NEW NUMBER-THEORETIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES ric Brier Houda - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Innovation Centre NEW NUMBER-THEORETIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES ric Brier Houda Ferradi Marc Joye David Naccache NutMiC 2019 Paris, June 2427, 2019 THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (1) The oldest and most known
Innovation Centre NEW NUMBER-THEORETIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES Éric Brier Houda Ferradi Marc Joye David Naccache NutMiC 2019 � Paris, June 24–27, 2019
THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (1) The oldest and most known family comprises species based on the inversion of a one-way permutation Notable species belonging to this family: RSA, Rabin, Paillier, ... • Faithful, well-behaved, well understood, long history. .. c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 2 Innovation Centre
THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (2) Appeared in the late 1980’s. Derived from domesticated (non-interactivized) ZKPs using the Fiat–Shamir transform Notable species belonging to this family: Fiat–Shamir, Schnorr, (EC)DSA, ... • Faster, give you signatures because they consent to, bend muscles in silence (pre-computation) then perform a fast jump to sign. .. c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 3 Innovation Centre
THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (3) The pairing-based family appeared in the 2000’s Notable species belonging to this family: Boneh–Lynn–Shacham, Waters, ... • More clumsy maths, cute, robust, look good, popular... c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 4 Innovation Centre
THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (4) We also have a few lattice-based and coding-based schemes Containing species such as BLISS, RLWE-SIGN, NTRU-SIGN, Güneysu–Lyubashevsky–Pöppelmann, ... • Agile, post-quantum, rare, some seem to stink while still alive... c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 5 Innovation Centre
THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (5) We know one intriguing species based on p 2 q Called ESIGN • Very smart, first found in Japan c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 6 Innovation Centre
THIS TALK INTRODUCES AN ODDITY c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 7 Innovation Centre
THIS TALK INTRODUCES AN ODDITY • Thick fur to keep warm and dry under water • Electro-sensory system for underwater foraging • Snake-like venom released from back claws of males • A mammal laying eggs in underground burrows like reptiles. .. • Webbed feet for swimming like aquatic birds, toothless mouth and beak Platypus Signatures are prime numbers, works best modulo p r q , no known attacks � c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 7 Innovation Centre
LET’S GET STARTED WITH DEFINITIONS Definition (Jacobi Imprint) n = ( n 0 , . . . , n k − 1 ) ∈ N k such that gcd( a , n i ) = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, the For an integer a and � Jacobi imprint I � n ( a ) is given by k − 1 1 − � a � � a � � a � � n i 2 i where I � n ( a ) = = 2 n i n i i = 0 � a � a � a � a Remark: � = 0 if � = 1 and � = 1 if � = − 1 n i n i n i n i c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 8 Innovation Centre
LET’S GET STARTED WITH DEFINITIONS Definition (Jacobi Imprint) n = ( n 0 , . . . , n k − 1 ) ∈ N k such that gcd( a , n i ) = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, the For an integer a and � Jacobi imprint I � n ( a ) is given by k − 1 1 − � a � � a � � a � � n i 2 i where I � n ( a ) = = 2 n i n i i = 0 � a � a � a � a Remark: � = 0 if � = 1 and � = 1 if � = − 1 n i n i n i n i Facts 1 Factoring n i is not required for computing � a � n i 2 Legendre and Jacobi symbols coincide when n i ∈ P 3 Legendre symbol checks whether a is a square, but Jacobi symbol does not c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 8 Innovation Centre
A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1) q = ( q 0 , . . . , q k − 1 ) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = � k − 1 Let � j = 0 q j Consider the function F 0 given by F 0 : D ⊂ Z ∗ Q → N , x �→ F 0 ( x ) = I � q ( x ) c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9 Innovation Centre
A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1) q = ( q 0 , . . . , q k − 1 ) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = � k − 1 Let � j = 0 q j Consider the function F 0 given by F 0 : D ⊂ Z ∗ Q → N , x �→ F 0 ( x ) = I � q ( x ) y i 2 i with ˆ y = � k − 1 Attack #1 Given ˆ y i ∈ { 0 , 1 } , do the following: i = 0 ˆ � r i 1 For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, choose r i $ q i such that ← Z ∗ � = ˆ y i q i 2 Set x ← CRT ( � q ) where � r ,� r = ( r 0 , . . . , r k − 1 ) 3 Output x as a pre-image of ˆ y c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9 Innovation Centre
A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1) q = ( q 0 , . . . , q k − 1 ) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = � k − 1 Let � j = 0 q j Consider the function F 0 given by F 0 : D ⊂ Z ∗ Q → N , x �→ F 0 ( x ) = I � q ( x ) y i 2 i with ˆ y = � k − 1 Attack #1 Given ˆ y i ∈ { 0 , 1 } , do the following: i = 0 ˆ � r i 1 For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, choose r i $ q i such that ← Z ∗ � = ˆ y i q i 2 Set x ← CRT ( � q ) where � r ,� r = ( r 0 , . . . , r k − 1 ) 3 Output x as a pre-image of ˆ y Solution: Restrict D to entries smaller than a given bound B c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9 Innovation Centre
A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1) q = ( q 0 , . . . , q k − 1 ) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = � k − 1 Let � j = 0 q j Consider the function F 0 given by F 0 : D ⊂ Z ∗ Q → N , x �→ F 0 ( x ) = I � q ( x ) F 0 induces a group homomorphism from to { 0 , 1 } k , ⊕ : � Z ∗ � � � Q , · ∀ x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z ∗ F 0 ( x 1 · x 2 mod Q ) = F 0 ( x 1 ) ⊕ F 0 ( x 2 ) , Q c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9 Innovation Centre
A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1) q = ( q 0 , . . . , q k − 1 ) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = � k − 1 Let � j = 0 q j Consider the function F 0 given by F 0 : D ⊂ Z ∗ Q → N , x �→ F 0 ( x ) = I � q ( x ) y i 2 i with ˆ y = � k − 1 Attack #2 Given ˆ y i ∈ { 0 , 1 } , do the following: i = 0 ˆ 1 Generate a set of ℓ “small” primes p i and compute z i = F 0 ( p i ) 2 Use linear algebra modulo 2 to find ε i ∈ { 0 , 1 } such that ˆ y = ε 1 z 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ε ℓ z ℓ 3 Output x = � p i as a pre-image of ˆ y 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ ε i = 1 c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9 Innovation Centre
A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1) q = ( q 0 , . . . , q k − 1 ) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = � k − 1 Let � j = 0 q j Consider the function F 0 given by F 0 : D ⊂ Z ∗ Q → N , x �→ F 0 ( x ) = I � q ( x ) y i 2 i with ˆ y = � k − 1 Attack #2 Given ˆ y i ∈ { 0 , 1 } , do the following: i = 0 ˆ 1 Generate a set of ℓ “small” primes p i and compute z i = F 0 ( p i ) 2 Use linear algebra modulo 2 to find ε i ∈ { 0 , 1 } such that ˆ y = ε 1 z 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ε ℓ z ℓ 3 Output x = � p i as a pre-image of ˆ y 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ ε i = 1 Solution: Restrict D to prime values c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9 Innovation Centre
A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (2) Let κ denote a security parameter. Let also k = k ( κ ) and ℓ = ℓ ( κ ) Define D = x ∈ P | x < 2 k ℓ � and � F 1 : D → N , x �→ F 1 ( x ) = I � n ( x ) n = ( n 0 , . . . , n k − 1 ) is a set of k pairwise co-prime moduli of the form n i = p i 2 q i for where � ℓ -bit primes p i and q i , 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 Assumption For every polynomial-time algorithm A , the success probability $ � � Pr ˆ ← D ; A ( F 1 (ˆ x )) = x | F 1 ( x ) = F 1 (ˆ x ) x is negligible c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 10 Innovation Centre
SIGNATURES MODULO p 2 q Key generation Signer publishes k moduli n i = p i 2 q i . All secret factors (i.e., the p i ’s and q i ’s) are ℓ -bit long c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 11 Innovation Centre
SIGNATURES MODULO p 2 q Key generation Signer publishes k moduli n i = p i 2 q i . All secret factors (i.e., the p i ’s and q i ’s) are ℓ -bit long Signing Signer hashes H ( m ) = ( h 0 , . . . , h k − 1 ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } k and picks k random ℓ -bit integers r i such that � r i � for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 = h i , q i Next, signer generates at random u ∈ Z ∗ Q such that k − 1 q ) · u 2 mod Q � σ := CRT ( � where Q = r ,� ∈ P q i i = 0 c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 11 Innovation Centre
SIGNATURES MODULO p 2 q Key generation Signer publishes k moduli n i = p i 2 q i . All secret factors (i.e., the p i ’s and q i ’s) are ℓ -bit long Signing Signer hashes H ( m ) = ( h 0 , . . . , h k − 1 ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } k and picks k random ℓ -bit integers r i such that � r i � for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 = h i , q i Next, signer generates at random u ∈ Z ∗ Q such that k − 1 q ) · u 2 mod Q � σ := CRT ( � where Q = r ,� ∈ P q i i = 0 Verification To verify, check that (i) σ ∈ P , (ii) σ < 2 ℓ k (iii) I � n ( σ ) = H ( m ) c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 11 Innovation Centre
TOY EXAMPLE ( k = 8) Picking the secret primes i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 i = 6 i = 7 p i 59069 54139 52639 53813 49871 41269 53653 40361 q i 62989 32917 36583 48383 36653 34963 52517 38971 we have the public moduli n 0 = 219777865328629 n 1 = 096480757993357 n 2 = 101366529455143 n 3 = 140109376837127 n 4 = 091160286242573 n 5 = 059546546811643 n 6 = 151177768427453 n 7 = 063484161219691 and the value Q = � 7 i = 0 q i = 9625354820834308444301890854766785161 c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 12 Innovation Centre
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