H.-W. Sinn Th The E e European pean Balanc ance-of of-Paymen - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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H.-W. Sinn Th The E e European pean Balanc ance-of of-Paymen - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

H.-W. Sinn Th The E e European pean Balanc ance-of of-Paymen ments Cris isis is Hans-Werner Sinn May 2012 H.-W. Sinn 1. The bubble 2. The balance-of-payments crisis 3. The loss of competitiveness 4. The cost of the rescue operations


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H.-W. Sinn

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Th The E e European pean Balanc ance-of

  • f-Paymen

ments Cris isis is

Hans-Werner Sinn May 2012

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  • 4. The cost of the rescue operations
  • 1. The bubble
  • 2. The balance-of-payments

crisis

  • 5. Two options for Europe
  • 3. The loss of competitiveness
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  • 1. The bubble
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

% Italy Greece Ireland Spain Portugal France Germany Introduction of virtual euro Introduction of euro cash Irrevocably fixed conversion rates Belgium

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream.

5 10 15 20 25 30 40 35 EU Summit in Madrid

Net yields for 10-year government bonds

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1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

% Italy Greece Ireland Spain Portugal France Germany Introduction of virtual euro Introduction of euro cash Irrevocably fixed conversion rates Belgium

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream.

5 10 15 20 25 30 40 35 Conference of EU governments in Madrid

Net yields for 10-year government bonds

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2. The loss of competitiveness

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20 40 60 80 100

108

Slovenia

82

Slovakia

67

Greece

56

Spain

53

Ireland

51

Cyprus

47

Portugal

44

Luxembourg

40

Italy

37

Netherlands

26

Eurozone

25

Belgium

25

France

22

Finland

17

Austria

9

Germany

Price development 1995-2008

%

Source: Eurostat, calculations by the Ifo Institute.

March 2012

Trade-weighted appreciation vis-à-vis other euro countries: GIIPS: + 30% Germany:

  • 22%
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Necessary real write-down in the Eurozone (Goldman Sachs)

Portugal 35% Greece 30% Spain 20% France 20% Italy 10% to 15% Ireland 0% to 5%

Source: Goldman Sachs.

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Index Q3

  • 2008=100

France

Source: European Commission.

Greece Ireland Portugal Spain Italy

88 92 96 100 104 108

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Real exchange rate

(GDP deflator relative to rest of Eurozone)

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  • 3. The

balance-of-payments crisis

(Sinn & Wollmershäuser, CESifo WP 3500, NBER WP 17626, 2011)

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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Bundesbank

(left-hand scale)

GIPS

(right-hand scale)

  • 700
  • 500
  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100

  • 600
  • 100

100 200 300 400 500 700 600 April 2012 644 bn

Target balances: German claim and GIPS debt

Billion euros Billion euros

  • Feb. 2012
  • 671 bn

Netherlands

(left-hand scale) March 2012 157 bn

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547

146 100 45 0

  • 4 -

10 - 10 - 35 - 51 - 63 - 85 - 96 - 106

  • 194
  • 211
  • 300

300 600

(End of February 2012)

Billion euros

Target balances in the Eurozone

Source: IMF, IFS; Deutsche Bundesbank; De Nederlandsche Bank; Banco de España; Banca d‘Italia.

GIIPS: -671

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Credit and goods Balance-of-payments imbalances

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Credit flow stops Balance-of-payments imbalances

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Capital flight Balance-of-payments imbalances

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Balance-of-payments imbalances Capital flight

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Balance-of-payments imbalances Capital flight

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Reprinting the money Balance-of-payments imbalances

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What happened to the money flowing into the core?

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Why was it so easy to reprint the money?

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ECB collateral requirements

Date

Standard Until 24 October 2008 A- From 25 Oktober 2008 BBB- 3 May 2010 – 7 July 2011 Rating requirement waved for government bonds of Greece, Irleland and Portugal ELA credit Non-traded ABS created by commercial banks Company credit, national liability

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Germany and the Netherlands received for their current account surpluses in 2008-2012 only Target claims.

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Accumulated current account surplus

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Target claim and current account surplus

% of GDP

  • 10
  • 5

5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Target claims Germany

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Accumulated current account surplus

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Target claim and current account surplus

% of GDP

  • 10
  • 5

5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Target claims Germany Netherlands

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4. The cost of the rescue

  • perations
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Target liabilities** (GIPS and Italy) ECB purchases

  • f government bonds*
  • 1. rescue plan Greece (EU)
  • 1. rescue plan Greece (IMF)

Portugal (IMF, EFSM, EFSF) Ireland (IMF, EFSM, EFSF)

1269

Until now awarded Potential with preliminary ESM

* Data update: 17.5.2012 ** Data End of February 2012

The European bail-out funds (billion euros)

German exposure****

386

(without ECB)

883

671 212 77 63 120 78 30 18

  • 2. rescue plan Greece (EU)
  • 2. rescue plan Greece (IMF)

IMF EFSM ESM guarantees

2153

1270

(without ECB)

883

671 212 53*** 620 188 250 49

Capital contribution promised by EFSF

80 30

656

286 57 15*** 10 80 15 168 2 22

*** Credits disbursed by the end of 2011, unused resources to be released by the EFSF.

**** if GIPS countries and Italy default

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* Data update: 17.5.2012 ** Data End of February 2012

The European bail-out funds (billion euros)

*** Credits disbursed by the end of 2011, unused resources to be released by the EFSF.

**** if GIPS countries and Italy default

German exposure**** 656

286 57 15*** 10 80 15 168 2 22

Netherland´s exposure**** 141

60 12 3*** 2 17 5 35

1

5

in % of GDP (2011) 26 23

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  • Fiscal rescue operation circumventing parliaments

(Europe is no nation)

  • High risks for the core central banks
  • Eurobonds follow with necessity
  • Uniform interest despite differences in credit risk

imply interest subsidies

  • Allocation of capital through a central planning agency

rather than the capital market

Why is the Target credit a problem?

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Really rescue?

  • 1. Wrong asset prices are supported

artificially, capital stays away.

  • 3. Wrong goods prices and wages are

supported artificially: Current account deficits are maintained.

  • 2. ECB chases away the interbank

credit.

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  • 5. Two options for

Europe

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Two options for Europe

  • 1. Eurobonds and Target credit like

today, political debt constraints

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Two options for Europe

  • 1. Eurobonds and Target credit like

today, political debt constraints

  • 2. Liability, interest spreads, and

settlement of Target balances with marketable assets

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2 4 6 8 10 12

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

USA

0.1% April 2012 21 bn dollars

% of GDP (of the previous year)

Target and ISA balances

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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Eurozone

April 2012 947 bn euros

USA

0.1% April 2012 21 bn dollars

2 4 6 8 10 12

10.1%

% of GDP (of the previous year)

Target and ISA balances

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A crisis procedure: insurance with deductibles

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I II III

Liquidity crisis

  • Tempory help (two years)

Impending insolvency

  • Piecemeal approach maturity by maturity
  • Other maturities cannot be called due (CAC)
  • Haircut up to 50%
  • Replacement bonds, secured up to 80%
  • Upper bound for guarantees and liquidity help:

30% of GDP Full insolvency Exit from the Eurozone (my proposal)

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  • 6. Conclusions
  • US model is better, because it has harder budget

constraints.

  • ECB causes capital flight and maintains

current-account imbalances.

  • Balance-of-payment crisis caused by

loss of competitiveness

  • The eurozone needs an internal realignment.
  • Target: 947 billion euro bailout program not

sanctioned by any parliaments

  • EEAG bankruptcy procedure for help and orderly default
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