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Tax, Investment and Industrial Policy Presentation for Taxation & - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Tax, Investment and Industrial Policy Presentation for Taxation & Developing Countries (a PEAKS training course) 16 September 2013 Dirk Willem te Velde (Overseas Development Institute) Overview Using taxation as industrial policy


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Tax, Investment and Industrial Policy

Presentation for Taxation & Developing Countries (a PEAKS training course)

16 September 2013 Dirk Willem te Velde (Overseas Development Institute)

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Overview

  • Using taxation as industrial policy
  • Classifying investment incentives
  • WTO compliance
  • Impact of incentives (some considerations)

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Tax as Industrial Policy

  • Trade tax incentives– (negative) protection is largely

discredited, but exemptions are still used

  • (Corporate/investment) tax incentives to attract pioneer

sectors and encourage human capital formation (e.g. Singapore) or green innovation (e.g. R&D allowances), addressing market and co-ordination failures

  • Tax incentives on their own or as part of a package (skills,

R&D, infra, clustering, zones), which requires implementation capacity, strategy, consistency, etc.

  • Risk of mismanagement and fiscal problems

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Classification of Tax Incentives

  • Corporate tax reductions, exemptions and

deductions – Low statutory tax rates, Preferential tax rates, tax holidays, others (loss-carry forward etc)

  • Investment allowances and investment credit
  • Taxes on dividends, interests and capital gains
  • Taxes on inputs and imported goods

– VAT exemptions, reduced duties 4

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WTO Compliance

  • WTO rules constrain (to some extent) countries by
  • ffering certain trade-distorting incentives in order to

limit trade distortionary incentives. An incentive is an implicit subsidy

  • Relevant agreements

– Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) – Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ACM) – Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 5

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Impact of Investment Incentives

  • Literature on attracting FDI (econometric, economic, surveys, tax

lawyers): – Main determinants are market size, economic fundamentals, resource availability, etc; but – But incentives can be important at margin; and – Tax advisors look for countries with tax treaties (DTTs etc) …

  • Revenue foregone:

– What would have been fiscal revenues in the absence of incentives? Static (and dynamic) counterfactuals?

  • Impact of incentives on investment levels, investment behaviour etc.

– Very little firm level evidence (mostly relying on first point!)

  • Relation to governance, intra-state competition, corruption

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Investment Incentives Revenue Foregone and Link with Investment

1991- 1993 2001- 2003 Antigua and Barbuda 5.1 9.2 Dominica 4.2 4.3 Grenada 11.4 11.3 St Kitts and Nevis 5.8 12.2 St Lucia 5.9 5.9 St Vincent and the Grenadines 6.7 6.1

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Caribbean examples of customs' revenue losses from concessions, 1991-2003 (% of GDP)

REVENUE LOSS/ IMPORT v/s INVESTMENT/ SALES

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 REVENUE LOSS/IMPORT INVESTMENT/SALES

Source: CREDIT report Source: Meyn et al (2008)

Firm level performance and Incentives, St Lucia

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Impact of SEZs on Jobs and Productivity

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Towards structural transformation Towards employment creation

Singapore Malaysia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Mauritius Kenya Madagascar Ghana Lesotho Tanzania Nigeria Malawi Senegal

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Some Concluding Thoughts

  • Tax incentives do affect investment decisions and

behaviour, but there are strong doubts about whether the cost-benefit analysis is positive for host-countries

  • Successful tax incentives are part of a

package/strategy. Principles for successful industrial policy also apply to tax incentives

  • Fiscal incentives in weak governance contexts likely to

be most harmful

  • But lack of good empirical studies

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