Modals as lexical indicators of argumentation in predictions IADA - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Modals as lexical indicators of argumentation in predictions

IADA Workshop Word Meaning in Argumentative Dialogue

Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milan 2008, 15-17 May Andrea Rocci University of Lugano (Switzerland)

Three themes for a workshop

Lexical semantics Argumentation Dialogue

The context of the research

Modality

Logically, as the truth-evaluation of states of affairs with respect to sets

• f possible worlds (or alternatives) of various kinds.

Cognitively, as the basic human ability of thinking of states of affairs

• ther than what is the case

In terms of linguistic semantics, as lexically encoded by modal verbs in

English and in Italian.

Argumentation

Seen in its pragmatic and inferential aspects. Observed in a particular interaction field and discourse genre: financial

communication mediated by newspapers

Prediction

As speech-act level “pragmatic predicate” imposing presuppositions on

sender, addressee, propositional content and discourse co(n)-text.

As socially recognized key-move in different activity types within the

interaction field of financial communication.

What is a prediction?

According to Searle & Vanderveken (1985):

To predict is to assert with the propositional content condition

that the propositional content is future with respect to the time of the utterance and the preparatory condition that the speaker has evidence in support of the proposition. Evidence is a special kind

• f reason.

S&V also introduce the complementary illocution of retrodiction:

To retrodict is simply to assert a past proposition with respect

to the time of utterance, on the basis of present evidence.

Merlini (1983):

Pragma-linguistic analysis of prediction as a key speech act in

economic discourse.

Predictions are conditional BUT Mc Closkey (1985) : “conditional predictions are cheap” What kind of commitment on the antecedent? Predictions are modalized

Future, uncertainty and unsettledness

There will be a naval battle tomorrow

(Cf. Aristotelis De Interpretatione IX)

t0 w1 w4 w3 w2

Future, uncertainty and unsettledness

There will be a naval battle tomorrow

(Cf. Aristotelis De Interpretatione IX)

For all what I know, certainly there will be a

naval battle tomorrow

t0 w1 w4 w3 w2 t0 w1 w4 w3 w2 t0 w1 w4 w3 w2 t0 w1 w4 w3 w2 t0 w1 w4 w3 w2

Modality and predictions in financial news: a first reconnaissance

Firm's fortunes may rise as commodity prices fall

(Headline)

Major airlines around the globe continue to see strong

passenger demand, so profit could climb if they are able to raise prices while their own costs drop as fuel prices

• fall. (From the body text)

Wall Street Journal Europe (WSJE) on September 14, 2006

A reduction of that percentage to 30% would likely lead

Standard & Poor's to raise the company's corporate credit rating to "stable" from "negative," according to primary credit analyst Mary Ellen Olson.

(WSJE, February 13, 2007)

He believes that investors may well believe …

• Christoph Weil, an economist with

Commerzbank in Frankfurt, contends that the financial-market turmoil makes a serious euro-zone slowdown "all the more likely," and contends that the ECB will begin trimming its key interest rate in the second quarter. He expects that policy makers could begin publicly shifting their concern from inflation to growth in March, when new forecasts from the central bank's staff are released.

• (Rate-policy shift could sap euro, WSJ

Europe February 1, 2008)

• Such concerns have helped limit the

dollar's losses against the euro, despite the Fed's recent moves— which once might have produced a dramatic fall in the dollar. The euro is "still essentially where we were at the start of December," says Simon Derrick, the London-based chief currency strategist for the Bank of New York Mellon. "That I find absolutely remarkable."

• Mr. Derrick believes investors may be

focused more on the risks to growth than on those posed by inflation. They "may well believe that the ECB is not being reactive enough and the euro is too highly valued," he says

Finance obsessed by modals…

Forward looking statements in financial metadiscourse

This press release contains statements that constitute forward-looking statements […] Words such as "believes," "anticipates," "expects," "intends" and "plans" and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements but are not the exclusive means of identifying such statements. […] By their very nature, forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties, both general and specific, and risks exist that predictions, forecasts, projections and other outcomes described or implied in forward- looking statements will not be achieved. […]

From the Cautionary statement regarding forward-looking information which accompanies a Credit Suisse press release.

Lies, damned lies and forward looking statements (Title of a blog on finance on the Internet. Sadly, now closed.)

What this paper does

Discuss Toulmin’s hypothesis on modals as

argumentative indicators

Present an alternative semantic approach to the

argumentative relevance of the models

Apply the theory to the differences between

deve and dovrebbe in what concerns the marking of predictive standpoints, looking at a corpus of economic-financial news

The place of modality in an argument

Modal qualifier

Provides “explicit

reference to the degree of force which

• ur data confer to our

claim in virtue of our warrant” (Toulmin 1958: 101

Modals as argumentative indicators in Toulmin

“These terms— ‘possible’, ‘necessary’ and the like— are

best understood, I shall argue, by examining the functions they have when we come to set out our arguments” (Toulmin 1958: 18).

Modal Markers Phases of the Argument Possibility: may / possible/ [can?] Putting forward an hypothesis as worth considering; Impossibility: cannot Ruling out an hypothesis; Necessity: necessarily/ must Having ruled out other hypotheses, presenting

• ne particular conclusion as unequivocally the
• ne to accept.

Must as an indicator of conclusion in different fields of argument

Under the circumstances, there is only one decision

• pen to us; the child must be returned to the custody of

its parent.

Considering the dimensions of the sun, moon and earth

and their relative positions at the time concerned, we see that the moon must be completely obscured at the moment.

According to Toulmin, the role played in the argument

characterizes the specific, field invariant, force of the

• modal. On the other hand the logical type both of the

conclusion of the premises varies according to the field

• f argument.

Field-invariant force and field- dependent criteria

Your physique being what it is, you can’t lift that weight

singlehanded – to attempt to do so would be vain

The seating capacity of the Town Hall being what it is, you can’t get

ten thousand people into it –to attempt to do so would be vain.

The nomenclature of sexes and relationships being what it is, you

can’t have a male sister – event to talk about one would be unintelligible.

The

by-laws being as they are, you can’t smoke in this compartment, Sir – to do so would be a contravention of them

‘P being what it is, you must rule out anything involving Q: to

do otherwise would be R and would invite S’

The problem in Toulmin’s account.

Toulmin’s direct mapping between the

semantics of the modals and argumentative operations does nor work.

Modal criteria do not always map on types of

arguments for a conclusion and

Modal force does not always correspond to

the force with which the standpoint is advanced or to a phase or type of speech-act in an argumentative discussion.

Same criteria, but different arguments

(a) Jonh can lift 100 kg siglehanded. (b) Jonh can lift 100 kg single-handed. He has an exceptionally

powerful physique. (from cause to effect)

(c) Jonh can lift 100 kg single-handed. I’ve seen him doing so with

my own eyes. (from testimony and induction)

(d) Jonh can lift 100 kg single-handed. The trainer told me so. (from

expert opinion)

In all the examples the modal indicates what is possible to

accomplish with respect to John’s muscles, and physical build in general.

Criterion: “John’s physique being what it is”

Modal force is not a type of argumentative speech act

For Toulmin, possibility corresponds to putting

forward an hypothesis as worth considering;

But in the above arguments the arguer rather

presents conclusive evidence to assert the general compatibility of the action with the agent’s body, rather than presenting an uncertain hypothesis on this action taking place

• n any particular occasion.

The theory of relative modality

Necessity modals indicate that the proposition is

necessarily entailed by (that is logically follows from) a set of propositions, called the conversational background (B) of the modal

Must/ Necessarily (B, ϕ) ⇔ ( B → ϕ) A proposition is a possibility relative to a given

conversational background B, if and only if the proposition is logically compatible with B – that is if {B ∪ ϕ} is a consistent set of propositions.

• May/ Can/ Possibly (B, ϕ) ⇔ ¬ ( B → ¬ϕ) ⇔ ◊(B ∧ ϕ)

Different conversational backgrounds for necessity and possibility

• Ontological modality:

(i) A possible state of affairs ϕ is entailed by or compatible with facts of kind B. John cannot sing. He's stuck in a traffic jam.

• Deontic modality

(ii) An action α is entailed by or compatible with norms or ideals of kind B. John must leave the country. The new immigration law was voted by the

parliament.

• Anankastic modality

(iii) A social/institutional fact ϕ is entailed by or compatible with the set of

social/institutional facts of the relevant kind B.

To be elected in the Italian Senate, you must be at least 35 years old

• Epistemic-doxastic modality

(iv) A (meta-represented) hypothesis ϕ is entailed by or compatible with a

relevant set of beliefs B held by the speaker at the moment of utterance.

• I don’t see John’s car in the parking lot. He must have already left the

University.

The relationship of different modalities to argument

Only the epistemic/doxastic uses of the modals relate

constitutively to the structure or “form” of the argument – to inferential relations.

These modals function as direct indicators of argumentatively

relevant speech acts.

The various shades of ontological and deontic modality

express relations between the modalized proposition and sets of facts, values or norms that are part of the content level of the argumentation and may or may not be exploited inferentially through specific argumentation schemes.

An example: the deontic space and locus a causa finali

John must leave the country. So that he can live

and continue the fight. (what the realization of the political goals entails)

John must leave the country. So that he can

provide for his family. (what the fulfilment of a goal-moral obligation entails)

John: “I must leave the country. I cannot stand

the vulgarity of the times.” (what the satisfaction

• f the aesthetic preferences entails)

Epistemic implications of a deontic modal

• NEW YORK - Europa (e mondo)

attenti, a Citigroup sono state tolte le redini.

• La principale banca americana e

stata perdonata dalla Federal Reserve e, per crescere, potrà tornare a fagocitare prede sui mercati globali: dopo un anno di forzata moratoria sulle grandi acquisizioni, imposta davanti alla scoperta di scandali e inadeguati controlli interni, la Fed ha concluso che il colosso dei servizi finanziari ha “compiuto significativi progressi” nella governance e nella gestione del rischio, sufficienti a togliere i freni a piani di conquista.

• (Il Sole-24 Ore, April 5, 2006)

Explicit premise:

Citigroup can take over other financial companies.

Implicit premise (partially

developed from presuppositions): ‘Citigroup had the habit to (try to) take over other financial companies’

Implicit Conclusion (inferred

from the above premises and from topical maxims): Citigroup will probably try to take-over other financial companies in the future.

Deve vs dovrebbe in the Italian financial press/1

Ciò detto, ci dobbiamo preparare ad agire in un

mercato negativamente influenzato dall' andamento fiacco del Pil, un mercato che nel 2002 dovrebbe calare dell' 8% in Italia a 2,2 milioni di vetture [...] (Corpus IL SOLE 24 ORE).

‘That said, we must be prepared to act in a market

negatively influenced by the weak GDP figures, a market that in 2002 should/ought/is expected to decrease by 8% in Italy to 2.2 million cars’

Changing dovrebbe to deve creates an effect of

inevitable necessity – which is not the probability meaning of doxastic deve

Deve vs dovrebbe in the Italian financial press/1

Poco dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, ha ricordato, l' Italia ha

vissuto il famoso miracolo economico, diventando in poco tempo uno dei Paesi più ricchi del mondo. Dev' essere scattata una molla particolare per innescare un processo di sviluppo così rapido, ha sottolineato l' economista. (Corpus IL SOLE 24 ORE)

‘Shortly after WWII – he reminded – Italy witnessed the famous

Economic Miracle, becoming in a short time one of the richest countries in the world. Some very particular trigger must have gone off that sparkled such a rapid economic development process – the economist emphasized’

Changing deve to dovrebbe destroys discourse coherence,

making impossible to consider the the event of the ‘Economic Miracle’ as evidence that ‘some special trigger went off’

Inferential Deve: a retroductive epistemic-doxastic modal

• deve

Is retroductive - possible only in contexts that block the possibility of an

interpretation with future reference of the embedded process;

expresses inferential evidentiality and creates difficulties in the context of

reportative expressions (except in free indirect speech);

is deictically anchored to the utterance moment and refers to the on-line

inferences of the speaker (except in free indirect speech);

its conversational background is doxastic (rather than ontological),

referring to beliefs metarepresented qua beliefs:

A (meta-represented) hypothesis ϕ is entailed by a relevant set of beliefs

B held by the speaker at the moment of utterance.

Deve and causal argumentation

− (a)

p: Giovanni ha lavorato molto. q: Dev’essere stanco.

‘John worked a lot. He must be tired’ Causality: CAUSE (p,q)

time: p<q argument: p → q

− (b) p: Giovanni è stanco. q: Deve aver lavorato molto.

Causality: CAUSE (q,p)

time: q<p argument: p → q

‘John is tired. He must have worked a lot.’

Epistemic deve can be used to manifest inferential relations

both co-oriented with the direction of time-causation (inference from cause to effect) and anti-oriented (inference from effect to cause). (2.a) above is an example of the latter.

Dovrebbe and causal argumentation

− (a) p: Giovanni ha lavorato molto. q: Dovrebbe essere

stanco.

Causality: CAUSE (p,q)

time: p<q argument: p → q

‘John worked a lot. He should be tired’

(b) p: Giovanni è stanco. q: *Dovrebbe aver lavorato molto.

Causality: CAUSE (q,p)

time: q<p argument: p → q

‘John is tired. He should have worked a lot’

Dovrebbe cannot occur in inferences from the effect to the

cause (temporally anti-oriented).

The nature of “predictive” dovrebbe

The different behavior of deve and dovrebbe with respect to argumentative discourse relations can be explained as follows:

Epistemic deve, selecting a meta-representational doxastic conversational

background, concerns the properly argumentative level, the form of argumentation, and can convey any kind of deduction (from cause to effect, from effect to cause, and many non-causal schemes): it's sensitive only to the form of the major premise (p→q) that supports the deduction, and disregards its specific contents .

Dovrebbe, on the other hand, primarily conveys a causal relationships of a

natural or deontic kind – where the commitment creates the expectation of the action. As a further implicature, the assertion of this relationship may be taken as manifesting the major premise of an argument based on causality or compliance to norms.

Dovrebbe is the hypothetical/conditional version of an ontological or

deontic modality. As such it is characterized by a double conversational background:

The basic ontological or deontic background is further restricted by a a

non-factual set of propositions (assumptions) to be saturated in the discourse context.

An example

[...] secondo stime autorevoli, a fronte di consumi per

77,5 milioni di barili/giorno (mbg), l' offerta ora è di 79,9 mbg, con uno sbilancio che, in condizioni normali, dovrebbe far precipitare le quotazioni. (IL SOLE 24 ORE 05/12/2002)

‘According to authoritative estimates, with a

consumption of 77.5 million barrel per day (MBD), the

• ffer is now of 79.9 MBD with an unbalance that,

under normal conditions. ought/would/should make the price fall’

Analysis of the example

The basic conversational background of dovrebbe is contextually

identified to the current situation of the economy, which notably includes the following two propositions:

Oil consumption is 77.5 MBD Oil offer is offer is now of 79.9 MBD

The conditional restriction is identified with

Under normal conditions

The 'fall of the price' p is a logical consequence of the compatibility

restricted union of the propositions in the modal base and the set of propositions making up the 'normal conditions'.

This means that the basic conversational background alone might

not be enough to license p as a consequence.

Analysis of the example

It can be observed that economic causality is treated

much like physical causality (the human agency involved is not 'visible'). This is in accordance with the ontology assumed by classical models of market economy (market forces like physical forces).

The existence of the causal relation can be taken as an

argument for p, to the extent that normal condition do indeed apply in w0.

Obviously, 'Normal conditions' apply to most of the

worlds most of the times, hence the frequent probability reading of dovrebbe. This is an implicature and can be cancelled.

The preceding text in the example hints that in the

specific situation 'normal conditions' may well not apply in w0.

The larger co-text of the example

In fact, in the preceding text, the article, written shortly

before the US invasion of Irak, mentions

The work of UN weapons inspectors in Irak Strikes in Venezuela

Then the author introduces the discussion of oil surplus

with

Se però dimentichiamo i rischi “politici”... 'However, if we forget about political risks...'

So, the necessity applies in a 'normal scenario' where

we ignore political risks and we reason from a purely economical viewpoint. But risks are not facts. Interestingly, the noun risk itself hides a modal component...so,in the end, the simplified scenario might still apply...