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The Dilemma of Early Warning Against Debris Caused by Successful Ballistic Missile Interception Dima Kanevsky CEMA The Center for Military Analyses Rafael, Israel Unclassified General Since the year 2001 Israel has sustained more


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Dima Kanevsky CEMA – The Center for Military Analyses Rafael, Israel

The Dilemma of Early Warning Against Debris Caused by Successful Ballistic Missile Interception

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General

 Since the year 2001 Israel has sustained more

than 16,000 rockets

 Iron Dome is an Anti-Missile Air Defence

System which is operational since April 2010 and has shot down more than 500 rockets with a success rate of over 86%

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18,000 1,000 90%

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Background

29/7/2014  The role of Anti-Missiles Air

Defence Systems in military

  • perations is steadily increasing

 Every successful interception is

followed by falling debris

 Some of the debris might

endanger people below the interception point

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Main Dilemma

29/7/2014  This (new) situation evokes the question:

Disturbance of the life routine Life-saving

Is early warning against interception debris essential?

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Goals

Estimate the risk to the population on the ground:

Calculate the limits of debris’ danger area

Calculate the time during which the danger persists

Estimate of casualty numbers in case no early warning is given

Recommend ways to update the

early warning policy based on research results

Is early warning against interception debris essential?

If so, where should this warning be given?

How should people be warned?

What instructions should be given to the population?

This paper discusses lower tier intercepts only (up to 15-20 km)

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Method

Threat Type Interception Height Wind Profile On-Ground Distribution Map Population Density Expected Number of Casualties Additional Considerations

Early Warning Policy

Time of Fall Exposed Population Total Population

Vulnerability Model Distribution Model 29/7/2014

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Threat Type Interception Height Wind Profile On-Ground Distribution Map Population Density Expected Number of Casualties Additional Considerations

Early Warning Policy

Time of Fall Exposed Population Total Population

Vulnerability Model Distribution Model 29/7/2014

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Single Fragment Trajectory

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10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Ground distance Height

Short, not affected by wind Long, affected by wind

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Homogeneous Fragmentation Cloud

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  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 300 400

  • 500
  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 300 Horizontal distance, m Vertical distance, m

  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 300

  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 300 Fragment mass - 5 gram, Height - 3000 m Ground distance, m Ground distance, m

Side view Top view

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Drifting

29/7/2014 Falling time – up to several minutes

100 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7

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Simplified Approach Validation

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Downwind distance, m

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Threat Type Interception Height Wind Profile On-Ground Distribution Map Population Density Expected Number of Casualties Additional Considerations

Early Warning Policy

Time of Fall Exposed Population Total Population Vulnerability Model

Distribution Model 29/7/2014

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Vulnerability Model

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10-4 10-6 10-8 10-10 10-12

Fragments Density Person Presented Area Population Density Ratio of Exposed Population

* * *

Probability of Casualty

=

Expected Number of Casualties dx dy Probability

  • f

Casualty

=

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Criterion for Dangerous Fragment

 Currently measured by amount of kinetic

energy or kinetic energy per cross-section area

 A fragment approaches the ground with a

constant (terminal) velocity, which is a function of its mass

 Hence the criterion can be formulated in

terms of fragment’s mass

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Risk Estimation

29/7/2014 Risk Level Expected Impact Fragment Mass (Terminal Velocity)

No risk

Minor Injury – scratch, limited bleeding

0-2 grams (40 miles/h)

Low

Minor to Moderate Injury

2-5 grams (50-100 miles/h)

Medium

Moderate to Serious Injury

5-10 grams (55-110 miles/h)

High

Serious to Severe Injury

above 10 grams (60-120 miles/h) steel ball stone ball £1

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Who Needs to be Warned?

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Unprotected persons should find the nearest shelter (concrete roof)

Persons in a car should stop and remain inside

Persons inside a building should do nothing

Below concrete roof

100 grams 50 grams

Below non-concrete roof Inside a car Unprotected

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Expected Number of Casualties

(real-time calculation)

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10-4 10-6 10-8 10-10 10-12

  • 12
  • 10
  • 8
  • 6
  • 4

10-4 10-6 10-8 10-10 10-12

Medium-sized warhead, Total expected number of casualties – 510-3 Salvo of 5 small warheads, Total expected number of casualties – 310-2

2 km 2 km

N N

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Conclusions

 Dangerous free falling fragments weigh 2

grams and more

 The expected number of casualties is about

1/100 per intercept

 The dangerous area might be very large  Early warning is not always essential (night,

wartime)

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