Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies Omer Le Lev, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

heuristic voting as ordinal dominance strategies
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Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies Omer Le Lev, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies Omer Le Lev, Reshef Meir, Sve vetlana Obraztsova ova, Maria Poluka karov AAAI 2019 Honolulu, Hawaii Voting A set of voters V A set of options (candidates) C A voting function f to


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Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies

Omer Le Lev, Reshef Meir, Sve vetlana Obraztsova

  • va, Maria Poluka

karov AAAI 2019 Honolulu, Hawaii

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Voting

A set of voters – V A set of options (candidates) – C A voting function f to take in voters preferences, and

  • utput an outcome
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Voting manipulation Gibbard–Satterthwaite

Other than in a dictatorship, when agents kn know how

  • t
  • thers ar

are v e vot

  • ting, they may

be better off voting differently than they believe.

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Voting manipulation Uncertainty?

What do you do when you do not know what all others are voting for?

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Voting manipulation Uncertainty?

What do you do when you do not know what all others are voting for?

Not Not pr probabi

  • babili

lity!

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Heuristics Not probability!

A function that takes a certain state and

  • utputs what should the voter vote for:

An arbitrary candidate that isn’t the least favorite. Truth bias Lazy bias T-pragmatist Leader rule

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Previously… Local dominance

Meir, L., Rosenschein A Lo Local-Do Domi minan ance Th Theory ry of Voting Equilibri ria, EC 2014

A binary model – probable/improbable states, calculated by a metric from a base data point (e.g., poll). Among the probably states, choose a dominant strategy.

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A small(?) change

Multiple in informa rmatio ion sets ts, denoting which is more probable than another

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A small(?) change

A B

Multiple in informa rmatio ion sets ts, denoting which is more probable than another. Each has an equivalent pi pivot t gra graph ph.

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A small(?) change

A B A B C

Multiple in informa rmatio ion sets ts, denoting which is more probable than another. Each has an equivalent pi pivot t gra graph ph.

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A small(?) change

A B A B C A B C

Multiple in informa rmatio ion sets ts, denoting which is more probable than another. Each has an equivalent pi pivot t gra graph ph.

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A small(?) change

A B A B C A B C

Each level is nested in the subsequent ones

Multiple in informa rmatio ion sets ts, denoting which is more probable than another. Each has an equivalent pi pivot t gra graph ph.

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Ordinal domination

A B A B C A B C

Action a dominates action b if there is an information set where a dominates b.

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Different graphs for different heuristics

Arbitrarily voting for anyone that isn’t least favorite: A graph where all candidates are tied with each other.

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Different graphs for different heuristics

Local dominance: A graph where candidates of a certain distance from the winner are tied.

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Different graphs for different heuristics

Truth-bias / Lazy-bias: Level 1: as in local dominace. Level 2: Truthful vote connected to all nodes in level 1.

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Different graphs for different heuristics

Leader rule Level 1: top two candidates Level 2: ”star” connecting winner to all other candidates.

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Iterative voting & local dominance

Regular metric distances induce pivot graphs that are upward closed (if tied with a candidate, also tied with candidates with higher scores). When using candidate-wise rules, such as ℓ∞, the pivot graph is a clique at every level

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Iterative voting & local dominance

If voters’ model is a cliqued

  • ne, the will converge using
  • rdinal dominance when using

plurality or veto.

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Iterative voting & local dominance

If voters’ model is a cliqued

  • ne, the will converge using
  • rdinal dominance when using

plurality or ve veto.

Known from previous result, Meir, Pl Plurali lity y vo voting under unce certainty, AAAI 2015

Ne New

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Future directions

More matchings between heur heurist stics s and nd graphs hs Creation of no novel el heur heurist stics s using graphs Co Convergence results using graph topology Gr Graph ph to topology meaning? More unc uncer ertaint nty rep epresent esentations ns using graphs

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Thanks for listening!