Surge refers to the increase in US troops in Iraq JanMay 2007 using - - PDF document

‘Surge’ refers to the increase in US troops in Iraq Jan­May 2007 using COIN doctrine; build­up phase of the surge completed by end of May 07 followed by ‘surge’ of

• perations that began in Jun 07 (“Arrowhead” series) (Accidental Guerrilla p 144)

SIGACTs are ‘significant activities’ ­ attacks against Coalition and Iraqi government forces, and civilians and infrastructure, as observed by Coalition Forces.

Sidebar: ‘Purge before the Surge’ – By the time Bush announced the Surge on 10 Jan ‘06, his entire national security team was shaken apart; specifically, Rumsfeld was out, Casey was replaced by Petraeus, Abizaid chose retirement over job as D Nat Intel, and Khalilzad was made ambassador to UN (MR Gordon & Gen BE Trainor, The Endgame, Pantheon, NY, 2012, p 308). 1

Afghanistan: 33,000 troop surge applied in late 2009 and formation of Afghan ‘local’ police (ALP) was designed to replicate COIN tactics from Iraq and effects of SOI. “COIN is the comprehensive civilian and military effort taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.” (S. Melton) COIN also refers to ‘clear, build, and hold’. Simplistic differentiation between COIN and CW is their CoG – population vs. military, respectively. Politicization of the Surge (Senator McCain, Feb 2, 2013) “I’m very aware of the history of the surge and the Anbar Awakening, and I also am aware that any casual observer will know that the surge was the fundamental factor, led by two great leaders…”. 2

Source: War Within (p 200 & 262); B Woodward (2008) Awakening began in Ramadi (Anbar) in Oct 06, which led the way for SOI standup. Situational Awareness Council of Colonels presented six major negative trends including “current strategy is not working” and “ethnic and sectarian conflict is increasing” (03 Nov 2006) However, “(Commanders in Baghdad) thought that they had enough troops” (ISG member and incoming SecDec Gates, 05 Dec 2006); Bob Gates was member of the Iraq Study Group 3

SIGACTs: “intensity of insurgent activity measured as attacks per capita against Coalition and Iraqi government forces … they capture violence against civilians and between nonstate actors only when U.S. forces are present and so dramatically undercount sectarian violence” (p 790 of E Berman, JN Shapiro, J Felter (2011) Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq, J Pol Economy 119(4): 766 – 819). Limitations: SIGACTs –vary from disabled IED with no casualties to an incident (eg., suicide bomber) with dozens of casualties AOs – from a neighbourhood to a village to a district with thousands of population to a village 4

Trend lines were lower, but not necessarily significantly. Source: Biddle S, Friedman JA, Shapiro JN (2012). Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007. International Security, 37(1), pp. 7–40. pairwise t­test for dependent samples. The t­test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically different from each other. Sidebar: Steve Biddle is quoted (Dec 2006) as supporting the Surge “noting that American forces were limiting the scale of the violence (and) if the mission shifted to focus on training, violence would increase” (The Endgame p 303) 5

Optional Timeline analysis by Province (see back slides) 6

Note: Al­‘Askariyya (al­Askari; one of the holiest in Shi’a Islam) shrine at Samarra (~ 125 km N Baghdad) purposely bombed 22 Feb ‘06 (month 25) by AQI to incite sectarian war GWB file indicated 1200 weekly attacks in Iraq Dec 2006 (War Within p 305)

• civilian deaths peaked Sep 06 – Jan 07 (2700 – 3800/month; 125/day in Dec 06), and

more than half occurred in Baghdad (p 126); also, ~ 50% of the war during 2006 took place within Baghdad (Accidental Guerrilla p 130)

• violence began to decline in early 07, although unevenly, before decreasing

dramatically in Aug 07; (early) 2007 was the deadliest for US troops (331 dead Apr – Jun) (Accidental Guerrilla p 148), but not for civilians, which peaked in late 2006 7

Sunni – AQI split began when AQI demanded upholding Quran religious customs while Sunnis held fast to tribal customs, (e.g., refusal to yield to AQI’s demands for inter­ marriage, which was one strategy for cementing ties) (Accidental Guerrilla p 159­60) 8

Most SOI standups occurred shortly after full strength of the surge troops were deployed and became operational. SOI standups in Diyala and Tamim occurred long after the surge and the violence has decreased in these provinces, which was clearly a reactive development. Peak SIGACT in Baghdad occurred long before full strength of surge; hence, the latter is not connected to decrease in violence. SOI standup in Baghdad, Salahaddin, and Babil is a result of the insurgency losing steam/defeated ­ too short a period elapsed from full surge strength to be defeated but additional influence was likely. All peak SIGACT occurred before full surge strength and SOI standup. The SOI standup in Anbar is not connected with the surge. 9

• bs 3 = average of SIGACT observed during the first 3 months after SOI standup

pred 6­3 = average of SIGACT predicted during the first 3 months after SOI standup using the linear regression of SIGACT 6 months prior to SOI standup Interpretation: Observed & Predicted post­SOI SIGACT are not different based on 6 months of pre­SOI SIGACT, but they are if based on 9 months or more. 10

Note: Decrease of US Forces from peak of 160,000 (Dec 05) to 126,900 (Jun 06); decrease of total coalition force (CF) from peak of 183,000 (Dec 05) to 146,900 (Jun 06) – suggests that the ‘Surge’ simply restored US troop numbers, certainly it did not add capacity beyond 2005 levels. Despite increased tempo, ops Together Forward I & II (summer 06) were considered dismal failures to “clear, hold, and build”; instead considered by Kilcullen as the “Kiss of Death” that describes the killing of tribal leaders/members that supported ISF & CF troops after they left an area clearly contradicts the notion of SOF effectiveness. 11

Note: Combined pop of the 6 provinces (Al­Anbar, At­Ta'min, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad­Din) where the Surge occurred was 10,442,320 in 1997 (total Iraq pop 22,046,244); hence, the ‘local’ troop density was considerably higher, by about a factor

• f 3.

Effective Troop Density Ratios: McGrath ratio (13:1,000) ; RAND ratio 13.5:1,000; Quinlivan’s 20:1,000; COIN FM 3­24 20­25:1,000 However, British lost Cyprus campaign with force ratio of 110:1 while Indonesians defeated Dar’ul Islam with a ratio < 3:1 – difference is attributed to level of local support (Accidental Guerrilla p 181) Also, insurgencies are lengthy – normal duration between 15 and 40 years (Accidental Guerrilla p 184) While effective thresholds are debatable and conflict­specific, the important point is that both growth and readiness were increasing throughout 2006. Readiness Levels: ISF readiness = (3*#level_1 + 2*#level_2 + #level_3)/6, where level_1 can lead, level_2 can follow, and level_3 is in training. (# refers to number of units) 12

Key question is whether the Surge was necessary or whether a change in operational doctrine (i.e., adoption of COIN) would have sufficed with the 140K troops in Iraq – considering that violence had started to decline prior to the Surge, the latter would likely have worked, albeit at a slower pace. Alternative hypotheses/causes: Much earlier shift of loyalty of Sunni insurgents decreased tempo of JAM early adoption of COIN increased tempo of SOF growth of ISF “Fog of War” was especially dense in late 2006, making it very difficult to identify a winning strategy. While it is apparent that COIN and CW both contributed to the decline in violence, what remains unknown is the optimal mix of the two and the quantification of alternative causes, which collectively were primarily responsible for initiating the decline in violence. Hindsight (and this analysis) reveals that violence was on the cusp of declining in late 2006, which would not have been visible to military planners and the NSC (“Fog of War”). Thus, it is understandable why decisions to bridge the ISF with a surge of US troops until ISF strengthened further in 2007 were difficult to make. The situation in Baghdad and surrounding belts was intense in late 2006, especially with Sunni and AQ strongholds; hence the need for a Surge to deal with the ‘local’ insurgency, as advocated by Gen. Odierno (The Endgame p 300), which was not appreciated by other high level commanders; e.g., Gen. Pace believed that there was no military answer to the situation 13

in Iraq (Gamble p 93), which was probably true if military actions continued to be constrained by conventional warfare. Further, Gen. Casey did not support the Surge (“I don’t think we need additional forces at this time.” Fall 2006, The Endgame p 294), since he, as well as Rumsfeld and Khalizad (US ambassador), perceived any additional forces as an impediment for Iraq growing and strengthening their SF. Pace and these like­minded commanders did not make the connection that more troops would be required if COIN was executed (esp to ‘hold’ security). SOF capabilities and development of host SF likely contributed to initiating the decline in violence. “Security is a precondition for political and economic progress” (11 Dec 06 Jack Keane, War Within p 281; caveat on the application of COIN and acknowledgement of a commitment to a ‘long war’). COIN “clear, hold, & build” was a catalyst for the ‘Awakening’ and standup of SOI ­ it was also instrumental in furthering the decline in violence after peaking in late 2006. ”Tribal revolt (Awakening/uprising) was arguably the most significant change in the Iraqi

• perational environment in several years.” (Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla p 179) falls

short of claiming it was more important than the Surge; “The Surge worked.” (p 185); yet, “uprising against extremism belongs to the Iraqi people – it was their idea” (p 183); Kilcullen concedes the importance of the uprising not only in stemming the violence, but in lessening the demands on US & coalition forces. “Americans in the lead FM 3­24 COIN doctrine is a path to strategic disappointment.” (Stephen L Melton (Apr 2013) Aligning FM 3­24 Counterinsurgency with Reality, Small Wars J, p 8) – forceful argument that COIN can only succeed if led by the host nation for face­validity. “SFA (security force assistance) should probably be our first­­and last­­ response to defeating foreign insurgencies.” Strategic policy – capabilities development Conventional capabilities are as important as COIN in modern warfare – the fiscal austerity environment seem to favour “cheaper” alternatives in capabilities development such as COIN rather than investment in more expensive conventional capabilities and platforms. (Downes’ paper ‘Forced to be Free’ argues that a high price is paid for a good

• utcome regardless of pre­conditions for intervention since the price is high either

initially to intervene in a strong economic state where democratic reform can be more easily implemented after regime change or later in a weak autocratic state that is not institutionized for democratization) 13

Final Note: The question of deploying a Surge carried serious strategic consequences given that the US reserves were tapped out (Gamble p 92­93). Hence, the decision to carry out the Surge was much more serious than if the US had ample reserves, in which case the ‘Gamble’ would not have been so dramatic. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not the Government of Canada. 14