Internet Caf Internet Cafs in in Florida Florida Presented by: - - PDF document

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Internet Caf Internet Cafs in in Florida Florida Presented by: - - PDF document

10/4/2011 Internet Caf Internet Cafs in in Florida Florida Presented by: David G. Shields Assistant County Attorney Seminole County Attorneys Office 1101 East First St. Sanford, FL 32771 (407) 665-7254


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SLIDE 1

10/4/2011 1

  • Internet Café

Internet Cafés in in Florida Florida

Presented by: David G. Shields Assistant County Attorney Seminole County Attorney’s Office

1101 East First St. Sanford, FL 32771 (407) 665-7254 dshields@seminolecountyfl.gov

  • Internet Cafés

Internet Cafés

Part I Part I

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SLIDE 2

10/4/2011 2

What Are Internet Cafés? What Are Internet Cafés?

Facilities Facilities which which

  • stensibly
  • stensibly
  • ffer
  • ffer

public public access access to to the the Internet, Internet, or

  • r in

in some some cases cases telephone telephone access access cards, cards, using using claimed claimed “sweepstakes” “sweepstakes” to to promote promote customer customer use use of

  • f

the the facility facility. The The economic economic reality reality appears appears to to be be that that the the claimed claimed “sweepstakes” “sweepstakes” are are the the real real business, business, not not the the Internet Internet

  • r
  • r telephone

telephone access access. .

  • Problems with Internet Cafés

Problems with Internet Cafés

They They generally generally operate

  • perate exclusively

exclusively in in cash cash and and at at all all hours hours of

  • f the

the night, night, making making them them prime prime targets targets for for armed armed robbery robbery. They They generally generally operate

  • perate 24

24/7, making making them them nuisances, nuisances, particularly particularly where where located located next next to to residential residential neighborhoods, neighborhoods, and and also also to to adjacent adjacent businesses businesses. .

  • Problems with Internet Cafés

Problems with Internet Cafés

They They have have the the same same secondary secondary effects effects as as conventional conventional gambling, gambling, regardless regardless

  • f
  • f

whether whether their their activities activities technically technically constitute constitute gambling gambling under under Florida Florida law law. They They are are not not regulated regulated by by the the Florida Florida Division Division of

  • f Pari

Pari-Mutuel Mutuel Wagering Wagering.

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SLIDE 3

10/4/2011 3

Problems with Internet Cafés Problems with Internet Cafés

They They generally generally resist resist providing providing detailed detailed information information to to evaluate evaluate their their activities activities. . At At best, best, they they operate

  • perate in

in a legal legal grey grey area area and and more more than than likely likely they they violate violate existing existing Florida Florida law law.

  • Problems with Internet Cafés

Problems with Internet Cafés

Instead Instead of

  • f watching

watching out

  • ut for

for compulsive compulsive gamblers, gamblers, at at least least some some of

  • f them

them have have a practice practice of

  • f having

having their their customers customers sign sign a statement statement acknowledging acknowledging they they are are not not gambling gambling.

  • Seminole County Ordinance

Seminole County Ordinance 2011 2011-1

Part II Part II

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SLIDE 4

10/4/2011 4

Seminole County Ordinance Seminole County Ordinance

On On January January 11 11, 2011 2011, Seminole Seminole County County adopted adopted Ordinance Ordinance 2011 2011-1, banning banning “simulated “simulated gambling gambling devices devices. .” The The Ordinance Ordinance definition definition of

  • f

“simulated “simulated gambling gambling device” device” is is extended extended and and detailed detailed in in order

  • rder to

to target target precisely precisely the the devices devices used used in in the the prohibited prohibited activity activity.

  • Exemptions from the

Exemptions from the Ordinance Ordinance

Devices Devices for for personal, personal, recreational recreational and and non non-commercial commercial use use. Devices Devices or

  • r activity

activity permitted permitted by by the the Florida Florida Statutes Statutes. . Florida Florida Statutes Statutes control control

  • ver
  • ver

the the Ordinance Ordinance where where there there is is conflict conflict.

  • The Federal Litigation

The Federal Litigation

Part III Part III

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SLIDE 5

10/4/2011 5

The Federal Litigation The Federal Litigation

On On February February 1, 2011 2011, a federal federal lawsuit lawsuit was was filed filed against against Seminole Seminole County County seeking seeking to to enjoin enjoin enforcement enforcement

  • f
  • f

the the Ordinance Ordinance. The The plaintiffs plaintiffs were were able able to to

  • btain
  • btain

a temporary temporary restraining restraining order

  • rder

when when they they filed filed the the lawsuit lawsuit.

  • The Federal Litigation

The Federal Litigation

The The plaintiffs’ plaintiffs’ principal principal theory theory seems seems to to be be that that banning banning simulated simulated gambling gambling devices devices violates violates the the First First Amendment Amendment right right of

  • f free

free speech speech and and the the Ordinance Ordinance is is overbroad

  • verbroad.
  • The Federal Litigation

The Federal Litigation

On On May May 6, 2011 2011, the the Federal Federal District District Court Court entered entered an an Order Order denying denying the the plaintiffs’ plaintiffs’ motion motion for for a preliminary preliminary injunction injunction.

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SLIDE 6

10/4/2011 6

The Court’s May 6, 2011 Order The Court’s May 6, 2011 Order

“The “The Temporary Temporary Restraining Restraining Order Order issued issued on

  • n

February February 1 1, 2011 2011 concluded concluded that that at at least least some some video video games games constitute constitute protected protected speech speech and and that that Plaintiffs Plaintiffs therefore therefore had had made made a showing showing that that they they were were entitled entitled to to a temporary temporary restraining restraining

  • rder
  • rder.
  • The Court’s May 6, 2011 Order

The Court’s May 6, 2011 Order

“Although

Although the the Order Order correctly correctly determined determined that that video video games games can can constitute constitute protected protected speech, speech, a thorough thorough examination examination of

  • f the

the parties’ parties’ arguments arguments and and of

  • f the

the Ordinance Ordinance yields yields the the conclusion conclusion that that the the Ordinance Ordinance does does not not prohibit prohibit that that protected protected speech speech. . Instead, Instead, the the Ordinance Ordinance prohibits prohibits only

  • nly conduct

conduct. .” May May 6 6, , 2011 2011 Order Order at at 6 6.

  • The Federal Litigation

The Federal Litigation

On On May May 12 12, 2011 2011, the the plaintiffs plaintiffs filed filed an an interlocutory interlocutory appeal appeal with with the the Eleventh Eleventh Circuit Circuit Court Court of

  • f Appeals

Appeals. . The The plaintiffs plaintiffs also also filed filed a motion motion to to stay stay proceedings proceedings below below pending pending appeal appeal and and to to reimpose reimpose the the temporary temporary restraining restraining order

  • rder

against against the the County County pending pending appeal appeal.

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SLIDE 7

10/4/2011 7

The Federal Litigation The Federal Litigation

On On September September 8, 2011 2011, both both

  • f
  • f

the the plaintiffs’ plaintiffs’ motions motions were were denied denied. The The case case continues continues in in the the trial trial court court and and

  • n
  • n appeal

appeal.

  • Are

Are Internet Internet Cafés Cafés Already Already Illegal Illegal in in Florida? Florida?

Part IV Part IV

  • The

The Florida Florida Constitution Constitution Prohibits Prohibits Lotteries Lotteries Subject Subject to to Only Only a Few Few Exceptions Exceptions

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SLIDE 8

10/4/2011 8 Article X, Section 7 of the 1968 Article X, Section 7 of the 1968 Florida Constitution provides: Florida Constitution provides:

Lotteries Lotteries - Lotteries, other than the Lotteries, other than the types of pari types of pari-mutuel pools authorized mutuel pools authorized by law as of the effective date of this by law as of the effective date of this constitution, are hereby prohibited in constitution, are hereby prohibited in this state. this state.

  • The Exceptions:

The Exceptions:

Pari Pari-mutuel mutuel pools pools that that existed existed in in 1968 1968: horse horse racing, racing, dog dog racing, racing, jai jai- alai, alai, and and bingo bingo. The The state state lottery lottery under under Article Article X, X, Section Section 15 15 of

  • f the

the Florida Florida Constitution Constitution.

  • The Exceptions (Cont’)

The Exceptions (Cont’)

Slot Slot machines machines at at pari pari-mutuel mutuel facilities facilities

  • nly
  • nly

in in Miami Miami-Dade Dade and and Broward Broward County County under under Article Article X, X, Section Section 23 23 of

  • f

the the Florida Florida Constitution Constitution.

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SLIDE 9

10/4/2011 9

No Exception No Exception for Internet for Internet Cafés Cafés

There There are are no no constitutional constitutional exceptions exceptions for for electronic electronic sweepstakes sweepstakes

  • r
  • r

the the activities activities that that generally generally occur

  • ccur in

in Internet Internet cafés, cafés, to to the the extent extent these these activities activities constitute constitute lotteries lotteries. .

  • Section

Section 849 849.09 09(1), ), Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2011 2011), ), also also prohibits prohibits lotteries lotteries.

Elements of a Elements of a Lottery Lottery

By By case case law law in in Florida Florida and and generally generally the the other

  • ther

states, states, a lottery lottery consists consists of

  • f three

three elements elements:

  • Prize

Prize

  • Chance

Chance

  • Consideration

Consideration Little Little River River Theatre Theatre Corp

  • Corp. v. State

State ex ex rel rel Hodge, Hodge, 185 185 So

  • So. 855

855, 868 868 (Fla (Fla. 1939 1939) ).

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SLIDE 10

10/4/2011 10

To avoid having a lottery, one of the elements must be eliminated.

  • Usually consideration is the

targeted element.

Elements of a Lottery Elements of a Lottery

What Is Meant by Consideration? What Is Meant by Consideration?

  • Consideration

Consideration is is a common common law law contract contract concept concept generally generally meaning meaning there there has has been been an an exchange exchange of

  • f value

value between between two two parties parties as as

  • pposed
  • pposed to

to a free free gift gift from from one

  • ne party

party to to the the

  • ther
  • ther.

.

  • While

While the the states states are are generally generally consistent consistent on

  • n the

the naming naming of

  • f the

the three three elements elements of

  • f a

a lottery, lottery, they they have have deviated deviated

  • n
  • n

what what is is meant meant by by the the consideration consideration element

  • element. Florida’s

Florida’s approach approach is is conservative conservative.

  • What Is Meant by Consideration?

What Is Meant by Consideration?

In In Florida, Florida, consideration consideration that that is is necessary necessary to to establish establish a simple simple contract contract is is sufficient sufficient to to constitute constitute a lottery

  • lottery. Blackburn

Blackburn v. Ippolito Ippolito, 156 156 So So.2d 550 550 (Fla (Fla. 2d DCA DCA 1963 1963) ). Some Some of

  • f the

the other

  • ther states

states have have become become more more relaxed relaxed on

  • n the

the consideration consideration element element in in recent recent years, years, but but as as discussed discussed below, below, this this approach approach has has not not been been adopted adopted by by any any Florida Florida court court.

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SLIDE 11

10/4/2011 11

Florida Florida Statutes Statutes Concerning Concerning Game Game Promotions Promotions and and Charitable Charitable Drawings Drawings

Section Section 849 849.094 094, Florida Florida Statutes Statutes ( (2011 2011), ), concerning concerning game game promotions promotions for for commercial commercial products products or

  • r services,

services, Section Section 849 849.0935 0935, Florida Florida Statutes Statutes ( (2011 2011), ), concerning concerning drawings drawings by by charitable charitable

  • rganizations
  • rganizations.
  • These two statutes have technical

requirements with which the Internet cafés must comply if they are to claim legitimacy under these statutes.

  • Game Promotion Requirements

Game Promotion Requirements

For For a game game promotion promotion with with total total prizes prizes over

  • ver

$5,000 000, the the operator

  • perator is

is required required to to file file the the rules rules and and regulations regulations for for the the game game and and a list list

  • f
  • f all

all prize prize and and prizes prizes categories categories with with the the Florida Florida Department Department

  • f
  • f

Agriculture Agriculture and and Consumer Consumer Services Services at at least least 7 days days before before each each game game begins

  • begins. §849

849.094 094( (3), ), Fla

  • Fla. Stat

Stat. (2011 2011).

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SLIDE 12

10/4/2011 12

Game Promotion Requirements Game Promotion Requirements

For For a game game promotion promotion with with total total prizes prizes over

  • ver

$5,000 000, the the operator

  • perator is

is required required to to set set up up a a trust trust fund fund or

  • r obtain
  • btain a surety

surety bond bond to to cover cover the the amount amount of

  • f prizes

prizes and and provide provide evidence evidence of

  • f this

this to to the the Florida Florida Department Department of

  • f Agriculture

Agriculture and and Consumer Consumer Services

  • Services. § 849

849.094 094( (4), ), Fla

  • Fla. Stat

Stat. (2011 2011).

  • Game Promotion Requirements

Game Promotion Requirements

For For a game game promotion promotion with with total total prizes prizes over

  • ver

$5,000 000, the the operator

  • perator is

is required required to to provide provide the the Florida Florida Department Department of

  • f Agriculture

Agriculture and and Consumer Consumer Services Services with with a certified certified list list of

  • f

winners winners or

  • r a certified

certified copy copy of

  • f a publication

publication of

  • f

the the winners

  • winners. §849

849.094 094(5), ), Fla

  • Fla. Stat
  • Stat. (

(2011 2011).

  • Game Promotions

Game Promotions

The The Florida Florida Department Department

  • f
  • f

Agriculture Agriculture and and Consumer Consumer Services Services for for a time time took took the the position position that that Internet Internet cafés cafés could could avoid avoid the the $ $5,000 000 threshold threshold described described above above by by treating treating each each machine machine as as a a separate separate game game. Under Under this this theory, theory, one

  • ne facility

facility may may have have a hundred hundred machines machines and and give give away away hundreds hundreds of

  • f

thousands thousands of

  • f dollars

dollars but but limit limit the the prizes prizes per per machine machine to to $ $5 5,000 000.

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SLIDE 13

10/4/2011 13

Game Promotions Game Promotions

The The Department Department has has since since abandoned abandoned this this position, position, which which was was never never formalized formalized through through formal formal rulemaking rulemaking under under Chapter Chapter 120 120 of

  • f the

the Florida Florida Statutes Statutes anyway anyway.

  • Charitable

Charitable Drawing Requirements Drawing Requirements

As As to to charitable charitable drawings, drawings, an an organization

  • rganization is

is prohibited prohibited from from conducting conducting a drawing drawing in in which which the the winner winner is is predetermined predetermined by by means means

  • f
  • f

matching, matching, instant instant win win

  • r
  • r

preselected preselected sweepstakes

  • sweepstakes. § 849

849.0935 0935(4)(a), )(a), Fla

  • Fla. Stat

Stat. (2011 2011). Yet Yet this this seems seems to to be be exactly exactly how how the the Internet Internet café café games games operate

  • perate.
  • Under Both Statutes Consideration

Under Both Statutes Consideration Must Be Eliminated Must Be Eliminated

As As to to game game promotions, promotions, “It “It is is unlawful unlawful for for any any operator

  • perator . . . [t]o

[t]o require require an an entry entry fee, fee, payment, payment,

  • r
  • r

proof proof

  • f
  • f

purchase purchase as as a condition condition of

  • f entering

entering a game game promotion promotion.” § 849 849.094 094(2)(e), )(e), Fla

  • Fla. Stat
  • Stat. (2011

2011).

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SLIDE 14

10/4/2011 14 Under Both Statutes Consideration Under Both Statutes Consideration Must Be Eliminated Must Be Eliminated

As As to to charitable charitable drawings, drawings, “It “It is is unlawful unlawful for for any any

  • rganization
  • rganization which,

which, pursuant pursuant to to the the authority authority granted granted by by this this section, section, promotes, promotes, operates,

  • perates, or
  • r

conducts conducts a drawing drawing by by chance chance . . . . . . [t]o [t]o require require an an entry entry fee, fee, donation, donation, substantial substantial consideration, consideration, payment, payment, proof proof of

  • f purchase,

purchase, or

  • r contribution

contribution as as a condition condition of

  • f entering

entering the the drawing drawing or

  • r of
  • f being

being selected selected to to win win a a prize prize.” § §849 849. .0935 0935(4)(b), )(b), Fla Fla. Stat Stat. . (2011 2011).

  • Under Both Statutes Consideration

Under Both Statutes Consideration Must Be Eliminated Must Be Eliminated

To To reinforce reinforce the the prohibition prohibition of

  • f consideration

consideration to to enter enter charitable charitable drawings, drawings, Section Section 849 849.0935 0935(4)(b), )(b), Florida Florida Statutes Statutes ( (2011 2011), ), does does permit permit the the organization

  • rganization to

to suggest suggest a minimum minimum donation donation for for entering entering the the drawing

  • drawing. Such

Such a a provision provision would would be be unnecessary unnecessary if if the the

  • rganization
  • rganization

could could in in any any way way require require consideration consideration to to enter enter.

  • Avoiding

Avoiding a Lottery Lottery by by Eliminating Eliminating Consideration Consideration or

  • r Not

Not

Part V Part V

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SLIDE 15

10/4/2011 15

Over Over the the last last several several decades decades there there has has evolved, evolved, through through cases, cases, statutes statutes and and national national marketeering marketeering from from

  • utside
  • utside
  • f
  • f

Florida, Florida, a novel novel idea idea that that the the common common law law consideration consideration element element of

  • f a lottery

lottery can can be be eliminated eliminated by by permitting permitting limited limited free free entries entries. .

  • A.M.O.E.

A.M.O.E.

This This idea idea has has a name, name, Alternative Alternative Means Means of

  • f

Entry Entry or

  • r “A

“A.M.O.E.” It It has has also also been been called called “Flexible “Flexible Entry Entry.” The The concept concept of

  • f the

the A.M.O.E. is is that that the the common common law law lottery lottery element element of

  • f consideration

consideration can can be be eliminated eliminated from from a game game promotion promotion by by making making available available some some but but not not all all of

  • f the

the entries entries free free to to the the public public with with no no purchase purchase necessary necessary.

  • A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

The The persons persons receiving receiving the the A.M.O.E. are are the the ones

  • nes receiving

receiving the the free free entries entries. . All All the the other

  • ther entries

entries can can be be obtained

  • btained only
  • nly
  • n
  • n the

the condition condition of

  • f the

the customer customer making making a required required purchase purchase of

  • f a product

product or

  • r service

service.

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SLIDE 16

10/4/2011 16

A.M.O.E. (Cont’) A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

Until Until the the Internet Internet cafés cafés came came along, along, no no

  • ne
  • ne seems

seems to to have have ever ever tried tried to to apply apply the the A.M.O.E. concept concept to to a charitable charitable drawing, drawing, but but

  • nly
  • nly

to to game game promotions promotions

  • f
  • f

commercial commercial products products or

  • r services

services. .

  • A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

There There is is no no statute, statute, regulation regulation or

  • r case

case in in Florida Florida that that embraces embraces the the A.M.O.E. concept concept. As As mentioned mentioned previously, previously, in in Florida, Florida, consideration consideration necessary necessary to to establish establish a a simple simple contract contract is is sufficient sufficient to to constitute constitute a a lottery

  • lottery. Blackburn

Blackburn v. Ippolito Ippolito, 156 156 So So.2d 550 550 (Fla (Fla. 2d DCA DCA 1963 1963).

  • A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

Florida Florida would would have have to to change change its its existing existing law law significantly significantly to to go go along along with with the the approach approach taken taken by by other

  • ther states

states. . There There are are also also reasonable reasonable policy policy reasons reasons for for rejecting rejecting the the A.M.O.E. approach approach.

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SLIDE 17

10/4/2011 17

A.M.O.E. (Cont’) A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

A.M.O.E. is is illogical illogical on

  • n its

its face

  • face. One

One does does not not eliminate eliminate something something completely completely by by eliminating eliminating it it partially partially.

  • A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

The The term term consideration consideration in in the the common common law law definition definition

  • f
  • f

a lottery lottery seems seems intended intended to to prohibit prohibit anyone anyone and and everyone everyone from from paying paying consideration consideration to to enter enter a game game of

  • f chance

chance for for a prize, prize, not not to to ensure ensure some some people people can can play play such such a game game for for free free. Persons Persons who who receive receive a game game entry entry on

  • n the

the condition condition of

  • f a required

required purchase purchase are are gambling gambling even even if if those those who who are are playing playing for for free free are are not not.

  • A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

Further, Further, A.M.O.E. is is premised premised

  • n
  • n

the the customer’s customer’s consideration consideration in in the the form form

  • f
  • f

payment payment flowing flowing

  • nly
  • nly

to to the the product product

  • r
  • r

service service being being purchased purchased and and not not to to the the associated associated game game promotion promotion entry entry. This This premise premise runs runs contrary contrary to to Florida Florida common common law law of

  • f contracts

contracts.

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SLIDE 18

10/4/2011 18

A.M.O.E. (Cont’) A.M.O.E. (Cont’)

Under Under Blackburn Blackburn v. . Ippolito Ippolito, 156 156 So So.2d 550 550 (Fla (Fla. 2d DCA DCA 1963 1963), ), the the Florida Florida common common law law of

  • f contracts

contracts is is the the source source for for determining determining whether whether the the consideration consideration element element of

  • f a lottery

lottery is is present present.

  • Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co.

Jenkins v. City Ice & Fuel Co.

In In Jenkins Jenkins v. City City Ice Ice & Fuel Fuel Co Co., 160 160 So

  • So. 215

215, 218 218 (Fla (Fla. 1935 1935) citing citing First First Restatement Restatement of

  • f

Contracts Contracts §83 83, the the Florida Florida Supreme Supreme Court Court held held: “[W]here “[W]here a promise promise is is sufficient sufficient as as a consideration consideration if if it it alone alone were were bargained bargained for for and and given given in in exchange exchange for for a promise promise on

  • n the

the other

  • ther

side, side, it it is is sufficient sufficient as as a consideration consideration for for as as many many promises promises as as the the opposite

  • pposite party

party has has bargained bargained for for and and given given in in exchange exchange for for it it. .”

  • Jenkins

Jenkins Concerned the Concerned the Purchase of a Business Purchase of a Business

The The seller seller had had previously previously entered entered a requirements requirements contract contract with with a third third party party. The The business business purchaser purchaser refused refused to to honor honor the the requirements requirements contract contract and and the the third third party party sued sued the the business business purchaser purchaser.

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SLIDE 19

10/4/2011 19

Jenkins Jenkins (cont’) (cont’)

The The court court considered considered several several contract contract issues issues concluding, concluding, among among other

  • ther things,

things, that that honoring honoring the the requirements requirements contract contract was was one

  • ne of
  • f several

several promises promises that that the the business business purchaser purchaser made made as as part part of

  • f the

the purchase purchase of

  • f the

the business, business, all all of

  • f which

which were were supported supported by by consideration consideration based based on

  • n

the the First First Restatement Restatement of

  • f Contracts

Contracts §83 83.

  • Jenkins

Jenkins (cont’) (cont’)

The The business business purchaser purchaser was was thus thus not not able able to to disclaim disclaim the the requirements requirements contract contract by by splitting splitting it it from from the the consideration consideration supplied supplied by by its its other

  • ther promises

promises to to the the seller

  • seller. See

See Jenkins Jenkins v. . City City Ice Ice & Fuel Fuel Co Co., 160 160 So

  • So. at

at 217 217-220 220.

  • Calamari and Perillo

Calamari and Perillo

Calamari Calamari and and Perillo Perillo on

  • n Contracts

Contracts § 4.15 15 (5th th ed

  • ed. 2003

2003) says says essentially essentially the the same same thing thing as as Jenkins, Jenkins, demonstrating demonstrating this this is is “hornbook” “hornbook” law law:

slide-20
SLIDE 20

10/4/2011 20

Calamari and Perillo Calamari and Perillo

“Sometimes, “Sometimes, each each party party to to a bilateral bilateral contract contract makes makes a single single promise

  • promise. But

But often

  • ften the

the number number

  • f
  • f promises

promises made made by by the the two two promisors promisors need need not not be be equal

  • equal. For

For example, example, in in consideration consideration of

  • f

an an employee’s employee’s promised promised services, services, the the employer employer may may promise promise a salary, salary, a year year-end end bonus bonus and and other

  • ther fringe

fringe benefits benefits. . All All three three promises promises of

  • f the

the employer employer are are supported supported by by the the

  • ne
  • ne promise

promise of

  • f the

the employee employee. . The The rule rule is is that that

  • ne
  • ne consideration

consideration will will support support many many promises promises. .”

  • Consideration

Consideration Is Present Is Present

An An Internet Internet Cafe’s Cafe’s promises promises of

  • f a product

product

  • r
  • r service

service and and a game game entry entry in in a single single transaction transaction are are therefore therefore both both supported supported by by the the customer’s customer’s consideration consideration in in the the form form of

  • f a cash

cash payment payment.

  • Consideration Is Present

Consideration Is Present

Additionally, Additionally, the the language language

  • f
  • f

Sections Sections 849 849.094 094(2)(e) )(e) and and 849 849.0935 0935(4)(b), )(b), Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2011 2011), ), quoted quoted above, above, explicitly explicitly requires requires all all game game or

  • r drawing

drawing entries entries to to be be free free of

  • f any

any required required purchase purchase.

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SLIDE 21

10/4/2011 21

To Resolve To Resolve Any Doubt Any Doubt

Lastly, Lastly, Section Section 894 894.094 094, Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2011 2011), ), contains contains rules rules and and regulations regulations for for game game promotions promotions but but does does not not explicitly explicitly authorize authorize them

  • them. The

The statutory statutory authorization authorization for for conducting conducting a game game promotion promotion in in Florida Florida derives derives exclusively exclusively from from Section Section 849 849.09 09(1 1), ), Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2011 2011), ), which which provides provides in in part part:

  • To Resolve Any Doubt

To Resolve Any Doubt

  • It

It is is unlawful unlawful for for any any person person in in this this state state to to: (a) (a) Set Set up, up, promote, promote, or

  • r conduct

conduct any any lottery lottery for for money money or

  • r for

for anything anything of

  • f value

value; ; . . . . . . Provided, Provided, that that nothing nothing in in this this section section shall shall prohibit prohibit participation participation in in any any nationally nationally advertised advertised contest, contest, drawing, drawing, game game or

  • r puzzle

puzzle of

  • f skill

skill or

  • r

chance chance for for a prize prize or

  • r prizes

prizes unless unless it it can can be be construed construed as as a lottery lottery under under this this section section; . . . (emphasis (emphasis supplied) supplied).

  • To Resolve Any Doubt

To Resolve Any Doubt

The The language language

  • f
  • f

Section Section 849 849.09 09(1), ), Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2011 2011), ), means means that that any any uncertainty uncertainty about about whether whether a game game promotion promotion constitutes constitutes an an illegal illegal lottery lottery must must be be resolved resolved by by it it being being deemed deemed an an illegal illegal lottery lottery.

slide-22
SLIDE 22

10/4/2011 22

It Is a It Is a Lottery Lottery

Therefore, Therefore, even even if if a game game promoter promoter gives gives away away some some game game entries entries for for free, free, the the statutory statutory authorization authorization to to conduct conduct the the game game promotions promotions ends ends with with any any entry entry conditioned conditioned

  • n
  • n a payment

payment or

  • r required

required purchase purchase because because at at that that point point the the game game promotion promotion entry entry can can be be construed construed as as a lottery lottery entry entry under under Section Section 849 849.09 09(1), ), Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2011 2011) ).

  • The Florida Department of

The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Agriculture and Consumer Services

It It should should also also be be noted noted that that although although Section Section 849 849.094 094(8)(a), )(a), Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2000 2000) grants grants the the Florida Florida Department Department

  • f
  • f Agriculture

Agriculture and and Consumer Consumer Services Services rulemaking rulemaking authority authority regarding regarding the the operation

  • peration of
  • f game

game promotions, promotions, the the

  • nly
  • nly

rules rules that that the the Department Department has has promulgated promulgated to to date date concern concern advertisements advertisements and and electronic electronic filing filing of

  • f documents

documents with with the the Department Department.

  • The Florida Department of

The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Agriculture and Consumer Services

The The Department Department has has not not issued issued any any formal formal rules rules concerning concerning Internet Internet cafés, cafés, electronic electronic game game promotions promotions

  • r
  • r

the the practice practice

  • f
  • f

providing providing some some but but not not all all game game promotion promotion entries entries free free of

  • f any

any consideration consideration.

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SLIDE 23

10/4/2011 23 The Florida Department of The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Agriculture and Consumer Services

The The Department’s Department’s internal internal policies policies that that have have not not been been incorporated incorporated into into formal formal rules rules pursuant pursuant to to Chapter Chapter 120 120, Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2011 2011), ), are are not not binding binding on

  • n anyone

anyone outside

  • utside the

the Department Department. See See §§ §§120 120.54 54(1)(a) )(a) and and 120 120.52 52( (16 16), ), Fla Fla. Stat

  • Stat. (2011

2011).

  • The

The Miami Miami-Dade/Broward Dade/Broward County County Slot Slot Machine Machine Statute Statute

Part VI Part VI

  • Section 551.102(8), Florida Statutes

Section 551.102(8), Florida Statutes (2011)

(2011)

(8) “Slot “Slot machine” machine” means means any any mechanical mechanical

  • r
  • r

electrical electrical contrivance, contrivance, terminal terminal that that may may or

  • r may

may not not be be capable capable of

  • f downloading

downloading slot slot games games from from a central central server server system, system, machine, machine, or

  • r other
  • ther device

device that, that, upon upon insertion insertion of

  • f a coin,

coin, bill, bill, ticket, ticket, token, token, or

  • r similar

similar

  • bject
  • bject
  • r
  • r

upon upon payment payment

  • f
  • f

any any consideration consideration whatsoever, whatsoever, including including the the use use of

  • f any

any electronic electronic payment payment system system except except a credit credit card card or

  • r debit

debit card, card, is is available available to to play play or

  • r operate,
  • perate, the

the play play or

  • r operation
  • peration
  • f
  • f which,

which, whether whether by by reason reason of

  • f skill

skill or

  • r application

application of

  • f

the the element element of

  • f chance

chance or

  • r both,

both, . . . .

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SLIDE 24

10/4/2011 24 Section 551.102(8), Section 551.102(8), Florida Statutes (2011) Florida Statutes (2011) (Cont’)

(Cont’)

. . . . may may deliver deliver or

  • r entitle

entitle the the person person or

  • r persons

persons playing playing or

  • r operating
  • perating the

the contrivance, contrivance, terminal, terminal, machine, machine, or

  • r other
  • ther device

device to to receive receive cash, cash, billets, billets, tickets, tickets, tokens, tokens,

  • r
  • r

electronic electronic credits credits to to be be exchanged exchanged for for cash cash or

  • r to

to receive receive merchandise merchandise

  • r
  • r anything

anything of

  • f value

value whatsoever, whatsoever, whether whether the the payoff payoff is is made made automatically automatically from from the the machine machine

  • r
  • r manually

manually.

  • Section 551.102(8),

Section 551.102(8), Florida Statutes (2011) Florida Statutes (2011) (cont’)

(cont’)

The The term term includes includes associated associated equipment equipment necessary necessary to to conduct conduct the the operation

  • peration of
  • f the

the contrivance, contrivance, terminal, terminal, machine, machine,

  • r
  • r
  • ther
  • ther

device

  • device. Slot

Slot machines machines may may use use spinning spinning reels, reels, video video displays, displays, or

  • r both
  • both. A slot

slot machine machine is is not not a “coin “coin-operated

  • perated amusement

amusement machine” machine” as as defined defined in in s. 212 212.02 02(24 24) or

  • r an

an amusement amusement game game or

  • r machine

machine as as described described in in s. 849 849.161 161, and and slot slot machines machines are are not not subject subject to to the the tax tax imposed imposed by by s. 212 212.05 05(1)(h) )(h).

  • Section 551.102(8),

Section 551.102(8), Florida Statutes (2011) Florida Statutes (2011) (cont’) (cont’)

This definition would seem to cover the This definition would seem to cover the devices used in Internet Cafés devices used in Internet Cafés

slide-25
SLIDE 25

10/4/2011 25 Section 551.109(2), Section 551.109(2), Florida Statutes (2011) Florida Statutes (2011)

Section Section 551 551.109 109(2), ), Florida Florida Statutes Statutes (2011 2011), ), prohibits prohibits anyone anyone from from possessing possessing a a slot slot machine, machine, as as defined defined in in Section Section 551 551. .102 102(8), ), without without a license license from from the the State State of

  • f Florida

Florida. . Licenses Licenses for for these these devices devices are are generally generally not not available available for for devices devices located located outside

  • utside of
  • f pari

pari- mutuel mutuel facilities facilities in in Miami Miami-Dade Dade and and Broward Broward County County.

  • Section 551.109(2),

Section 551.109(2), Florida Statutes (2011) Florida Statutes (2011)

But But stay stay tuned tuned: Florida Florida Gaming Gaming v. . Dept Dept of

  • f Bus

Bus. . & Prof

  • Prof. Reg
  • Reg. Case

Case No

  • No. 1D: 10

10-6780 6780; ; 1D: 11 11- 130 130 concerns concerns whether whether 2009 2009 changes changes to to Chapter Chapter 551 551 authorizing authorizing slot slot machines machines at at pari pari- mutuel mutuel facilities facilities throughout throughout Florida Florida is is constitutional constitutional. Regardless Regardless of

  • f the

the outcome

  • utcome of
  • f Florida

Florida Gaming Gaming, Internet Internet Cafés Cafés are are not not pari pari-mutuel mutuel facilities facilities. .

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

ALLIED VETERANS OF THE WORLD, INC.: AFFILIATE 67, ALLIED VETERANS OF THE WORLD, INC.: AFFILIATE 74, Plaintiffs, and Case No. 6:11-cv-155-Orl-28DAB PHONE-SWEEPS, LLC, HASSAN SALEM MALIH d/b/a EMPIRE PHONESWEEP, JACK’S BUSINESS CENTERS, LLC, and DARRELL AGOSTINO, Intervenor-Plaintiffs,

  • vs-

SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendant. ______________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Ordinance 2011-1 (“the Ordinance”), which was passed by Defendant Seminole County, Florida (“the County”)

  • n January 11, 2011 and which bans “simulated gambling devices” in the County.

(Ordinance, Ex. A to Doc. 1, at 7). A temporary restraining order was entered on Feburary 1, 2011. (Doc. 8). Currently pending are Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Preliminary Case 6:11-cv-00155-JA-GJK Document 46 Filed 05/06/11 Page 1 of 20 PageID 505

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SLIDE 37

Injunction1 (Doc. 17) and Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 18).2 As discussed below, both motions must be denied.

  • I. Preliminary Injunction Standard

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that “(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000).

  • II. Background

Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs Empire PhoneSweep and Jack’s Business Centers (collectively “Operator-Plaintiffs”) operate internet centers in Seminole County, Florida.3 (Doc. 17 at 2; Intervenor Compl., Doc. 22, at 34). The internet centers contain common desktop computers, and Operator-Plaintiffs sell internet time to be used on those computers. (Compl. ¶ 15). When customers purchase internet time, they also receive a proportional number of entries into a sweepstakes. (Id. ¶ 22). The customers are then given plastic

1 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3) is denied as moot because it is

superseded by Plaintiffs’ amended motion.

2 The County has filed responses to Plaintiffs’ and Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ motions (Docs.

26 & 33), and the parties made oral arguments on the motions on Feburary 17, 2011.

3Intervenor-Plaintiff Darrell Agostino is the owner of Jack’s Business Centers, and

Intervenor-Plaintiff Phone-Sweeps, LLC develops software that is utilized in the sweepstakes games played at internet centers.

  • 2-

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SLIDE 38

account cards that contain a “magnetic strip with an electronically encoded, personal identification number (PIN).” (Id. ¶ 21). When a customer swipes the account card at a terminal, “the card electronically transmits the customer’s PIN to the computer” and the customer can then either access the internet or find out whether he won the sweepstakes. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). The customer has three options to find out whether he won the sweepstakes: he can ask the cashier; he can use the “quick reveal” option on the computer, which “simply displays by alphanumeric text the results of each entry without fanfare”; or he can he can play a video simulation of a casino game–for example a video slot machine. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29). Playing the game does not affect the outcome of the sweepstakes; it is merely an entertaining method of delivering the

  • results. (Id. ¶ 29). If the customer wins the sweepstakes, he is entitled to a prize.

In response to the “increasing proliferation” of such internet centers, (Ordinance at 1), the County enacted the Ordinance, which makes it illegal for “any person to design, develop, manage, supervise, maintain, provide, produce, possess or use one or multiple simulated gambling devices,” (id. at 7). The Ordinance defines a “simulated gambling device” as “any device that, upon connection with an object, is available to play or operate a computer simulation of any game, and which may deliver or entitle the person or persons playing or

  • perating the device to a payoff.” (Id. at 5). The Ordinance then goes on to define nearly

every word contained in the definition of “simulated gambling device.” The definitions are cumulative; every condition provided must be met for something to qualify as a “simulated gambling device.”

  • 3-

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SLIDE 39

The first part of the definition requires that a person “connect” an “object” to a “device.” A “device” is “any mechanical or electrical contrivance, computer, terminal, video

  • r other equipment that may or may not be capable of downloading games” and includes

“any associated equipment necessary to conduct the operation of the device.” (Id.). An “object” is “a coin, bill, ticket, token, card or similar object, obtained directly or indirectly through payment of consideration, or obtained as a bonus or supplement to another transaction involving the payment of consideration.” (Id.). The “connection” that must be made between the two can be an “insertion, swiping, passing in range, or any other technical means of physically or electromagnetically connecting.” (Id.). Once the connection is made, the device must make “a computer simulation”4 of a “game” available to “play or operate.” The definition of “game” under the ordinance includes “slot machines, poker, bingo, craps, keno, [or] any other type of game ordinarily played in a casino,” and “a game involving the display of the results of a raffle, sweepstakes, drawing, contest or other promotion, lotto, [or] sweepstakes” and “any other game associated with gambling or which could be associated with gambling.” (Id. at 6). Playing or operating the computer simulation of a game “includes the use of skill, the application of the element of chance, or both.” (Id. at 5). Finally, a “payoff” is defined as “cash, monetary or other credit, billets, tickets, tokens, or electronic credits to be exchanged for cash or to receive

4A “‘computer simulation’ includes simulations by means of a computer, computer

system, video display, video system or any other form of electronic video presentation.” (Ordinance at 5).

  • 4-

Case 6:11-cv-00155-JA-GJK Document 46 Filed 05/06/11 Page 4 of 20 PageID 508

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SLIDE 40

merchandise or anything of value whatsoever, whether made automatically from the machine

  • r manually.” (Id. at 6).

To illustrate, it is helpful to examine how Operator-Plaintiffs’ activities fit within the context of the Ordinance. Operator-Plaintiffs’ computers (devices) are, upon swiping (connecting) an account card (object), available to play (utilizing skill and/or chance) a computer simulation of casino games (for example, a slot machine), which may entitle the player to a payoff (for example, cash) for winning the sweepstakes.

  • III. Analysis

Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs claim that the Ordinance violates the United States Constitution in several ways and that they will suffer irreparable injury if the County is allowed to enforce the Ordinance. First and foremost, they claim that the Ordinance violates the First Amendment. Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs also argue that the Ordinance is void for vagueness, violates the dormant Commerce Clause, and imposes fines and penalties on a strict liability basis without the requisite showing of a “responsible relationship” in violation of the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 17 at 14; see generally Doc. 18). As discussed below, Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs have not shown that they have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, and therefore the motions for preliminary injunction will be denied.

  • A. First Amendment

Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs assert that the Ordinance violates the First Amendment as applied to them because it is a content-based restriction on speech and that it violates the First Amendment on its face because it is overbroad. However, the statute

  • 5-

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SLIDE 41

regulates conduct rather than speech, and therefore, Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on their First Amendment challenges. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on February 1, 2011 (Doc. 8) concluded that at least some video games constitute protected speech and that Plaintiffs therefore had made a showing that they were entitled to a temporary restraining order. Although the Order correctly determined that video games can constitute protected speech, a thorough examination of the parties’ arguments and of the Ordinance yields the conclusion that the Ordinance does not prohibit that protected speech. Instead, the Ordinance prohibits only conduct.

  • 1. As Applied to the Operator-Plaintiffs

Operator-Plaintiffs argue that along with the video games played at their establishments, their patrons’ access to the internet is protected speech and the Ordinance bans such speech. However, the Ordinance in no way prohibits access to the internet; it

  • nly regulates the simulated gambling devices. Furthermore, although the games played

at Operator-Plaintiffs’ establishments may constitute protected speech, the Ordinance only bans the games if all elements of the definition of “simulated gambling device” are present. As noted above, a device must entitle the player to the possibility of a payoff in order to constitute a “simulated gambling device.” None of the video games at issue is banned on its own–only the playing of such a game in conjunction with the possibility of a payoff is

  • banned. Therefore, Operator-Plaintiffs are free to provide the video games to their patrons

and their patrons are free to play them–and thus make and receive whatever protected

  • 6-

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message is communicated by the video game–so long as the games are not associated with the conduct of a payoff.5 Operator-Plaintiffs also argue that the Ordinance bans speech that is “associated with gambling.” This argument takes the Ordinance out of context. The “associated with gambling” language is part of the definition of “game.” A “game” as defined by the Ordinance includes games that are, or could be, associated with gambling. The Ordinance in no way bars all speech associated with gambling; it only bans games associated with gambling if those games also provide the possibility of a payoff.

  • 2. As applied to Phone-Sweeps LLC

Intervenor-Plaintiff Phone-Sweeps LLC (“Phone-Sweeps”) “creates, develops, and maintains the computer software utilized by [Empire PhoneSweep and Jack’s Business Centers].” (Doc. 18 at 2). Phone-Sweeps argues that the computer code used in its computer software is protected speech, which the Ordinance unconstitutionally bans. As an initial matter, it is unclear whether the computer code contained in Phone- Sweeps’s software is, indeed, protected speech. Although some courts have determined that computer code can constitute protected speech in certain circumstances, such code is not always protected. Instead, because computer code can communicate both to humans and to computers, the way in which the code is utilized is relevant. There are three general “ways in which a programmer might be said to communicate through code ”: (1) to the user

  • f the program, which is not necessarily protected; (2) to the computer, which is never

5 Operator-Plaintiffs also assert that they are engaged in “expressive” conduct, but

they do not provide any support for such an argument.

  • 7-

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protected; and (3) to other programmers, which is likely protected. Universal City Studios,

  • Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449 (2d Cir. 2001).

In Universal City Studios, the Second Circuit recognized that “[i]nstructions such as computer code, which are intended to be executable by a computer, will often convey information capable of comprehension and assessment by a human being.” Id. at 448. For example, “[a] programmer reading a program learns information about instructing a computer . . . [and] programmers communicating ideas to one another almost inevitably communicate in code, much as musicians use notes.” Id. In such cases, the code is protected speech. However, “where a human’s mental faculties do not intercede in executing the instructions,” there is no First Amendment protection. Id. at 448 n.20 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d Cir. 2000)). Nowhere does Phone-Sweeps assert that it uses its code to communicate with other programmers or even that the user of the software may interpret the code. It appears that Phone-Sweeps utilizes its code only to communicate with the computer. Moreover, even if Phone-Sweeps’s software were protected speech, the software–alone–does not constitute a simulated gambling device and therefore is not banned by the Ordinance.6 The software cannot display itself, and it cannot provide a payoff. If a person utilized the software in conjunction with all of the other elements of a simulated gambling device then that person would be liable under the Ordinance, but the software, in and of itself, cannot constitute a simulated gambling device. Accordingly, because the

6 Neither the Plaintiffs nor the Intervenor-Plaintiffs allege that they design the entire

simulated gambling device.

  • 8-

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software on its own is not a simulated gambling device, designing the software is not a violation of the Ordinance. Phone-Sweeps has not shown a substantial likelihood of success

  • n its as-applied First Amendment challenge.
  • 3. Overbreadth

Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs argue that even if the Ordinance is not unconstitutional as applied to them, it is facially unconstitutional because it is overbroad. Normally, “to challenge a statute facially, ‘the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’” Fla. Ass’n of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc.

  • v. Div. of Legislative Info. Servs. of the Fla. Office of Legislative Servs., 525 F.3d 1073, 1079

n.7 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,745 (1987)). However, “[t]he First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to the normal rules governing facial challenges.” Id. at 1079 (citing Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)). For a law to be declared invalid under the overbreadth doctrine, the law’s “application to protected speech [must] be ‘substantial,’ not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope

  • f the law’s plainly legitimate applications.” Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119-120 (quoting Broadrick
  • v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)). The Supreme Court has described the overbreadth

doctrine as “strong medicine” and has cautioned that it should be used “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. This is because an overbroad law is declared unconstitutional in its entirety even if it could be legitimately enforced in some situations “unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.” Id. Also, although the possibility that an overbroad law will chill constitutionally protected speech is an important

  • 9-

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consideration, “there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech, or especially to constitutionally unprotected conduct.” Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119 (italicized emphasis in

  • riginal, bold emphasis added). Accordingly, “there comes a point at which the chilling effect
  • f an overbroad law . . . cannot justify prohibiting all enforcement of that law–particularly a

law that reflects ‘legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’” Id. Plaintiffs have posited several different scenarios that allegedly demonstrate that application of the Ordinance punishes constitutionally protected speech. However, when each is examined, it is clear that the Ordinance would either not apply in the scenario or its application would be constitutional. First, Plaintiffs argue that promotions like “my coke rewards”7 and games like those played at Chuck E. Cheese8 would be prohibited by the Ordinance. Even assuming that these games would constitute simulated gambling devices,9 the Ordinance’s application to

7 To play my coke rewards, an individual purchases a qualifying beverage and obtains

the code that is printed somewhere on the packaging. My Coke Rewards, How It Works, http://www.mycokerewards.com/howItWorks.do?WT.ac=mnuHIW_PO (last visited May 5, 2011). The individual then creates an account on the website and enters his or her code to get points. Id. Those points can then be used to, among other things, enter sweepstakes

  • r instantly win. Id.

8 The games Plaintiffs refer to are those that require a player to purchase a token,

insert the token into the game, and receive tickets for playing. (Charles Lee Black Aff., Ex. I to Compl., ¶¶ 3-7). The tickets can then be redeemed for merchandise. (Id. ¶ 7).

9 It is unclear whether either of these would constitute a simulated gambling device.

The Court is not aware of any games–as defined by the Ordinance–available through my coke rewards. Additionally, the Chuck E. Cheese games may fall within the exception for

  • 10-

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these games–like its application to Operator-Plaintiffs’ games–only prohibits conduct. Coke and Chuck E. Cheese would still be free to communicate the same messages as long as there was no possibility of a payoff. Plaintiffs seemingly argue that because my coke rewards and Chuck E. Cheese are outside the conduct that the County stated it was intending to regulate, the Ordinance is overbroad. This, however, is obviously not the same kind of “overbreadth” that makes a law violative of the First Amendment. Next, Plaintiffs claim that the Ordinance would unconstitutionally punish people who play World of Warcraft (“WOW”) and “develop virtual characters for later sale or trade.” (Doc. 17 at 18). WOW is a “Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing game” where “players from around the world assume the roles of heroic fantasy characters and explore a virtual world full of mystery, magic, and endless adventure.” World of Warcraft, Beginner’s Guide, http://us.battle.net/wow/en/game/guide/ (last visited May 5, 2011). Plaintiffs argue that all elements of a simulated gambling device are present when someone plays WOW and then sells or trades the digital products accumulated while playing. However, it is likely that WOW would fall within the Ordinance’s exemption for “an individual’s personal, recreational, and non-commercial ownership, possession, play, operation or use of a device which could be construed to be a simulated gambling device.” (Ordinance at 7). Even if it did not fall within the exemption, WOW would not be prohibited by the

  • Ordinance. Although WOW does utilize a “device” because it is played on a computer,

Plaintiffs have not shown that the device has to be connected with an “object” in order to play devices expressly permitted by the Florida Statutes.

  • 11-

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WOW or that WOW itself falls within the definition of “game.” As previously noted, an “object” is “a coin, bill, ticket, token, card or similar object, obtained directly or indirectly through payment of consideration, or obtained as a bonus or supplement to another transaction involving the payment of consideration.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiffs apparently would like the Court to ignore the definition provided within the Ordinance and consider the direct entry of a credit card number into a computer in order to play WOW as satisfying the “object” requirement. This is clearly contrary to the plain language of the Ordinance. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs attempt to separate the consideration aspect from the rest

  • f the definition of “object” and argue that because individuals must pay to play WOW, the

“object” requirement is satisfied. The mere fact that an individual must pay to play a game is insufficient to deem the game a simulated gambling device. Rather, an individual must

  • btain a coin, bill, ticket, token, card or similar object through the payment of consideration,

and that coin, bill, ticket, token, card or similar object must then be inserted, swiped, passed in range, or otherwise physically or electromagnetically connected to the computer. Therefore, under the terms of the Ordinance the consideration must relate to obtaining the

  • bject–not to playing the game.

Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that WOW falls within the definition of “game” because it involves the elements of chance and skill. However, the elements of chance and skill are part of the definition of “play or operate,” not the definition of game. WOW does not fall within the definition of game because it clearly is not a “slot machine, poker, bingo, craps, keno, or any other type of game ordinarily played in a casino,” nor is it “a game involving the display

  • f the results of a raffle, sweepstakes, drawing, contest or other promotion, lotto, [or]
  • 12-

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sweepstakes.” A determination that WOW is a game that is “associated with gambling or which could be associated with gambling” would be an unreasonable reading of the Ordinance. As their last example, Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally

  • verbroad because it bans viewing the results of the lottery or other sweepstakes, or

communicating about the results of any “game” as defined by the Ordinance, over the

  • internet. Again, Plaintiffs fail to recognize that every element of the definition of “simulated

gambling device” must be present in order for an activity to be prohibited. Using a computer to view the results of a lottery or to communicate about the results of a “game” would not constitute using a simulated gambling device because the computer is not simulating any

  • game. Although the definition of “game” includes games that involve “the display of the

results” of the lottery, simply viewing the winning lottery numbers is not a game that displays the results; it is just the results. Similarly, discussing the results of a game does not constitute playing a game. Plaintiffs attempt to further confuse the issue by arguing that because the Ordinance regulates “legal” conduct, it is overbroad. All parties concede that the Ordinance regulates more than just gambling, and Plaintiffs assert that–but for this Ordinance–their conduct would be legal because it is not gambling.10 This assertion is entirely irrelevant. If legislative bodies were prohibited from regulating previously unregulated conduct, nearly every new law would

10 The County disputes this assertion but argues that even if it were true, the

Ordinance constitutionally regulates Plaintiffs’ and Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ conduct.

  • 13-

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be declared unconstitutional. Such an absurd result is clearly not contemplated by the

  • verbreadth doctrine.

Finally, Intervenor-Plaintiffs argue that this case is controlled by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). In Ashcroft, a statute banning “simulated” child pornography was declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that while “actual” child pornography was obscenity, and therefore unprotected speech, “simulated” child pornography was not obscenity and could not be prohibited merely because of its similarities to “actual” child pornography. Intervenor-Plaintiffs argue that Ashcroft applies here and that the County is not allowed to prohibit “simulated” gambling merely because it is allowed to regulate “actual” gambling. However, the use of the word “simulated” is where the similarities between Ashcroft and the instant case end. In Ashcroft, the simulated child pornography was not protected merely because it was “simulated”; it was protected because it constituted protected speech. As discussed above, the Ordinance here prohibits conduct–not speech.

  • B. Vagueness

Plaintiffs also challenge the Ordinance on vagueness grounds.11 They argue that the terms “simulated gambling device,” “game,” “use,” “game ordinally played in a casino,” and “any other game associated with gambling or which could be associated with gambling” are unconstitutionally vague. “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).

11 Intervenor-Plaintiffs make no separate vagueness argument, but they adopt

Plaintiffs’ arguments.

  • 14-

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“A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1999)). It is also a “well-established rule of constitutional law . . . that a party ‘to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations.’” United States v. Di Pietro, 615 F.3d 1369, 1371 (11th Cir. 2010). This rule “avoids an undesirable foray by federal courts into ‘every conceivable situation which might possibly arise in the application of complex and comprehensive legislation’ . . . [and] it ensures that federal courts make informed judgments by limiting their decisions to actual, not hypothetical, cases that carry with them facts and data on which a well-reasoned decision may be based.” Id. at 1372 (internal citations omitted). Under the vagueness doctrine, this means that “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982). This rule holds true even in the context of a First Amendment challenge. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2010) (“[E]ven to the extent a heightened vagueness standard applies, a plaintiff whose speech is clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim under the Due Process Clause

  • f the Fifth Amendment for lack of notice. And he certainly cannot do so based on the speech
  • f others.”).
  • 15-

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In sum, Plaintiffs cannot raise a successful vagueness claim because their conduct is clearly proscribed by the Ordinance. In fact, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that the statute is vague as applied to them. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the exceptions in the Ordinance–which they do not assert apply to them–are vague and that some of the definitions are vague on their face. (Doc. 17 at 20-21). Plaintiffs also attempt to merge their

  • verbreadth argument with their vagueness argument by stating that the definition of “game”

implicates a wide variety of protected speech. (Id. at 21). However, “a Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge does not turn on whether a law applies to a substantial amount of protected expression. Otherwise the [vagueness and overbreadth] doctrines would be substantially redundant.” Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2719 (internal citations

  • mitted).
  • C. Unconstitutionally Underinclusive

Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally underinclusive because it “discriminates against electronic communication in favor of ‘traditional’ paper communication” and because it “discriminates against ‘commercial’ in favor

  • f ‘non-commercial’ behavior.” (Doc. 17 at 22; Doc. 18 at 11). However, because the

Ordinance does not infringe on Constitutionally protected rights, the County must only have a rational basis for regulating commercial electronic simulated gambling as opposed to non- commercial or paper simulated gambling. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”). As conceded by Plaintiffs during oral argument, the County’s stated basis–to protect the public

  • 16-

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from the deceptive nature of commercial electronic simulated gambling devices–satisfies the rational basis requirement, and therefore the statute is not unconstitutionally underinclusive.

  • D. Dormant Commerce Clause

“The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits ‘regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’” Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)). “To determine whether a statutory scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause, [the Court] employ[s] two tiers of analysis.” Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1108 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). First, the Court “must determine whether the [] law discriminates against out-of-state residents on its face.” Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2011). If it discriminates facially, “the regulation must be shown to ‘advance[ ] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’” Cachia, 542 F.3d at 842 (quoting Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109). On the other hand, “[i]f a regulation is directed equally at interstate and local businesses, and has ‘only indirect effects on interstate commerce,’ [the Court] ‘examine[s] whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.’” Id. (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)). The Ordinance does not discriminate on its face. It regulates evenhandedly and applies to local, in-state, and out-of-state interests equally. Therefore, the Court must determine whether the Ordinance has a discriminatory impact.

  • 17-

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“The Supreme Court has emphasized several factors which guide [courts] in determining whether a neutrally-worded state law has a discriminatory impact”: (1) “whether the state law ‘exclude[s] a class of predominantly out-of-state [residents],’” Locke, 634 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 137 (1978)); (2) “whether the state statute imposes costs on out-of-state residents that in-state residents do not have to bear,” id. (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977)); and (3) “whether the state legislature was motivated by protectionist purposes in passing the law at issue,” id. (citing Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005)). None of these factors is present here. Rather than impacting out-of-state interests more than in-state interests, the largest impact of the ordinance is wholly in-state. Intervenor-Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance unreasonably burdens the dissemination of speech via the internet, but as discussed above, the Ordinance does not impact the dissemination of speech. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have a substantial likelihood

  • f success on the merits of their dormant Commerce Clause claim.12
  • E. “Responsible Relationship” under the Due Process Clause

Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintffs argue that the Ordinance is unconstitutional because it lacks a mens rea requirement and imposes vicarious liability without requiring a showing

  • f a “responsible relationship” between the defendant and the person committing the act.

However, on its face, the Ordinance does not impose vicarious liability; it only makes

12 The County also argues that the statute does not apply to interstate commerce

because it does not implicate the use of the internet. In light of the discussion in the text, the Court need not address this argument.

  • 18-

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individuals liable for their own actions. Plaintiffs’ and Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ reliance on Lady

  • J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999), is inapposite. The
  • rdinance at issue in Lady J. Lingerie specifically stated that “[a]ll acts of any servant, agent,
  • r employee, paid or unpaid, of an owner shall be imputed to the owner and be deemed to

be an act of the owner if done within the scope of such servant, agent or employee’s scope

  • f authority under the owner.” Id. The Ordinance in this case contains no such language.

It makes people liable for their own acts of managing, supervising, and maintaining simulated gambling devices, but nowhere does the Ordinance imply that owners or managers will be liable for the acts of third parties. (Ordinance at 7). Plaintiffs have also failed to show that the Ordinance’s lack of a specific mens rea requirement violates the Due Process Clause. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133, 1152 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[The] civil penalties [at issue] may be imposed without mens rea requirements because they are indeed civil.”); Northern Wind, Inc.

  • v. Daley, 200 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1999) (“As a general matter, scienter is not required to

impose civil penalties for regulatory violations when the regulation is silent as to state of mind.”); State v. Oxx, 417 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (holding that the criminal statute at issue did not violate the Due Process Clause even though it did not expressly require mens rea because it “describe[d] a crime malum prohibitum, not malum in se”; it did not “appear to chill a person's exercise of his or her first amendment rights”; and it “punishes certain affirmative acts, not a failure to act,” and “proof of an act [raises] a presumption that it was knowingly and intentionally done”).

  • IV. Conclusion
  • 19-

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SLIDE 55

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 17) and Intevenor Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 18) are DENIED, and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3) is DENIED as moot. It is further ORDERED that the Temporary Restraining Order issued on Feburary 1, 2011, is no longer in effect. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida this 6th day of May, 2011. Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Unrepresented Party

  • 20-

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

ALLIED VETERANS OF THE WORLD, INC.: AFFILIATE 67, ALLIED VETERANS OF THE WORLD, INC.: AFFILIATE 74, Plaintiffs,

  • vs-

Case No. 6:11-cv-155-Orl-28DAB SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendant. ______________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs Empire PhoneSweep and Jack’s Business Centers (collectively “Operator-Plaintiffs”) operate internet centers in Seminole County, Florida.1 (Doc. 17 at 2; Intervenor Compl., Doc. 22, at 34). At these centers, Operator-Plaintiffs offer promotional sweepstakes and customers are able to play a video game to discover whether they won the sweepstakes or not. On January 11, 2011, Defendant Seminole County, Florida (“the County”) enacted Ordinance 2011-1 (“the Ordinance”), which prohibits “simulated gambling devices,” and these sweepstakes games appear to fall within the Ordinance’s definition of simulated gambling devices. Consequently, Plaintiffs filed the instant action seeking a judgment declaring the Ordinance to be unconstitutional under the

1Intervenor-Plaintiff Darrell Agostino is the owner of Jack’s Business Centers, and

Intervenor-Plaintiff Phone-Sweeps, LLC develops software that is utilized in the sweepstakes games played at internet centers. Case 6:11-cv-00155-JA-GJK Document 73 Filed 09/08/11 Page 1 of 7 PageID 1021

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SLIDE 57

First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 1). Intervenor-Plaintiffs were granted permission to intervene on February 11, 2011. (Doc. 21). Subsequently, Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs filed motions for a preliminary injunction (Docs. 17 & 18). Those motions were denied in the Court’s Order (Doc. 46) issued

  • n May 6, 2011 (“the May 6 Order”), and Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs filed a Notice of

Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. 48) on May 12, 2011. This case is now before the Court on the Motion to Stay Trial Court Proceedings Pending Appeal filed by Plaintiffs and Intervenor- Plaintiffs (Doc. 50) and Defendant’s Response (Doc. 56); the Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal filed by Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs (Doc. 51) and Defendant’s Response (Doc. 57); and the Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 61) filed by Plaintiffs and Intervenor- Plaintiffs. The standard for granting a stay of trial court proceedings pending appeal and for granting an injunction pending appeal is generally the same. See Beta Upsilon Chi Upsilon Chapter at the Univ. of Fla. v. Machen, 586 F.3d 908, 914 n.9 (11th Cir. 2009); Hernandez

  • v. Dugger, 839 F. Supp. 849, 851 (M.D. Fla. 1993). In considering the motions, the Court

must consider (1) whether the movant is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay or injunction; (3) whether the

  • ther party will suffer substantial harm if the stay or injunction is issued; and (4) whether the

stay or injunction is in the public interest. Beta Upsilon, 586 F.3d at 914 n.9; Hernandez, 839

  • F. Supp. at 851. These are the same factors analyzed in determining whether a court should

grant a preliminary injunction, Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000), and therefore, many of the arguments that Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs make in support of

  • 2-

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SLIDE 58

their motions simply re-hash those made in their motions for preliminary injunction without providing any new support. The Court will not re-address those arguments but will take up those that were not discussed previously. First, Plaintiffs and Intevenor-Plaintiffs assert that the recent Supreme Court opinion in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011)–decided after the May 6 Order was issued–“rejects the ‘conduct not speech’ distinction” relied on in that Order. However, Brown is distinguishable. (Doc. 61 at 3). The law at issue in Brown prohibited “the sale or rental of ‘violent video games’ to minors.” Id. at 2732. Plaintiffs and Intevenor- Plaintiffs focus on a footnote in the opinion rejecting the contention that because the regulation only bans the “sale or rental” of violent video games, “rather than the ‘creation’ or ‘possession’” of such games, it is subject to a lower level of scrutiny. Id. at 2734 n.1. However, the Brown Court’s rationale is inapplicable here; it reasoned that banning the sale

  • r rental of the games suppressed speech because it banned access to the games–akin to

a regulation that allows the writing of books but not the selling of them. Unlike the regulation at issue in Brown, however, the Ordinance in no way bans access to the games. The games at issue here can be made, distributed, played, and accessed by anyone without violating the Ordinance. Second, Plaintiffs argue that, at the very least, the ordinance regulates speech and conduct and therefore should be analyzed under the test set forth in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). (Doc. 50 at 18; Doc. 51 at 11). As discussed in the May 6 Order, the Ordinance regulates only conduct and therefore it need only withstand

  • 3-

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SLIDE 59

rational basis scrutiny. However, even assuming the O’Brien analysis is appropriate, the Ordinance still passes constitutional muster. In O’Brien, the Supreme Court recognized that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” 391 U.S. at 376. Accordingly, “an ordinance is valid if: (1) it serves a substantial interest within the power of the government; (2) the ordinance furthers that interest; (3) the interest served is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) there is no less restrictive alternative.” Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 596 F.3d 1265, 1277 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). The County’s stated basis for enacting the Ordinance is to protect the public from the deceptive nature of commercial electronic simulated gambling devices. (Ordinance at 2). Furthermore, the County is trying to regulate the secondary effects caused by the “establishments that utilize simulated gambling devices” such as “disturbances of the peace and good order of the community” and hazards to “the public health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of Seminole County.” (Id.). This is a substantial interest that is undoubtedly within the power of the County to regulate, and banning simulated gambling devices certainly furthers this interest. Although Plaintiffs assert that the Ordinance is aimed at suppressing speech, it is not. Again, as discussed in the May 6 Order, “Operator-Plaintiffs are free to provide the video games to their patrons and their patrons are free to play them–and thus make and receive whatever protected message is communicated by the video game–so long as the games are

  • 4-

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not associated with the conduct of a payoff.” (May 6 Order at 6-7). However, even if there were an incidental burden on speech, it would be “‘no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible’” because the Ordinance is a “‘neutral regulation [that] promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’” First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla., 638 F.3d 756, 762-63 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). Furthermore, Plaintiff and Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ reliance on Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) is inapposite. The statute at issue in Citizens United prohibited “corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate,” id. at 886 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441b); in other words, the statute at issue prohibited spending money to make or create speech. The Ordinance here makes no such prohibitions, and the rationale behind the Court’s decision in Citizens United is inapplicable. Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs additionally argue that the payment of money banned by the Ordinance constitutes expressive conduct. This argument also fails. The First Amendment protects “only [] conduct that is inherently expressive,” and conduct is not transformed into protected speech merely because “‘the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.’” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65-66 (2006) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 1679). Furthermore, when “explanatory speech is necessary” to understand the message intended to be conveyed by conduct, it is “strong evidence that the conduct at issue [] is not so inherently expressive that

  • 5-

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SLIDE 61

it warrants protection.” Id. at 66. The mere payment of money in this case does not amount to such inherently expressive conduct and does not warrant First Amendment protection. Finally, Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs argue that this Court’s ruling created a new category of unprotected speech. As discussed at length in both this Order and the May 6 Order, the Ordinance regulates conduct, not speech, and even if it did have an incidental impact on speech, the Ordinance is still constitutional under O’Brien. The Court is not creating a new category of unprotected speech.2 As the previous discussion illustrates, Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs have failed to show that they are likely to prevail on the merits of their case. Plaintiffs and Intervenor- Plaintiffs have also failed to establish the other considerations for granting a stay or injunction pending appeal. The only threatened injury Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs complain of is the suppression of their First Amendment rights; however, because the Ordinance is not violative of the First Amendment, Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of irreparable injury absent an injunction pending appeal. Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs have also failed to show that they would be injured absent a stay

  • f trial court proceedings pending appeal. Additionally, while an injunction would not cause

great harm to the County, it would be against the public interest, and staying the trial court proceedings would not be in the interests of justice, nor would it further judicial economy.

2Indeed, as the County points out, Plaintiffs’ and Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ analysis–when

taken to its logical conclusion–would prohibit the regulation of traditional gambling, which has “been closely regulated or even forbidden, without anyone suspecting that these restrictions violate the first amendment.” There to Care, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. Dep’t of Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994).

  • 6-

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SLIDE 62

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Trial Court Proceedings Pending Appeal (Doc. 50) and the Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal (Doc. 51) filed by Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Plaintiffs are DENIED. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida this 8th day of September, 2011. Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record Unrepresented Party

  • 7-

Case 6:11-cv-00155-JA-GJK Document 73 Filed 09/08/11 Page 7 of 7 PageID 1027

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SLIDE 67
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SLIDE 68
  • ,0###+ !*%#%####!",!#+-

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SLIDE 69
  • ;%#+*!!"# !%, ,###%!*

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