Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences Game Theory Course: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences . . Single-Peaked Preferences Sometimes
Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences .
. Single-Peaked Preferences • Sometimes voters’ preferences have nicer properties • Prominent case: candidates can be ordered from left to right • Voters: have a most-preferred candidate and then candidates who are more extreme are less-preferred Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences .
. Single-Peaked Preferences a b c d e Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences .
. Median Voting: A Condorcet Winner Always Exists with an Odd Number of Voters a b c d e Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham Social Choice: Single-Peaked Preferences .
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