Financial Crypto and Data Security Mar. 3, 2011 Mercury: Recovering - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Financial Crypto and Data Security Mar. 3, 2011 Mercury: Recovering - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Financial Crypto and Data Security Mar. 3, 2011 Mercury: Recovering Forgotten Passwords Using Personal Devices M. Mannan NSERC PDF, University of Toronto m.mannan@utoronto.ca Collaborators: D. Barrera, C.D. Brown, D. Lie, P.C. van Oorschot


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Financial Crypto and Data Security – Mar. 3, 2011 Mercury: Recovering Forgotten Passwords Using Personal Devices

  • M. Mannan

NSERC PDF, University of Toronto m.mannan@utoronto.ca

Collaborators: D. Barrera, C.D. Brown, D. Lie, P.C. van Oorschot

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Why do we need password recovery?

none is immune to forgetting recall-based authentication needs reset/recovery

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Why recovery must be secure?

“So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.” (The art of war, 6:30) Recovery/reset techniques are weaker than password?

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Recovery vs. reset

In many cases users are forced to choose a new password lack of a secure transmission channel for passwords? cleartext passwords are not stored? ... but good passwords are not easy to generate Our focus: recover the original password

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‘I forgot my password’: now what?

  • 1. Small, local env: ask the admin (secure, not scalable)
  • 2. Large org, networked env: email, PVQ (scalable, insecure)

– help desk calls are expensive Our design goals: scalable, secure, deployable

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State of the art

  • 1. Password managers: in all platforms
  • 2. Email, SMS, phone: ownership, “secure” media
  • 3. Personal verification questions (PVQs): more secrets!

related: Facebook social auth, Blue moon No academic proposals for recovery?

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Password managers

  • 1. Online encrypted storage (LastPass)
  • 2. Offline encrypted storage (KeePass)
  • 3. Issues:

– trust: third parties? – password update: extra step? – master password: weak or none?

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Email password reset/recovery

  • 1. Widely used
  • 2. Issues:

– trust email providers – trust ISPs, wifi providers – check spam, keep waiting... – reset vs. recovery

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Facebook social auth

  • 1. Used for account verification

– e.g., Captcha replacement

  • 2. Issues:

– abstract/pet images – barely known friends – privacy issues?

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Blue moon: preference-based auth

Better than regular PVQs?

... but no password recovery

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Our proposal: Mercury

  • 1. Key idea

use end-to-end encryption for safe password retrieval

  • 2. Mechanism

user generates a key pair for password recovery shares the public key with a site during account setup the site sends encrypted password during recovery

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Mercury: components

  • 1. User PC (i.e., the primary login machine)
  • 2. Remote server
  • 3. Personal mobile device (PMD) – for portability
  • 4. Mercury software on: PC + PMD + Server
  • 5. Local communication channel: PC ↔ PMD
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Mercury: design features and usage

  • 1. Key design features

– use familiar technologies: smart-phones, QR codes – personal-level public keys, but no PKIs

  • 2. Examples: online accounts, desktop password recovery
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Mercury: steps

  • 1. Key generation and backup
  • 2. Key sharing
  • 3. Password recovery
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Key generation: personal objects

see also: Object-based password (HotSec’08)

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Key generation: random seed

  • 1. Same seed ⇒ same keys
  • 2. Save offline: print the QR coded seed
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Key sharing with remote parties

  • 1. Users can upload the public key from the primary PC

unique key per site, or

  • ne key for all sites
  • 2. Keys can be sent directly from the PMD
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Password recovery steps

User (U) Server (S) IDU, “forgot my password”

  • Retrieves P, pubU
  • m = encode({P}EpubU )

U transfers m to PMD, retrieves P = {decode(m)}DprivU

What if: the server does not store cleartext password?

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Server-side password storage

  • 1. Original password (plaintext or encrypted)
  • 2. Hashed password

store public-key encrypted password use reset password

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PC-to-device channel examples

  • 1. QR code: requires camera
  • 2. Audio: universal availability
  • 3. Direct email access from device
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Features, advantages

  • 1. Secure recovery: allows users to keep the same password
  • 2. No third parties: user↔password↔server
  • 3. Password update remains the same (for the primary mode of Mercury)
  • 4. Key restoration after device update: usability?
  • 5. Cheap two-factor auth (sort of)
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Limitations

  • 1. Require: server-side assistance +

personal device (optional)

  • 2. Device issues: compromised, lost, stolen
  • 3. User level key management

leaked keys, key-gen objects

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Mercury Android app and test website

(a) startup (b) web-based recovery (c) decrypted passwd

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Open issues

  • 1. How to bring service providers on-board?

trusted third parties – Google/Firefox Sync?

  • 2. What more can we do with user-level public keys?

pk-based auth? Android app and test site:

http://www.ccsl.carleton.ca/software/mercury/