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Paper presented for the 4 th International PPP Conference, Geneva - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Why did It happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82 Paper presented for the 4 th International PPP Conference, Geneva 3-4 February 2011 Sverre Knutsen Norwegian School of Management


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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82 Paper presented for the 4th International PPP Conference, Geneva 3-4 February 2011

Sverre Knutsen Norwegian School of Management

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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82

  • The purpose of my paper is the describe and

analyse the causes of banking crises

  • And more specifically: Which causal factors

can be identified as crucial for building up

  • f financial imbalances to such an extent

that they trigger a systemic banking crisis?

  • To answer the question I study two cases that

are different in many ways, but have experienced systemic banking crises

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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82

  • I hope the analysis of the cases reveal

common patterns

  • However, it is important to realize that each

banking crisis in history also has unique features

  • Moreover, it has to be emphasized that

financial crises are complex processes, and that the search for mono-causal explanations will not work

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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82

  • In his “Essays on Instability and Finance”, from

1982, Hyman P. Minsky asked: Can “It” Happen Again?

  • “It” – that is a systemic financial crisis

subsequently causing a deep economic depression

  • Up until the late 1980s the conventional

wisdom among Norwegian economists and policymakers that “It” “couldn't happen here”.

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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82

  • Robert E. Lucas in his "presidential address to the

American Economic Association”, 10th of January 2003: “My thesis in this lecture is that macroeconomics in this original sense has succeeded: Its central problem of depression- prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many decades.”

  • Hence, Lucas obviously excluded the possibility

that “It” could happen again in the USA

  • Obviously, they were all wrong.

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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82

  • In my paper I have chosen a theoretical and

analytical framework from Hyman Minsky – in particular his “Financial Instability Hypothesis”

  • Minsky’s theory is an attempt to a fully

endogenous explanation of the causes of financial crises.

  • Minsky mainly generalises upon experiences

from post-war USA

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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82

  • “Within the neoclassical synthesis a serious depression

cannot occur as a result of internal operations of the

  • economy. In this theory a serious depression can only

be result of policy errors or non-essential institutional flaws” (Minsky)

  • A capitalist economy is inherently unstable and crisis

prone

– Financial system is vital to dynamism in a capitalist economy – Driven by innovations and search for profit – M makes a distinction between three types of financial positions: hedge, speculative and Ponzi

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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82

  • The basic Minsky cycle
  • Over the business cycle and especially during a period
  • f boom and prosperity, the financial structure of a

capitalist economy become more and more fragile

  • It is the mix of the different financial positions that

eventually trigger a financial crisis

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Why did “It” happen again? The American Subprime Crisis Compared with the Norwegian Banking Crisis 1987-82

  • The Minsky super cycle
  • The institutions of capitalism are vital to stabilize the
  • economy. However, the actors continuously press to

alter the rules of the game and change the institutional and regulatory framework

  • Thus, there is a long-term deterioration of the major

stabilizing institutions, finally bringing about a new regulatory regime

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Comparison Hyman Minsky: “...there are as many varieties of capitalism as Heinz has pickles.”

NO US Economy Small,open High GDP per head Income spread: egalitarian World’s largest High GDP per head Income spread: non-egalitarian Political system Parliamentary Presidential Supervisory system In transition from fragmented to integrated (from 1986) Fragmented Banking structure Universal banks, Nationswide branch- banking from late 1960s Specialized Fragmented, Radical change after 1980 10

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Comparison

NO US Financial system characteristics Bank based Market based 11

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Comparison

NO US Financialization Y Y Safety-net Y Y Regulations (legislation) Tight Liberalization after 1975, Extensive de-reg. 1983-87 More lax Liberalization after 1980 Extensive de-reg. From late 1990s Financial innovations Y Y Funding characteristics during run-up to crisis Increased share of short- term debt Increased share of short- term debt Steep increase in corporate and household debt Y Y 12

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Comparison

NO US Asset price inflation Y (stock market and housing/real estate bubbles) Y (housing bubble) Substantial capital inflow Y Y Wages/salaries to GDP Preceded by decreasing w/GDP ratios Consumption maintained by increased debt Preceded by decreasing w/GDP ratios Consumption maintained by increased debt 13