improvement of productivity of TWR process Jan Alexander Langlo, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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improvement of productivity of TWR process Jan Alexander Langlo, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Usefulness of FMECA for improvement of productivity of TWR process Jan Alexander Langlo, Aslak Wegner Eide, Amela Karahasanovi , Lisbeth Hansson, Hans Erik Swendgaard, Bjrn Andersen Theodor Zeh , Stephan Kind Karl-Herbert Rokitansky, Thomas


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SLIDE 1

Usefulness of FMECA for improvement of productivity of TWR process

Jan Alexander Langlo, Aslak Wegner Eide, Amela Karahasanović, Lisbeth Hansson, Hans Erik Swendgaard, Bjørn Andersen Theodor Zeh, Stephan Kind Karl-Herbert Rokitansky, Thomas Gräupl

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SLIDE 2

The Hypothesis

  • Applying processes from mass production improves

productivity and safety in ATM Systems.

  • Assumptions
  • An ATM Control Room is a sociotechnical system
  • An ATM Control Room is producing “something”
  • Main Questions
  • Can ATM be seen as production process?
  • Can the production be divided into value adding production steps?
  • Which process tools fit best?
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SLIDE 3

ZeFMaP - Safety Critical Mass Production

„Production Process“ (Value Adding)

Production Step 1 Production Step 2 Production Step 3 Domain Know How: Workflow Analyses Business Blue Printing Usability Engineering: Optimized Man/Machine Symbioses HF Safety: Decision Points -> all possible decisions: xFMEA Analyses HF Productivity: x6sigma Optimisation Loop „KVP“

Improvement

Production Step n

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SLIDE 4

FMECA & FTA

  • Failure Mode and Effects and Criticality Analyses

Simplified: (Product)FMECA shall detect and analyse failures of systems through analyses of possible malfunctioning of one ore more

  • f its parts (Fault Tree Analyses). Every possible combination of

malfunctioning parts are to be analysed.

We looked for something like:

  • Decision Quality and System-wide Effect Analyses

would be the analogue method to gain system optimised decisions for every possible situation.

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SLIDE 5

System-wide Decision Analyses

HF Safety: Decision Points -> all possible decisions: xFMEA Analyses

Deterministic points for a decision Decision Variables

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SLIDE 6

Setup

  • Simulated Environment: Hamburg

Airport (EDDH)

  • 5 Roles: Clearance Delivery, Ground,

Apron 1, Apron 2, Tower

  • Two days; training and

measured runs (37 flights in 37,5 minutes)

  • Defined Workflows &

Separation Rules

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SLIDE 7

Tools

  • FREQUENTIS:

Electronic Flight Strips

  • Clearances: CPDLC on

flight strips

  • 4D Aerospace: Radar &

Auxiliary Display

  • Communication: Verbal
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SLIDE 8
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SLIDE 9

The goals of the first experiment

Evaluating the experimental design, tools and measurements -> limited scenario Collecting the data for FMECA analysis

  • Is FMECA

useful?

  • What is the

quality of the decisions?

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SLIDE 10

The data we collected

  • Log files, screen captures, observations, video,

interviews, background and post-run questionnaires

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SLIDE 11

Preparing the data

  • Synchronizing data sources
  • Coding handovers
  • Semi-automatic adaptations
  • Visual representations
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SLIDE 12

FMECA analysis

  • System – effect of the five controllers' decisions

(37,5 minutes, 27 departures, 10 arrivals)

  • Item – each of the role
  • Failure modes – list of possible non-optimal

decisions for each position (expert walkthrough)

CDR/APRON

  • Delay in strip take over
  • Delay in push back clearance
  • Rejected push back clearance (CTOC not valid)
  • ….
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SLIDE 13
  • Basic failure rate – number of decisions (with failure
  • r success) per total number of decisions for each

role

  • Severity – expert judgement for our KPIs (efficiency,

flexibility, predictability, safety)

  • Crisis: 0
  • Bad: 0.3
  • Medium: 0.6
  • Good :1
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SLIDE 14

Results

  • No arrivals that can be improved
  • Non-optimum decisions for departures were related

to 'Departure clearance to invalid CTOT'

  • Failure ratio - 0.23
  • CDC criticality number – 0.23 (failure mode ratio 1)
  • Severity codes for predictability averaged to 0.49
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SLIDE 15

Severity/predictability graph

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SLIDE 16

Validity

  • Limited scenario – too easy for the controllers
  • More challenging scenario in the second experiment
  • Relatively small number of optimal decisions for

closer investigation (225 optimal decisions; 19 non-

  • ptimal)
  • Collect all the decisions over a longer period and under different

conditions

  • Grading and scales – expert judgement
  • Need validation
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SLIDE 17

Conclusions and future work

  • Experiment 1 showed that the overall ZeFMaP process is

probably useful.

  • Particularly the process analyses (step 1) worked well.
  • Simplifications through CPDLC could have affected the

result.

  • FMECA could be useful on larger data sets and with more

challenging scenarios (Experiment 2) but probably not in real-time settings

  • Next level of productivity improvement can be expected

through real-time tools supporting system optimised decision

  • Follow up projects concentrating on this step could be

useful.

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SLIDE 18

Thank you for your attention! Questions? Suggestions?

Contacts: Amela@sintef.no Theodor.Zeh@frequentis.com