Science for policy and the scientification of politics Haris - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Science for policy and the scientification

• f politics

Haris Shekeris – Groupe de Lecture Séance 13 – 07 mars 2017

Presentation Plan

• I. Introduction
• II. Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model
• III. The Pragmatistic Model
• IV. Weingart’s empirical challenge
• V. Epilogue

• I. Introduction

Some pre-history

• Minimal input of scientific advice into policy-

making before WWII (but see Douglas)

• Deep cultural impact of Atom bombs?
• 1947: Steelman Report: Science for Policy (also

Vannevar Bush report on policy for Science)

• Research only relevant for defence purposes
• 1957: Shock of Sputnik – science let loose

(scientific arms-race?)

Reactions to science’s new dominant role

• Warning from Eisenhower himself: “captive of a

scientific-technological elite”

• “closed” or “court” politics – against democracy
• Fear of popularity of scientific decisions, promises of

technological miracles for research funds - “scientific salesmen” - conflict of interest ( also see Weingart)

• Positive reaction: “End of ideology”, “end of politics”

Underlying assumptions

• Actual influence of science on decisions coupled

with unaccountability of scientific advisors ( unknowingly, same problematic in Shekeris 2014 )

• Possession of superior knowledge by scientists

that renders them indispensable for policy (however, see “Wicked Problems” (1973) - policy problems set in opposition to scientific problems)

• II. Decisionistic vs Technocratic

Model

Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model

• I. Underlying assumptions
• Beyond administration as art, second stage of

“rationalisation” of government (Weber)

• Linear sequence of political problem definition –

expert advice – political decision

• Value-freedom of scientific knowledge
• Disinterestedness, neutrality and uniformity of

scientific community

Habermas does not question the latter assumptions -key topics for Weingart, STS achievement

Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model

• II. The Simple Decisionistic Model
• Division of labour between (rationalised, scientific)

means of carrying out (irrational, value-, goal- and needs-based) decisions and decisions themselves

• No ultimate justification of decisions and no cogent

discussion of values

• Dependence of expert on politician
• No involvement of the public (Schumpeterian

model)

Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model

• III. The Technocratic Model
• Decisions analysis: choice may be rationalised
• The politician an artifact of imperfect

rationalization

• No scope for democratic decision-making
• Weakening assumptions:

– Technical progress (Kitcher’s insistence on it?) – Continuum of rationality of problems

In real situations, values persist

Decisionistic vs Technocratic model

• IV. The Expanded decisionistic model
• A core of decision-making cannot be rationalised

further

• Science makes this presupposition a reality (see ‘risk’)
• Habermas’s criticism: failure due to abstract

separation of values and techniques

Suggestion: interdependence of values proceeding from interest situations and techniques used to satisfy value-oriented needs

pragmatistic model

• III. The pragmatistic model

The Pragmatistic Model

• Value-convictions persist only in so far as they’re

connected to available or imaginable techniques

• Critical interaction between expert and politician

– development of techniques based on value systems which in turn they transform

• Communication

between politicians and scientists necessarily mediated by institutionalized public discussion among citizens

A sketch of modern governance (in time?)

Modern state – first stage of Weberian “rationalization” (administration as art) Second stage of Weberian “rationalization” (administration as science, two-part relation) Democratized models, three part relation (Weingart disagrees)

Decisionistic (simple or expanded) model Technocratic model

The pragmatistic model (cont’d)

• Rational discussion ‘net’ between theory and

practice

• Translation of technical solution back into the

historical context of the practical situation

• Weakness: communication gap and translation

problems (question: Any progress with Public Engagement 50 years later?)

Implications of Habermas’ model - Scientification of politics à la Habermas

• Policy for scientific research as the locus of

problem of science-politics dialogue

• Aim: to direct consciously the co-evolution of social

life (and values, interests) and technological progress (note the historical situatedness)

• Public discourse internal to the elucidation of

tradition-bound self-understanding that determines needs and values

Scientification of politics à la Habermas

• Necessary but missing condition: enlightenment
• f political will, general public discussion free

from domination

• Problems:

– Decline of the public realm – Depoliticisation – lack of proper discussion on

practical problems

– Inaccessibility of scientific knowledge

Scientification of politics à la Habermas

• Habermas’ suggestions:

– Science Journalism and other

translation/communication efforts

– Free exchange of scientific information used for

military purposes (Wow!!)

– Initiatives by scientists to cross the boundaries and

initiate discussions with citizens ( RRI avant la lettre?)

Concluding thoughts on Habermas: Technocracy’s long shadow

• Socialism and “scientific government” (Henri de Saint-

Simon, Karl Marx)

• Epistocracy, rule of the knowers
• Evidence-based policy
• EU expert groups, recent bailouts and the questioning by

the EU parliament – economics as THE key example

• Afterthought: Kitcher and Collins guilty of assuming a

simple linear model of policy?

• IV. Weingart’s empirical Challenge

Weingart’s empirical challenge to Habermas

“Scientification of politics” hand-in- hand with “politicisation of science”

Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model

• I. Underlying assumptions
• Linear sequence of political problem definition –

expert advice – political decision

• Value-freedom of scientific knowledge
• Disinterestedness, neutrality and uniformity of

scientific community

Habermas does not question the latter assumptions -key topics for Weingart, STS achievement

Weingart’s empirical challenge to Habermas

• Cracks in popular perceptions of science after

the high-profile disasters (Three-Mile, Chernobyl)

• “Scientification of politics” hand-in-hand with

“politicisation of science”

Scientification of politics

• Many

scientific issues become political (environmental degradation, risk discourse) – and then scientists are called for advice

• Science one input among many in policy-making
• Coupling of science and policy via transformation of

scientific knowledge into expert appraisal – systemic feature, not due to personal idiosyncracies

Politicisation of Science

• New forms of science, eg regulatory science,

and new tools such as risk management

• Legitimising function of science – competing

parties in political controversies use experts

• Scientists pick sides based on various motives

(CFC legislation example, no empirical data at the beginning)

Weingart’s first paradox and its resolution

• The paradox: by the time scientific advice for

government becomes ubiquitous, initial concerns about the scientists’ role disappear

• The resolution: democratisation of scientific

expertise, reciprocal and recursive relationship between science and policy

Weingart’s second paradox

Despite the legitimating function of scientific knowledge, the quest for expertise exacerbates controversies rather than alleviating them (cf Sarewitz, excess of objectivity) and forces non-scientists to settle the debates However Policy-makers’ confidence in science by does not diminish

Second Paradox Resolution

• Domination of the discourse of science, no
• ther source of legitimacy – deep

institutionalisation of the science/policy links

• Unstable equilibrium, “contraction” and

“expansion”

Contraction and expansion

• Strategies used both by science and by politics
• Complementary rather than contradictory
• Contraction: hierarchical organisation of expertise

in policy, adopted by governments and by IPCC – reduction of knowledge input in policy

• Expansion: Overselling to media for attention

Crying Wolf

Alarmist pronouncements based on little evidence Establishment and dominance of scientific field expansion Challenge to credibility of science, difficulty to discern genuine knowledge

Two grim predictions

Rather, it is foreseeable that there will be no end to the continued production of knowledge which, to capture public attention and support, will be sold on promises and threats, a strategy that could be self-defeating in the long run. Likewise, it is foreseeable that there will be no end to the competition among policy-makers for the most recent scientific knowledge in the search for its legitimating power.

• V. Epilogue: An (important?) lacuna

Technology and business (industry) as shaping both the scientific research agenda and modern government Weingart aware of this but chooses to ignore it in his analysis See “Science, Government and the Politics of Knowledge”, Cozzens and Woodhouse, 1995