland: Steady progress amid external risks

Employment growth driving economy as Government is nearing EU fiscal target October 2017

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SLIDE 2

2

Index

Page 3: Summary Page 7: Macro Page 27: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 46: Brexit Page 53: Long-term fundamentals Page 61: Property Page 68: Other Data Page 79: Annex

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SLIDE 3

Growth is strong and Ireland is living within its means

Summary

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SLIDE 4

4

Macro picture is positive even if some metrics are skewed

50 100 150 200 250 300 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 GDP GNI*

Cleaner GNI* highlights rapid recovery (€bn) Appropriate debt analysis is needed… Debt-to-GDP (72.8%, from 120%) Debt-to-GNI* (106%, from 158%) Debt-to-GG Revenue (274%, from 353%) Average interest rate (3.1%, from 5.1%) …but Ireland running a primary surplus (€bn)

  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 Underlying Primary Balance

slide-5
SLIDE 5

5

More than €15bn in funding in 2017 as potential IMF early repayment deal sees NTMA exceed original funding plan

€15bn

>€15bn of

  • f fun

unding com

  • mpleted YT

YTD Average maturi rity of

  • f is

issu suance 12.2 .2 yea ears Interest t rate of

  • f 0.85

.85%

A

All ll maj ajor r cr cred edit rati ting ag agencies s have Ireland firmly in “A” grade following Moody’s upgrade in Se Sept 2017

37% 37%

  • f
  • f buy

buyers s in in the the la last fiv ive syn yndications were from Co Conti tinental Eur Europe

slide-6
SLIDE 6

6

Challenges remain for Ireland

Debt

Irela eland has has us used the the QE QE peri period to

  • del

deleverage ; ; he health thiest dem demographics s in in Eur Europe mea eans s tha that t the the cou

  • untry

try can an cop

  • pe wit

ith hi higher r deb debt

US

Ireland is still a “high beta” bet

  • n
  • n the

the US S ec economy, in n par parti ticular r its its ICT sec ector US S Corp Corporate Tax reform

Brexit

For

  • r every

ry 1% % dr drop in in UK K GDP DP, Ireland’s output may fall by an anywhere be between 0.3 .3-0.8%. .

slide-7
SLIDE 7

GDP/GNP mislead; GNI*, employment and consumption best reflect reality

Section 1: Macro

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SLIDE 8
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 15 20 25 30 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017f Domestic Demand Net Exports Change in Inventories GDP Change Forecast

8

Distortions to GDP/GNP make them sub-optimal indicators of economic performance

%

Substantial activity from multinationals in 2015/16 distorted the national accounts (see Annex for reasons)

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

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SLIDE 9

9

New GNI* metric is a better measure of underlying economic activity; grew by 9.4% nominally in 2016

  • GDP headline numbers do not reflect the “true”

growth of Ireland’s incomes due to MNCs.

  • Reasons for 2015/16 MNC distortions:
  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • By modifying GNI to take account of these factors,

GNI* gives us a better understanding of the underlying economy.

  • GNI* only available in nominal terms at present.
  • In time, GNI* will be published on a constant

price basis as well as at a quarterly frequency.

National Account – Current Prices (€ Billions, y-o-y growth rates) 2015 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 262bn (34.7%) 275.6bn (5.2%) minus Net Factor Income from rest

  • f the world

= Gross National Product (GNP) 206bn (25.0%) 226.7bn (10.1%) add EU subsidies minus EU taxes 1.2bn 1.0bn = Gross National Income (GNI) 207.2bn (24.9%) 227.7bn (9.9%) minus retained earnings of re- domiciled firms

  • 4.6bn
  • 5.8bn

minus depreciation on foreign

  • wned IP assets
  • 25.0bn
  • 27.8bn

minus depreciation on aircraft leasing

  • 4.6bn
  • 5.0bn

= GNI* 172.9bn (11.9%) 189.2bn (9.4%)

Source: CSO

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SLIDE 10

10

50 100 150 200 250 300 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 GDP GNI GNI*

GNI* was €189bn in 2016; 12% higher than in 2007 (current prices) GNI* growth rate averaged 7.6% since 2011 (current prices)

Irish recovery more realistic when looking at GNI*

Source: CSO Note: GNI* series pre 1995 = GNI given minimal distortions in pre-1995 era.

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 GDP GNI*

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SLIDE 11

11

Modified Final Domestic Demand (MFDD) is a useful cyclical indicator

  • MFDD also seeks to strip out the impacts of the

MNC distortions.

  • The measures omits parts of aircraft leasing and

IP imports from investment to give a modified measure of domestic demand.

  • The measures includes:
  • private consumption
  • government consumption
  • building investment
  • elements of machinery & equipment

investment

  • elements of intangible asset investment
  • This measure pegs nominal growth closer to 7.4%

at Q2 2017 (annualised y-o-y). In real terms, growth y-o-y in Q2 was 5.6%.

Source: CSO

  • 20.0%
  • 15.0%
  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Modified Dom. Demand (Real) Modified Dom. Demand (Nominal)

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SLIDE 12

75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Volume Index Value Index

12

Consumption is a large contributor to economic growth; unaffected by MNC distortions

Private consumption grew at 2.1% y-o-y in Q2 2017 “Core”* retail sales up 3.9% y-o-y in value terms August 2017 (peak=100)

Source: CSO, CSO (retail sales) * excludes motor sales; 3m average

Gap = price discounting; continues to widen

  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Consumption Growth Y-o-Y (RHS) Annualised Consumption (€bn)

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SLIDE 13

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 PMI Services PMI Manufacturing PMI Construction

13

Ireland composite PMI is expanding – manufacturing hurt in mid-2016 by Brexit Recovery is broad based (PMI chg. as cumulative index level, June 2000=100)

PMI indicators show Ireland’s broad based recovery

Source: Markit; Bloomberg; Investec ; NTMA workings

Growth of services is much stronger than rest

30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Services Manufacturing Composite

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SLIDE 14

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

14

Labour market has rebounded since 2012; unemployment continues to fall and Ireland employs two million again

Unemployment rate: 6.1% in September 2017 Employment up 12.6% from cyclical low (2008 peak = 100)

Unemployment has more than halved in 5 years

Source: CSO

65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Non-Construction Employment Total Employment

Non-Construction Employment above 2008 peak for first time

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SLIDE 15

15

Over 55% of all employment growth has been high skilled since start of 2014 Substantial shift from part-time employment to full-time employment in recent quarters

Employment growth driven by high skill job creation; Full- time employment growing at 5% in Q2 2017

Source: Eurostat; CSO High Skill jobs include the ISCO08 defined groupings Managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Part-time Emp (Y-o-Y) Full-time Emp (Y-o-Y) Employment (Y-o-Y)

  • 10.0%
  • 8.0%
  • 6.0%
  • 4.0%
  • 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 High Skill Other Employment Growth

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SLIDE 16

56% 57% 58% 59% 60% 61% 62% 63% 64% 65% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

16

Participation rate hovering around 60%

  • Part. rate down as construction jobs lost and

younger people stay in education longer

Labour participation has not yet recovered – young age groups the driver

Source: CSO,

Rate inflated pre-crisis by migrant construction workers

  • 20.0
  • 15.0
  • 10.0
  • 5.0

0.0 5.0 10.0

  • pp. change in participation rate since peak
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SLIDE 17

17

Wages and hours worked beginning to recover, although pockets of excess capacity remain

Wide disparity in wage growth across sectors

Wages only now rising, pointing to slack in the market

Source: CSO (Earnings), NTMA Analysis

35,750 36,000 36,250 36,500 36,750 37,000 37,250 37,500 31.2 31.4 31.6 31.8 32.0 32.2 32.4 Q4 2009 Q4 2010 Q4 2011 Q4 2012 Q4 2013 Q4 2014 Q4 2015 Q4 2016 Hours Worked (Annualised) Annualised Earnings (annualised,€, RHS) 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60

  • 1.5%
  • 1.0%
  • 0.5%

0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% Prof, science & tech Wholesale/Retail Transport/Storage Accom & Food Admin & Support Fin, Insurance & RE Health Industry Construction Public admin Education Info & Comm Arts & Rec 4Q average hourly earnings y-o-y 2017 Q2 average annual earnings (€000, RHS)

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SLIDE 18

18

Unemployment falling across Europe; falling faster here

Q4 Q4 2013 % Q4 Q4 2014 % Q4 Q4 2015 % Q4 Q4 2016 % Q2 Q2 2017 % Germany 5.1 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.9 .9 Netherlands 7.6 7.1 6.7 5.5 5.0 .0 Irela eland 12.2 .2 10.4 .4 9.0 .0 7.0 .0 6.2 .2 Sweden 8.0 7.8 7.1 6.9 6.6 .6 Belgium 8.5 8.6 8.7 7.2 7.6 .6 EU 28 10.7 9.9 9.0 8.3 7.7 .7 Euro area 11.9 11.4 10.5 9.7 9.2 .2 Portugal 15.4 13.5 12.3 10.4 9.2 .2 France 10.1 10.4 10.2 10.0 9.6 .6 Italy 12.3 12.7 11.6 11.8 11.2 .2 Spain 25.8 23.8 21.0 18.7 17.3 .3 Greece 27.6 25.9 24.3 23.3 22.6 .6

Source: Eurostat, 15-74 age basis

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SLIDE 19

19

Consumer confidence had recovered, though Brexit may have impacted Inflation in Ireland lower than EA due to sterling weakness

Rising employment and house price rises lift confidence; stagnating consumer prices underpin real income…

Source: KBC, ESRI, CSO; Eurostat

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 3 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 HICP Ireland HICP Euro Area

Brexit Vote Brexit Vote

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017

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SLIDE 20
  • 250

250 500 750 1,000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Financial Assets Liabilities Housing Assets Net Worth

20

… while household deleveraging continues; rising house prices bolster household balance sheets

Interest burden down to only 4% of disposable income from peak of 11% Household net worth (€bn) improved since 2012 underpinning consumer spending

Source: CBI, Eurostat NTMA calculations Note: Non-trackers bare c.90% of the interest burden Source: CBI, NTMA Calculations

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 % of f di disp sposable le Inc ncome Ireland EA-19 Germany Spain Italy Netherlands UK

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SLIDE 21

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% Household Debt (% of Disposable income) 50 70 90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Household Debt (€bn) Household Disposable Income (€bn, annualised)

21

Household debt down nearly €60bn from peak Debt to after-tax income* improving (145%) but among highest in Europe

Private debt levels are high but improving

Source: Eurostat Source: CBI

*Measure excludes “other liabilities” from household debt.

At 10-year low

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SLIDE 22
  • 2.0
  • 1.0

0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Billions € Principal Dwelling Buy-to-Let Total

22

Lending for House Purchase slowly improving (€bn net transactions) New credit to Businesses only now

  • utweighing deleveraging efforts (y-o-y)

Recovery has not been driven by credit

  • Econ. growth

positive in 2013-17

Source: CBI

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Total - Annual Growth Total ex Financial Intermediation Total ex Financial Intermediation and Property

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SLIDE 23

23

Gross household saving rate revised downwards recently – more in line with UK than EU

Source: Eurostat, CSO Note: Gross Savings as calculated by the CSO has tended to be a volatile series in the past, some caution is warranted when interpreting this data

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 % of

  • f Dis

Disposable Inc ncome (4Q (4Q MA) A) Ireland EU-28 EA-18 UK

slide-24
SLIDE 24
  • 10
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130

90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Contract Manufacturing* Services Goods ex. CM Exports

24

Cumulative post-crisis exports (4Q sum to end-2008 = 100, current prices) Ireland has tripled its share of global service exports in the last 15 years

Service exports have been very strong post-crisis; goods exports excluding contract manufacturing slower

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations , * Contract manufacturing proxy ; DataStream

Large increase in exports exaggerated by contract manufacturing*

Patent Cliff 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 Irish Services Export (% of Global Share)

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SLIDE 25

25

Ireland’s goods exports respond vigorously to euro movements – in both directions

  • A 1% depreciation of the euro increases

Irish goods exports to the US by 1%

  • The equivalent response for exports to the

UK is 1.1% and to the rest of world is 0.8%. Brexit has the opposite effect on Irish exports.

  • The EUR/USD exchange rate has a positive effect

(elasticity of 0.4) on Irish goods exports to the euro area, due to Ireland-based multinational companies’ exports to EA for onward sale to the rest of the world

  • The elasticity of total goods exports

excluding pharma to the exchange rate >1

Source: CSO; NTMA empirical analysis Note: All coefficients significant at 99% level; not affected by contract

  • manufacturing. Time period is 1998 to 2016 Q2. For longer time periods, the

UK elasticity is smaller (closer to 0.4-0.5 for 1981 onwards).

Response (% chg.) of Irish goods exports to 1% depreciation of the euro

1.00 1.11 0.41 0.83 1.08 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 US UK EA ROW EXP EXL PHA

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SLIDE 26

26

Ireland’s openness has been critical to Irish success; Brexit hinders export-led growth

Good

  • ods

Servic ices Tot

  • tal

2016 Exp. Imp. 2015 Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 25.0% 12.6% US 10.0% 21.0% 16.0% 18.4% UK 12.8% 23.4% UK 19.4% 8.0% 16.7% 13.6% EA 33.5% 27.9% EA 29.3% 26.4% 32.1% 26.8% China 3.1% 5.9% China 2.8% 0.3% 2.4% 2.2% Other 25.6% 30.2% Other 38.5% 44.4% 32.8% 39.0%

Source: CSO

Ireland benefits from export diversification by destination Breakdown of Irish trading partners % of total

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations; Data not affected by contract manufacturing

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 % of total goods exports US Euro area UK Other

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SLIDE 27

Fiscal accounts are robust; GDP revisions mean we need to look beyond usual debt ratios

Section 2: Fiscal & NTMA funding

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SLIDE 28

28

General Government Balance (excl. banking interventions) Deficit forecast to be fully closed in euro terms by 2020 (€bn)

Irrespective of GDP moves, Ireland has had six straight years of fiscal outperformance

  • 10

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019f GG Expenditure (ex-banking recap) GG Revenue

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

  • 9.0%
  • 8.2%
  • 6.4%
  • 3.7%
  • 1.2%
  • 0.7%
  • 0.3%
  • 11.8%
  • 10.9%
  • 8.0%
  • 4.6%
  • 1.8%
  • 1.0%
  • 0.5%
  • 14%
  • 12%
  • 10%
  • 8%
  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017f GGB (% of GDP) GGB (% of GNI*)

slide-29
SLIDE 29

29

At end-H1, govt. revenue close to expected profile despite deviations earlier in 2017 Tax and total revenue growing in line with economic growth

Despite deviations in earlier months, govt. revenue figures are almost back in line with expectations

Source: Department of Finance

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% Jan-14 Apr-14 Jul-14 Oct-14 Jan-15 Apr-15 Jul-15 Oct-15 Jan-16 Apr-16 Jul-16 Oct-16 Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Tax Revenue (y-o-y) Total Revenue (y-o-y)

  • 5.0%
  • 4.0%
  • 3.0%
  • 2.0%
  • 1.0%

0.0% 1.0%

  • 500
  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Actual Revenue versus Profile (€m) % of profile (RHS)

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SLIDE 30
  • 25%
  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10%

  • 25
  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 f Underlying Primary Balance Interest GGB underlying Structural Balance (% potential GDP, RHS)

30

Medium Term Objective of structural balance of -0.5% of GDP may be achieved in 2018

€4.3bn primary surplus in 2016

€bns

Source: CSO; Department of Finance; IMF

slide-31
SLIDE 31

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 Debt-to-GNI* Debt-to-GDP

31

Gross Government debt fell to 73% of GDP in 2016; GG debt to GNI* fell to 106%; reality somewhere in between

Peak eak

Debt-to-GNI* ratio is high but has declined quickly

Source: CSO; Department of Finance, NTMA calculations

36% 66% 78% 86% 89% 86% 66% 64% 61% 60% 25% 20% 32% 33% 30% 19% 11% 9% 9% 9% 62% 86% 110% 120% 119% 105% 77% 73% 70% 69% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% Net Debt Cash Balances/EDP assets GG Debt

slide-32
SLIDE 32

32

Alternative debt service metrics must also be used for Ireland e.g. General Government debt to GG Revenue

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018F 2020F Ireland Spain Italy Belgium EA-19

slide-33
SLIDE 33

33

Better to use broad range of debt serviceability metrics

2016 GG debt to GDP % GG debt to GG revenue % GG interest to GG rev % Gree eece 179.0 360.0 6.5 Por

  • rtu

tugal 130.4 302.8 9.8 Ital aly 132.6 281.3 8.4 Cyp Cypru rus 107.8 274.9 6.6 Irela eland 72.8 274.6 8.5* Sp Spain 99.4 262.5 7.4 UK UK 85.2 217.3 6.3 Be Belgium 106.0 208.7 5.6 EA19 89.3 193.0 4.8 EU EU28 83.6 186.1 4.8 Sl Slovenia 79.7 182.6 7.3 France 96.5 181.8 3.6 Aus ustri ria 84.6 170.9 4.2 Germ ermany 68.3 151.7 3.1 Ne Netherl rlands 62.3 141.4 2.5 Sl Slovakia 51.9 130.0 4.1 Fin inland 63.6 117.2 2.0

Source: Eurostat, NTMA calculations * Closer to 7% of GG Revenue if you exclude the interest paid to CBI. Other countries would also see their interest %

  • f GG Revenue fall under this treatment but Ireland’s would fall by more given amount held by CBI (FRNs etc.)
slide-34
SLIDE 34

34

Snowball Effect (i-g) in Ireland’s favour regardless of what “g” metric is used

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018f 2020f Nominal GDP Growth (g_1) GG Revenue Growth (g_2) Nominal GNI* Growth (g_3) Average Interest Rate (i) 35%

Source: CSO; Department of Finance, NTMA calculations Please note the break in the y-axis to incorporate the outsized 2015 GDP growth figure

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SLIDE 35

35

Over 50% of Irish debt stock held by “sticky” sources

Source: CSO, ECB, NTMA Analysis *excludes those held by Eurosystem. Euro system holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA holdings which are likely to further increase the Eurosystem’s holdings. ** Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRC-related liabilities. Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.

50 100 150 200 250 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Billions € IGBs* Retail Eurosystem Holdings Other Debt** Total Debt

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SLIDE 36

36

  • The Minister for Finance and Public Expenditure & Reform has announced that Ireland intends to repay its

remaining loans from the IMF (approx. €4.5bn), together with bilateral facilities agreed with Sweden (€0.6bn) and Denmark (€0.4bn), a total of circa €5.5bn.

  • This is not the first time Ireland has made an early repayment of programme loans. The NTMA has

previously implemented arrangements to repay over €18bn in IMF facilities to take advantage of reduced market borrowing costs and create savings for the Exchequer.

  • The NTMA estimates that interest savings for the Exchequer from the early repayment of c. €5.5bn could be
  • f the order of €150m over the remaining lifetime of the loans.
  • Early repayment of the loans requires agreement from our European lenders to waive the proportionate

early repayment clauses in our respective loan agreements.

  • Any replacement of programme loans with marketable debt also increases the ECB’s purchase capacity for

Irish government bonds.

  • In addition there are secondary market liquidity and operational benefits.

Ireland intends to repay IMF and Bilateral facilities early; €150m in expected interest savings plus extra QE capacity

slide-37
SLIDE 37

37

Maturity profile – modest refinancing in 2017 and 2018

Source: NTMA

Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extension that will bring their weighted-average maturity from 12.5 years to 19.5 years. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any of its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the EFSM loan maturity dates in the 2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.

5 10 15 20 25 Billions € Bond (Fixed & ILB) IMF EFSM EFSF Bond (Floating Rate) Bilateral

slide-38
SLIDE 38

5 10 15 20 25 30 € Billions Debt Profile Recent reductions Long-term extensions End 2013 Debt Profile

38

We improved our 2017-2020 maturity profile significantly in recent years

…Ireland compares favourably to

  • ther European countries

Various operations since 2013 have led to an extension of maturity…

Source: NTMA; ECB *excludes programme loans. Ireland’s maturity including these loans is still similar.

10.4 9.3 8.5 8.3 7.8 7.4 7.4 7.0 6.9 6.0 6.0 5.9 2 4 6 8 10 12 IR BG GR AT DK NL FR ES IT FN PT BD

Yea ears

Govt Debt Securities - Weighted Maturity EA Govt Debt Securities - Avg. Weighted Maturity

slide-39
SLIDE 39

39

NTMA funded approximately three to four quarters in advance; 2017 issuance to be larger than 2016

  • Ireland redeemed €6.2bn bond in October

2017.

  • Our next bond redemption will be

in October 2018 - €8.8bn.

  • NTMA indicated it would issue €9-13bn

worth of long term bonds in 2017. However, in light of the expected repayment of IMF and SWE/DEN loans, Ireland is expected to issue €16bn.

  • Exchequer cash balance at end Q3 2017

was €21bn.

Source: NTMA

  • EBR is the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (Department of Finance estimate)
  • Cash balances excludes non-liquid asset classes such as Housing Finance Agency

(HFA) Guaranteed Notes.

  • Other outflows includes contingencies.
  • Other funding includes Retail (State Savings).
  • Rounding may occur.

€8.6 Cash €9.4 Cash EBR STP EBR €2.3 Bond €6.2 Long term Paper €16 Bond €8.8 Loan Repay €5.5 FRNs + Switch

  • €2

€2 €6 €10 €14 €18 Y/E 2016 Outflow Funding (€16bn) Y/E 2017 2018 Outflow

slide-40
SLIDE 40
  • 1

4 9 14 19 24 Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13 Jul 13 Jan 14 Jul 14 Jan 15 Jul 15 Jan 16 Jul 16 Jan 17 Jul 17 10 Year 2 Year

EU/IMF Programme Entry Rising ELA

Moodys Downgrade

OMT EU/IMF loan rate reduction NTMA issuance recommences EU/IMF Programme Exit NTMA resumes bond auctions ECB QE Ireland’s 1st 100-year note Brexit

40

Ireland’s bond market performance has been underpinned by prudent domestic policy and ECB action

Yield (%)

Source: Bloomberg (weekly data)

slide-41
SLIDE 41

41

OMT and QE (PSPP) have both helped Ireland and other EA sovereigns Purchases of IGBs under PSPP will slow in 2017 to c.€6bn but still significant

ECB action has helped Ireland’s bond performance

Source: DataStream, Bloomberg; ECB, NTMA Analysis Note: As of end-Q2 2017

  • 1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 01/12 07/12 01/13 07/13 01/14 07/14 01/15 07/15 01/16 07/16 01/17 07/17 10 Year 15 Year 7 Year 30 year

OMT QE

40 80 120 160 200 GG Debt Estimated Eurosystem Holdings Universe Estimated Eurosystem Holdings Total PSPP-Eligible Billions €

slide-42
SLIDE 42

42

Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied

Investor breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications Country breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications

Source: NTMA

42% 32% 12% 13% Fund/Asset Manager Banks/Central Banks Pensions/Insurance Other Ireland, 10% UK, 28% 7.6% Cont. Europe, 37% 9.4% 10.2% Ireland UK US and Canada Continental Europe Nordics Other

slide-43
SLIDE 43

43

Central Bank of Ireland holdings increase domestic share

  • f Irish Government bonds (IGBs) through PSPP

€ Billi llion End quarter Dec 2014 Dec 2015 Dec 2016 Jun 2017

  • 1. Resident

50.8 50.8 54.6 55.7 (as % of total) (43.7%) (40.6%) (44.9%) (43.4%) – Credit Institutions and Central Bank* 45.9 46.9 51.1 52.5 – General Government 1.6 0.8 0.5 0.4 – Non-bank financial 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.4 – Households (and NFCs) 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3

  • 2. Rest of world

65.5 74.2 67.1 72.6 (as % of total) (56.3%) (59.4%) (55.1%) (56.6%) Total MLT debt 116.3 125.1 121.6 128.3

Source: CBI

slide-44
SLIDE 44

44

Breakdown of Ireland’s General Government debt

€ Billi llion 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 H1 H1 Currency and deposits (mainly retail debt) 62.1 31.4 20.9 20.7 21.3 21.5 Securities other than shares, exc. financial derivatives 87.3 112.7 119.1 125.6 124.0 134.9

  • Short-term (T-Bills, CP etc)

2.5 2.4 3.8 1.2 2.3 5.9

  • Long-term (MLT bonds)

84.8 110.3 115.3 124.4 121.8 129.0 Loans 60.6 71.3 63.3 54.9 55.2 54.8

  • Short-term

1.9 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4

  • Long-term

(official funding and prom notes 2009-12) 58.7 69.8 62.0 53.8 54.5 54.4 General Government Debt 210.0 215.3 203.3 201.1 200.6 211.2 EDP debt instrument assets 58.7 54.6 36.8 29.6 25.1 38.5 Net Government debt 151.3 160.7 166.5 171.5 175.5 172.7

Source: CSO

slide-45
SLIDE 45

45

Ireland: “A”grade from all major credit rating agencies

Rati ting Agency cy Long-term Sh Short rt-term rm Outl utlook/Trend Da Date of

  • f la

last cha change Standard & Poor's A+ A-1 Stable June 2015 Fitch Ratings A F1 Stable

  • Feb. 2016

Moody's A2 P-1 Stable Sept 2017 DBRS A(high) R-1 (middle) Stable March 2016 R&I A a-1 Stable

  • Jan. 2017
slide-46
SLIDE 46

Brexit is likely net negative for Ireland but opportunities may arise too

Section 3: Brexit

slide-47
SLIDE 47

47

Negative for the Irish economy: each 1% drop in UK GDP may lower Ireland’s GDP by between 0.3-0.8%

  • Trade
  • Lower demand from UK/ tariffs
  • FX: £ lower v € (1% annual avg. move

= 1% hit to Irish exports to the UK)

  • British market as test-bed less feasible
  • Higher import prices possible in long-term: tariffs

may outweigh FX benefit. Non-tariffs costs could also be significant.

  • Regions suffer (agriculture, tourism), while Dublin

may benefit (via FDI that leaves Britain)

  • Banking sector likely to suffer because
  • f its UK operations
  • Political economy (border?, ally on direction of EU

economic policy)

  • Increased FDI, as multinationals avoid turmoil
  • Financial services (passporting)
  • Other multinationals - especially

IT and business services

  • Commercial property occupancy could rise; there

may also be an influx of well paid workers

  • ECB and fiscal response in Europe
  • Some trade offsets
  • Irish companies may steal EU market share

from British ones

Cons Pros

slide-48
SLIDE 48

48

Trade channel is likely to be negatively impacted

  • Irish/UK trade linkages will suffer following

Brexit

  • The UK is the second largest single-country

export destination for Ireland’s goods and the largest for its services

  • At the same time, Ireland imports 25-30% of

its goods from the UK. Consumer goods, capital equipment and inputs into the export process will become cheaper thanks to FX.

  • There is significant employment related

to Ireland’s trade with the UK

  • The UK might only account for 17% of

Ireland’s total exports, but Ireland is more dependent than that, when you consider the employment related to those exports

  • SMEs (particularly agri-food and tourism) likely

to be more affected than larger companies by the introduction of tariffs and barriers to trade Ireland’s main trading partners

Source: CSO (2015)

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% Exports Imports Exports Imports Goods Services US UK EA Other

slide-49
SLIDE 49

49

Estimated Trade Reductions in “WTO rules Hard Brexit” Scenario

There could be significant trade impacts on Ireland in drastic “hard” Brexit scenario

Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis

% % of

  • f

exp xports ts los lost t wit ith UK UK % % of

  • f

tot

  • tal

exp xports ts los lost % % of

  • f UK

K exp xports ts los lost t with ith EU EU part partner % % of

  • f tot
  • tal

UK K Ex Export rts s los lost Irela eland 30.6 .6 4.2 .2 27.6 .6 1.5 .5 Belgium 35.1 3.1 25.7 1.0 Spain 38.6 2.9 25.6 0.7 Germany 34.1 2.5 19.4 2.0 Denmark 39.8 2.5 24.4 0.2 Portugal 33.0 2.2 27.7 0.1 EU EU Tot

  • tal

30.5 .5 2.1 .1 22.3 .3 9.8 .8 Poland 30.6 2.1 20.8 0.3 NL 22.1 2.0 15.6 0.9 Italy 29.9 1.7 26.9 0.8 France 24.9 1.6 20.9 1.2 Greece 28.4 1.2 27.2 0.1

  • 4
  • 3.5
  • 3
  • 2.5
  • 2
  • 1.5
  • 1
  • 0.5

T T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5 T+6 T+7 T+8 T+9 T+10

% deviations on the levelof GDP (relative to baseline)

Estimated GDP impact “WTO rules Hard Brexit” Scenario

slide-50
SLIDE 50

50

IE/UK goods trade slowed on back of currency moves before recent rebound

Effects of Brexit already visible from currency impact

Source: CSO; DataStream; CSO

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Euro/Sterling (y-o-y, Lagged 3Qs, RHS) Visitors to IE from UK (y-o-y)

  • 20%
  • 16%
  • 12%
  • 8%
  • 4%

0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20%

  • 50%
  • 40%
  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Euro/Sterling (y-o-y change, RHS) Imports Growth (y-o-y change in 6 mth flows) Exports Growth (y-o-y change in 6 mth flows)

UK visitor numbers have fallen (note time lag in effect)

slide-51
SLIDE 51

51

Research has shown that FDI decisions are based on a wide range of factors:

  • EU Membership
  • Common language (important for US companies)
  • Law system (Ireland and UK both have common

law structure)

  • Pro-business environment
  • Corporate tax
  • Educated workforce
  • Cost competitiveness
  • Regulatory environment (financial sector)
  • Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI.

The chief areas of interest are  Financial services  Business services  IT/ new media.

  • Dublin is likely to compete with Frankfurt,

Paris and Amsterdam for financial services, if the UK (City of London) loses EU passporting rights on

  • exit. There may be opportunities too in the

clearing of trades in €.

  • Ireland’s FDI opportunity will depend on the
  • utcome of post-exit trade negotiations.

FDI: Ireland may benefit Why choose Ireland

Foreign firms in the UK might consider relocation following Brexit

slide-52
SLIDE 52

52

Irish banks have exposure to UK market: challenging environment following Brexit

End-2016 % of Group Total Total Income €600m 19.3% Credit Outstanding €33.4bn 40.0% Operating Profit €188m 15.6% Impairment charge (€99m) 55.6% End End-2016 % % of

  • f Group

Tot

  • tal

Total Income €310m 11.8% Credit Outstanding €9.3bn 14.3% Operating Profit €171m 13.6% Impairment writeback €37m 12.6% BoI UK exposure AIB UK exposure

Source: Published bank accounts

slide-53
SLIDE 53

Ireland’s long run future looks bright. Key is retaining competitiveness by keeping wages and, hence, costs down

Section 4: Long term fundamentals

slide-54
SLIDE 54

54

Ireland’s GNI* per capita compares favourably to EA counterparts

Much rebalancing has taken place; GNI* per capita surpassed 2007 levels in 2016

Source: CSO

50 100 150 200 250 300 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 "Celtic Tiger" 1994-2001 Credit/Property Bubble Bubble Burst

Recovery

Gross National Income* at current prices (1995=100)

  • 10,000

20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Ireland (GDP) Ireland (GNI*) EA 19 (GDP) Germany (GNI)

slide-55
SLIDE 55

55

Ireland’s current account in surplus but heavily affected by MNC activity and re-domiciled PLCs

* For discussion on the undistributed profits of redomiciled PLCs see Fitzgerald, J. (2013), ‘The Effect of Redomiciled PLCs on GNP and the Irish Balance of Payments’

Source: CSO

  • 15.0%
  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Published Current Account 4 Quarter Average

Historically-high current account surplus (% of GDP) is flattered by re-domiciled PLCs and intangible assets

slide-56
SLIDE 56

56

Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term

Fertility rates in Ireland are above typical international replacement rates Old age dependency ratio (65+ : ages 15-64) compares well against OECD countries

Source: World Bank WDI (2016 for OAD ratio, 2015 for Fertility) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6

slide-57
SLIDE 57

57

Ireland’s population jumped to 4.79m in 2017 – up 200,000

  • n the 2011 Census

Ireland’s population profile healthier than the EU average Latest Census data show net migration positive since 2015 – mirroring economy

Source: Eurostat (2016) CSO; CSO

0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% >1 yr 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100+ Ireland EU28 48.7% of Ireland’s population aged 35 or below versus 41% for EU % of population in age cohort

  • 2.0%
  • 1.0%

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%

  • 100
  • 50

50 100 150 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Emigration (000s) Immigration (000s) Net Migration (000s) Net Migration (% of Pop, RHS)

slide-58
SLIDE 58

58

Ireland has large % of 25-34 years old with a third-level degree (2014 data)… … with highly educated migrants moving to Ireland in recent years (000s persons)

Workforce is young and educated – “Reverse Brain Drain” in effect

Source: Eurostat; CSO

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Italy Germany Slovakia Czech Rep Portugal Euro area EU28 Slovenia Austria Greece Finland Iceland Spain Denmark Poland Netherlands Belgium France UK Sweden Switzerland Norway Ireland Lithuania Luxembourg Cyprus

  • 100
  • 80
  • 60
  • 40
  • 20

20 40 60 80 100 Third level Other Education Net Migration 2009-2012 2013-2017

slide-59
SLIDE 59

59

Average PISA score for selected countries across maths, reading and science Average FDI inflow in $ per capita, 2011–16

Ireland continues to attract foreign investment: educated workforce one key reason

Source: OECD; Unctad (UN) database * Luxembourg excluded for presentation purposes – average $68,700 per capita over period.

460 480 500 520 540 560 Iceland Italy US Spain OECD Average France Sweden Portugal United Kingdom Belgium Netherlands Germany Ireland Korea Finland Canada Estonia Japan Hong Kong (China) Singapore 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 Slovakia Lithuania Romania Greece Germany Austria Poland Italy Denmark Latvia Slovenia France Spain Portugal Finland Sweden Iceland United Kingdom Belgium Norway Switzerland Netherlands Cyprus Ireland Malta

slide-60
SLIDE 60

85 90 95 100 105 110 115 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

60

Nominal Labour Cost Ratio – IE vs Euro Area Wage growth a natural consequence of improving labour conditions (1999-2021)

Ireland really competitive now, so we need to avoid repeat

  • f mid-2000s

Most competitive since early 2000s

Source: CSO, NTMA analysis *red dots are Budget 2018 forecasts (2017-2021); Non-Agriculture employment /wage data

Source: Eurostat, NTMA analysis *Ratio = IE Nom. Labour Costs/ EA Nom. Labour Costs

Wage Growth = -0.65*(UR) + 0.086 R² = 0.73

  • 6.0%
  • 4.0%
  • 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 2.0% 5.0% 8.0% 11.0% 14.0% 17.0% Nominal wage growth per head Unemployment Rate

slide-61
SLIDE 61

Property prices are rising thanks to lack

  • f supply and capital inflows

Section 5: Property

slide-62
SLIDE 62

62

Demand has picked up again having cooled in 2015; amendments to CBI rules have boosted buying power

Mortgage drawdowns rise from deep trough (000s) Demand increased following CBI rules adjustment

Supply tightening and demand lower below 3.0 and vice-versa

Source: ECB and CBI (Bank lending survey) Source: BPFI *4 quarter sum used

1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Supply Demand 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Residential Investment Letting Mover purchaser First Time Buyers

Drawdowns have slowed in recent quarters

slide-63
SLIDE 63

63

House prices rising strongly but some way

  • ff peak (Y-o-Y change, RHS peak =100)

Office leads commercial property

Property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012 (peak = 100 for all indices)

Source: CSO; IPD

0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 120.0 Retail Office Industrial 20 40 60 80 100 120

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 National Index (RHS) National (Y-o-Y %) Ex Dublin (Y-o-Y %) Dublin (Y-o-Y %)

slide-64
SLIDE 64

64

Residential market continues to be boosted by non- mortgage purchasers although impact has lessened

Non-mortgage transactions still important but falling below 50% of total Housing Completions above 14,000 in 2016 but still low historically (000s)

Note: Non-mortgage transactions are implied by difference between total transactions on property price register and BPFI mortgage data

Source: DoHPCLG, BPFI; Property Services Regulatory Authority

  • 10

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1970 1978 1986 1994 2002 2010 Nationally Dublin

  • ex. Dublin

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 Q4 2010 Q2 2011 Q4 2011 Q2 2012 Q4 2012 Q2 2013 Q4 2013 Q2 2014 Q4 2014 Q2 2015 Q4 2015 Q2 2016 Q4 2016 Q2 2017 Non-mortgage transactions Mortgage drawdowns for house purchase Non-mortgage transactions % of total (RHS)

slide-65
SLIDE 65
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 Q1 2011 Q3 2011 Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 Q3 2014 Q1 2015 Q3 2015 Q1 2016 Q3 2016 Q1 2017 4Q Sum of Transactions Y-o-Y Change (RHS)

65

  • First time buyers (FTBs) can borrow 90% of the

value of a home (10% minimum deposit). Five per cent of the total new lending to FTBs will be allowed above the 90% LTV limit.

  • For second and subsequent buyers (SSBs), banks

must restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 80 per cent LTV to no more than 20 per cent of new lending to SSBs.

  • Bank must restrict lending for primary dwelling

purchase above 3.5 times LTI to no more than 20 per cent of that aggregate value

  • Banks must limit Buy-to-Let loans (BTL) above 70

per cent LTV to 10 per cent of all BTL loans. CBI’s amended macro-prudential rules Transactions have slowed since macro- prudential rules introduced

CBI’s macro-prudential rules increase resilience of banking and household sector

Introduction in 2015

Source: Residential Property Price Register

slide-66
SLIDE 66

50 100 150 200 250 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Jones Lang LaSalle Real Office Estimated Rent Value (ERV) IPD Real Office Property Price Index

66

Real commercial property prices down 40% from peak (index 1983 = 100)

Real office property price moves together with Equivalent Rental Value (rents). Price is driven by real demand in the long-run Bub Bubble peri eriod

  • d

Source: IPD; NTMA

slide-67
SLIDE 67
  • 20.0%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0% SD NW BG UK DN FR IE LX FN OE ES NL EA BD IT GR PT

67

  • 40%
  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% NW SD BG UK DN FR LX FN OE IE ES NL BD EA IT GR PT

Irish house price valuations have risen relative to other European countries in 2017

Source: OECD, NTMA Workings

Deviation from average price-to-income ratio (Q2 2017) Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q4 2016)

Note: Measured as % over or under valuation relative to long term averages since 1980.

slide-68
SLIDE 68

Worries about contingent liabilities no longer; Ireland now has legacy assets

Section 6: Other data

slide-69
SLIDE 69

Ireland has legacy banking-related assets

  • Ba

Banki king

  • Banks are now profitable; Income, cost and balance sheet metrics are much improved.
  • Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs still high compared to EU.
  • An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) was completed in June. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish Exchequer.
  • NA

NAMA

  • NAMA has repaid 98% of its senior debt; it forecasts a profit of €3bn subject to market conditions.
  • IBR

BRC

  • Liquidation of the IBRC could return in excess of €1bn to the Irish Exchequer in the coming years.
  • In 2016, €280m was returned to the Exchequer as interim dividend.

69

slide-70
SLIDE 70
  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 Pre-Provisions Post-Provisions

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2

  • 2
  • 1.5
  • 1
  • 0.5

0.5 1 1.5

70

All three pillar banks in profit (€bn) for at least 24 months

Allied Irish Bank Bank of Ireland Permanent TSB

Source: Annual reports of banks - BOI, AIB, PTSB * Half year results annualised

State Ownership 71% owned 14% owned 75% owned

slide-71
SLIDE 71

71

Banks fundamentally rebuild their profitability

Net interest margins (%) recover Cost income ratios improve dramatically

Note: Margins are derived from weighted average interest rates on loans and deposits to and from households and non-financial corporations

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks Source: CBI, NTMA Calculations

123% 88% 144% 52% 58% 65% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% AIB BOI PTSB 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017H1 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

Outstanding Business New Business

slide-72
SLIDE 72

72

Ireland’s interest rates on lending for house purchase the highest in euro area Rates on SME loans* over euro area average

Profitability aided by higher interest rates than EA peers

Source: ECB *SME loans proxy of loans <1year and <€1m to Non-Financial Corporates

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 % Max Min Ireland Euro Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Max Min Ireland Euro Area

slide-73
SLIDE 73

73

19.9% 16.6% 14.4% 12.5% 17.1% 15.0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% CET1 % (Transitional) CET1 % (Fully Loaded) AIB BOI PTSB

CET 1 capital ratios (Jun-17)

  • 20

40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) AIB BOI Dec-10 Jun-17

Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen significantly as loan books have been slimmed down

Capital ratios strengthened as banks slimmed down and consolidated

Source: Published bank accounts

Note: “Transitional” refers to the transitional Basel III required for CET1 ratios “Fully loaded” refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios.

Source: Published bank accounts

slide-74
SLIDE 74

74

Asset quality continues to improve: impaired loans and provisions fall in 2017

Imp mpair ired loa

  • ans % (cov
  • verage %)1 by

by ba bank k and asset De Dec-15 15 De Dec-16 16 Jun un-17 17 Boo

  • ok

k (€bn) bn) BOI

Irish Residential Mortgages 9.3(52) 6.0(45) 5.3(42) 24.0 UK Residential Mortgages 1.6(22) 0.7(15) 0.7(15) 23.1 Irish SMEs 21.9(52) 15.7(55) 15.9(56) 8.8 UK SMEs 11.1(51) 6.3(55) 6.3(56) 1.9 Corporate 4.6(59) 3.5(54) 3.0(66) 9.0 CRE - Investment 28.5(53) 21.1(57) 19.7(53) 8.6 CRE - Land/Development 84.8(76) 68.8(73) 54.8(68) 0.7 Consumer Loans 4.1(105) 2.7(66) 2.4(65) 4.1 11.6( 6(56) 6) 7.6( 6(54 54) 6.7( 7(52 52) 80.1

AIB

Irish Residential Mortgages 16.6(38) 13.1(44) 11.2(45) 32.7 UK Residential Mortgages 10.8(50) 10.8(46) 8.8(37) 1.6 SMEs/Corporate 11.5(63) 8.0(60) 6.8(55) 17.4 CRE 37.4(61) 29.0(53) 26.0(50) 9.1 Consumer Loans 19.9(70) 13.9(58) 12.8(60) 3.1 18.6( 6(47) 7) 14.0( 0(44) 4) 12.1( 1(53) 3) 63.9

PTSB

Irish Residential Mortgages 23.6(49) 23.4(49) 23.1(50) 20.5 UK Residential Mortgages 3.9(39) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) Commercial 35.8(69) 29.6(113) 29.4(112) 0.2 Consumer Loans 27.0(93) 22.3(88) 18.0(95) 0.3 21.1( 1(49) 9) 23.1( 1(51) 1) 23.1( 1(51) 1) 21.0

1 Total impairment provisions are used for coverage ratios (in parentheses)

Loan Asset Mix (3 banks Jun 17)

Consumer CRE

62% 11% 4% 23%

Corporate/S ME Mortgage

All 3 PCAR banks (€bn) Dec-15 Dec-16 Jun-17 Total Loans 186.5 168.9 165.0 Impaired 29.0 20.3 17.9 (Impaired as % of Total) 15.5% 12.0% 10.8% Provisions 14.7 9.9 9.4 (Provisions as % of book) 7.9% 5.9% 5.7% (Provisions as % of Impaired) 50.6% 48.8% 52.5% Source: Published bank accounts

slide-75
SLIDE 75

20 40 60 80 100 120 Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Over 90 days >720 days 361-720 days 181-360 days 90-180 days

75

Irish residential mortgage arrears are improving across all duration categories; environment still dysfunctional

  • PDH mortgage arrears have fallen steadily since 2013. The smaller BTL market (c. 25% of total) has higher arrears but also saw

declines in the same period.

  • 120K PDH mortgage accounts were classified as restructured at end Q2 2017. Of these restructured accounts, over 87% were

meeting the terms of the restructured arrangement.

Mortgage arrears (90+ days) Total restructurings

Source: CBI

PDH Arrears (by thousands)

* ‘Other’ comprises accounts offered temporary Interest rate reductions, payment moratoriums and long-term solutions pending six months completion of payments.

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 PDH + BTL (by number) PDH + BTL (by balance) Split mortgage, 22.9% Reduced payment, 6.3% Term extension, 12.8% Capitalised arrears, 31%

  • Interest

Only, 3.3% Other*, 22.3%

slide-76
SLIDE 76

76

NAMA: 98% of its original senior debt has been repaid:

  • nly €500m left; likely to deliver surplus of around €3bn
  • NAMA’s operating performance is strong
  • Acquired 12,000 loans (over 60,000 saleable property units) related to €74bn par
  • f loans of 780 debtors for €32bn
  • NAMA continues to generate net profit after impairment charges.
  • It has repaid €29.7bn (98%) of €30.2bn of original senior debt
  • NAMA is meeting and exceeding its senior debt redemption targets well ahead of schedule. It remains
  • n course, subject to market conditions, to redeem all senior debt (€30.2 billion) by end-2017 and its

subordinated debt (€1.6 billion) by 2020.

  • NAMA remains on course to deliver a surplus for Irish taxpayers which is currently estimated at €3bn,

according to its management team - if current market conditions remain favourable.

  • In October 2015, NAMA announced a new initiative to develop up to 20,000 housing units

by 2020 – subject to commercial viability.

More NAMA information available on www.nama.ie

slide-77
SLIDE 77

77

NAMA’s residential development funding programme

  • In reaction to the lack of housing supply, NAMA hopes to fund 20,000 housing

units to the market by 2020 subject to commercial viability

  • The focus will be on starter homes and will be concentrated in the Greater Dublin Area

 75% of units will be houses, the remainder apartments  93% of units in Greater Dublin Area (Dublin, Wicklow, Kildare & Meath)

  • Progress of its building programme has been strong so far

 4,840 units completed since the start of 2014 to March 2017;  Another 2,064 under construction; 1,114 soon to be commenced*;  Planning permission have been granted for another 7,475;  Planning applications lodged or will be lodged in 2017 for a further 10,500 units

  • Existing NAMA commitments are unaffected by this new programme

 Plans for all senior debt to be repaid by end 2017 and subordinated debt repaid by

March 2020 are still in train.

*The units in this category are a combination of residential projects for which funding has been approved and preparations are underway to commence construction in Spring 2017. It also includes funding for developments where the next phase of residential construction will start once an earlier phase is completed.

More NAMA information available on www.nama.ie

slide-78
SLIDE 78

78

The European Commission’s ruling on Apple’s tax affairs does not change the NTMA’s funding plans

  • The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This

figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland’s tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014. This case has nothing to do with Ireland’s corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: “This decisi sion does not call into question Ireland’s general tax system or

  • r it

its corp

  • rporate tax rate”.
  • Apple is

is appealing the ruling, g, as as will the Irish sh Government. This process could be lengthy. Pending the

  • utcome of the appeal, Apple is expected to pay approximately €13bn plus EU interest to the Irish
  • Government. The funds will sit in escrow.
  • An escrow agent/custodian will be appointed by Apple and the Minister for Finance to hold and

administer the fund. The services of the escrow agent/custodian will be procured in accordance with the EU Regulations. The NTMA will run this procurement process.

  • The NTMA has made no

no allowance for these funds. In any case, if the appeal is unsuccessful it is possible that other EU countries where Apple makes sales would seek a share of back tax.

slide-79
SLIDE 79

Explanatory charts about the distortions to Ireland’s National Accounts

Annex

slide-80
SLIDE 80

80

Reclassification of several companies and “onshoring”

  • f IP led to step change in GDP & capital stock in 2015

Source: CSO; Department of Finance *due to confidentiality some sector data for 2015 has been restricted

50 100 150 200 250 300 Nominal GDP Nominal GNP

34.6% (c.€68bn) increase in nominal GDP in 2015

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 € Billions

  • Trans. equip. and R&D*

Research and Development Transport equipment Other Assets All fixed assets

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SLIDE 81

81

The change in capital stock resulted in large increase in net exports

Source: CSO

  • The capital stock expanded in 2015

by c. €300bn or c. 40%. This is due to:

  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • The transfer of whole entities and assets of this

size is not something seen before in Ireland.

  • Goods produced by the additional capital

were mainly exported. Complicating matters, the goods were produced through “contract manufacturing” (explained in detail overleaf).

  • Little or no employment in Ireland results from this

contract manufacturing.

40 80 120 160 200 240 280 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Domestic Demand Net Exports GDP

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SLIDE 82

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 National accounts exports Trade data exports

82

Contract manufacturing (CM) overstates the extent of goods export growth in the last two years

  • CM occurs where a company in Ireland engages

another abroad to manufacture products on its behalf.

  • Crucially, the foreign contract manufacturer

supplies a manufacturing service to the Irish entity but the overseas contractor never takes

  • wnership of the product. When the product is

sold abroad, a change of economic ownership takes place between Ireland and the country where the product is sold.

  • This export is recorded in Ireland’s statistics even

tho though it it was as ne never r pr produced in in Irela eland.

  • Previously, contract manufacturing did not have a

significant net impact on GDP as the company would send royalties back to where the intellectual property (IP) was “owned” – it was a royalty import. Now that the IP is here, Ireland’s GDP is artificially inflated.

Source: CSO, NTMA Calculations

c. c. €70 70 bn bn

Contract manufacturing proxy*

*Contract manufacturing proxy is calculated by taking the difference between the monthly International trade exports statistics and the National Accounts/BOP measure for goods exports. The monthly data is based on the actual volume of goods flowing through Ireland’s various ports/airports whereas the national accounts/BOP makes adjustments for, among other items, contract manufacturing.

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SLIDE 83

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Building Investment Machinery & Equipment Intangibles

Building investment in 2016 c. 65% of 2007 level

83

Investment distorted by multinationals importing IP into Ireland

  • Investment is now above the pre-crisis level due

to MNCs importing intangibles into Ireland.

  • Ireland has become an ICT hub in recent years

with this investment impacting the real economy.

  • However the recent sharp increase in intangibles

investment overstates Ireland’s position and should be discounted accordingly.

  • Building investment grew by 22% y-o-y Q2 2017

highlighting pent up demand for housing.

  • However,

, bui building in investment t is is a a muc uch smaller r part part of

  • f over

erall in investment t - in in 2017 Q2 Q2 it it was as c.65 c.65% of

  • f the

the unsu unsustainable 2007 lev level. Investment (4Q sum, €bns)

Source: CSO,

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SLIDE 84

84

Disclaimer

The information in this presentation is issued by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) for informational purposes. The contents of the presentation do not constitute investment advice and should not be read as such. The presentation does not constitute and is not an invitation or offer to buy or sell securities. The NTMA makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, correctness, completeness, availability, fitness for purpose or use of any information that is available in this presentation nor represents that its use would not infringe other proprietary rights. The information contained in this presentation speaks only as of the particular date or dates included in the accompanying

  • slides. The NTMA undertakes no obligation to, and disclaims any duty to, update any of the information
  • provided. Nothing contained in this presentation is, or may be relied on as a promise or representation (past
  • r future) of the Irish State or the NTMA.

The contents of this presentation should not be construed as legal, business or tax advice.