The evolution of Brazils trade policy Jean-Christophe Defraigne - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
The evolution of Brazils trade policy Jean-Christophe Defraigne - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
The evolution of Brazils trade policy Jean-Christophe Defraigne defraigne@fusl.ac.be FUSL A Brazilian trade policy guided by an active industrial policy The large domestic market enabled the possibility of national industrial policies since
A Brazilian trade policy guided by an active industrial policy
The large domestic market enabled the possibility of national industrial policies since the 1930s: import substitution industrialisation
The debt crisis of the 1980s and the hyperinflation forced some trade liberalization and further opening to FDI
Not along the lines of the Washington consensus
Some industries perceived as strategic continue to be protected (textile, automotive, chemicals, rubber, electric and electronics)
Presence of MNEs in the protected industries
Tax breaks for exports
Use of antidumping to protect domestic oligopoly or monopoly (75% of the 247 cases up to 2008 are used for industry in monopoly or duopoly (Da Motta Veiga 2008)
Privatization of state-owned firms in the 1980s-1990s but system of golden shares (Embraer, Vale), or ceiling of foreign participation (steel & Gerdau) and strategic use of national savings: unlike Argentina under Menem
Brazil’s tariff falling… (source: Mesquita-Moreira 2009)
…but still high… (source: Mesquita-Moreira 2009)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Japan China South Korea Indonesia Philippines Argentina Brazil
Brazil open to foreign investor : FDI inward stocks as a % of GDP in 2005
A Brazilian trade policy guided by an active industrial policy
Emergence of large Brazilian national champions
In Brazil traditional comparative advantages: agro-business (JBS) or in raw materials & energy (Vale, Petrobras, EBX, Votorantim)
In industries and services where state protection, procurements and domestic market size is essential: engineering, construction, telecom (Odebrecht, Camargo-Correâ and Andrade Gutierez-Oi-Brasil Telecom), banking (Itau, Bradesco, Banco do Brasil) & airplanes (Embraer)
Conglomerate (Votorantim: Cement, juice, mining, hydroelectric power), Camargo- Correâ (Construction, electricity, footwear, textile)
Family-owned and run
Small by world standards
Mainly domestic oriented (or restricted to Latin America) except for primary goods (mining and agro-business)
Typical in the first stage of development of large firms, not yet mature global competitors
A Brazilian trade policy guided by an active industrial policy
Trade policy patterns
- ffensive aspects agriculture liberalization (Ministry of Agriculture)
defensive aspects industry and services (including Singapore Issues)
Attempt to create coalitions in the multilateral trading system (G-20, IBSA Brasilia declaration in 2003, BRIC)
to block Singapore Issues and other US and European regional trade arrangement (FTAA, Mercosur-EU) in order to keep various tools for an active industrial policy
To block services liberalization to protect emerging national champions
and promote agriculture liberalization
Alternative outlets for primary exports thanks to the rising demands of emerging economies, most notably of China in the 2000s
Strategic use of Mercosur: outlet for Brazil’s manufactured exports to enlarge the domestic market, tariff structure shelters manufactured capital goods produced in Brazil. Tensions, especially after Argentina’s crisis, welfare gains distribution in favour of Brazil
Promotion of South-South agreements with large countries with similar strategy (Mercosur-India, Mercosur SACU, Mercosur-CAN, China market access status 2004)
China-Brazil trade 2001-2011
Period Trade Flow Reporter Partner Trade Value 2001 Import Brazil China $1,328,389,311 2002 Import Brazil China $1,553,993,640 2003 Import Brazil China $2,147,799,004 2004 Import Brazil China $3,710,477,153 2005 Import Brazil China $5,354,519,158 2006 Import Brazil China $7,989,343,057 2007 Import Brazil China $12,617,754,515 2008 Import Brazil China $20,040,022,368 2009 Import Brazil China $15,911,144,513 2010 Import Brazil China $25,535,684,189 2011 Import Brazil China $32,788,424,507
China-Brazil trade 2001-2011
Period Trade Flow Reporter Partner Trade Value 2001 Export Brazil China $1,902,122,203 2002 Export Brazil China $2,520,978,671 2003 Export Brazil China $4,533,363,162 2004 Export Brazil China $5,441,745,722 2005 Export Brazil China $6,834,996,980 2006 Export Brazil China $8,402,368,827 2007 Export Brazil China $10,748,813,792 2008 Export Brazil China $16,403,038,989 2009 Export Brazil China $20,190,831,368 2010 Export Brazil China $30,752,355,631 2011 Export Brazil China $44,314,595,336
The challenges of the Brazilian trade and industrial strategy
South-South coalitions and agreements are contradictory and unstable
- 1. On the DDA talks on agricultural liberalization: problem of reaching a consensus on
market access for the WTO G-20.
In 2003 at Cancun “Brazil had to reduce its ambition in market access issues in order to gather the support of India and China for its demands against developed countries’ domestic and export subsidies.” (WTO 2012)
Roberto Rodrigues, agricultural minister of Brazil 2005: “the G20 is like a group of friends setting off for a trip to the cinema. “Everyone wants to see the first movie, Export Subsidies,” he says. “Then about a fifth go home before the second one, Domestic
- Subsidies. By the final movie, Market Access, only about 40 per cent are left.”
The challenges of the Brazilian trade and industrial strategy
- 2. Internal tensions in the Mercosur on trade agreements : stagnation of the process,
macroeconomic volatility, rising competition from China, rising protectionism from Argentina after the 2001 crisis
- 3. Many south-south agreements are limited to a narrow range of products: Mercosur-
India, Mercosur SACU, Mercosur-CAN , Mexico
- 4. China-Brazil relations
China-Brazil trade is north-south (iron ore, soya beans vs manufactured product):
Brazil faces a deficit in automotive components in 2006
Loss of market shares in Latin American markets (30% in Chile, 13% in Mexico, Chinese penetration is twice faster in Argentina)
market status (2004) but anti-dumping and safeguards
One exception: Embraer & AVIC II: Harbin Embraer Aircraft industry joint venture
Intra-Mercosur exports share in total exports (in %)
Source: European Commission (2007) p. 46. Source: European Commission (2007) p. 46.
Intra-Mercosur import share in total imports (in %)
The challenges of the Brazilian trade and industrial strategy
The problem of technology and diversification of Brazil’s export structure
Brazil exports are still to dependent on primary products : it had it good since the 2000s but can it last?
Commodities prices are still unstable in this period of crisis (notably due to the penetration of financial operators on the world commodity markets) even if likely to increase in the long run (problem of Vale: 44% profit loss this quarter compared to last year because of falling world demand)
Currency problems, QE and Eurozone injection of liquidities which are in part channelled to Brazilian capital markets with high interest rates: appreciation of the real & Giudo Mantega mentions “currency wars”
Shrinking trade surplus
Fear of a return to the1998 crisis situation despite substantial reserves?
Source: World Bank 2012
The challenges of the Brazilian trade and industrial strategy
Can Brazil upgrade its technological level to diversify and create global competitors in the manufacturing and services industries?
Weak performance compared to other BRIC and the gap is widening.
Brazil is not well inserted in the global production networks of MNEs:
weak infrastructure due to insufficient investments and high transport costs
distant from the economic centres and regional economic integration processes (Europe, NAFTA, ASEAN+3)
limited strength in knowledge-based tradable services (outsourcing in software, health and medical services, law and accountancy).
Limitation of the Portuguese language
Limited technological spill-over generated by FDI
The challenges of the Brazilian trade and industrial strategy
In the absence of major changes in these fields and if the lobbying power of the national champions in manufacturing is not deeply weakened by exogenous factors
Brazil is likely to remain defensive:
- n non agricultural trade liberalization
- n Singapore Issues
- n North-South RTAs.
Brazil is likely to try to keep Mercosur as a backyard for its manufactured exports and accept Argentina’s current protectionist stance
0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 South Korea China Brazil
R&D expenditures as share of GDP (2011)
R&D expenditures as share of GDP (2011)
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 South Korea China Brazil
Researchers (per 100 000 people) 2005
Researchers (per 100 000 people) 2005
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 South Korea China Brazil
receipt of royalties and licence fees ($ million) 2005
receipt of royalties and licence fees ($ million) 2005
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 South Korea China Brazil High tech export (% of manufactured exports) 1990 High tech export (% of manufactured exports) 2005
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 South Korea China Brazil
firms in the global top 500
number of firms in the global 500 (2011)
And the EU?
EU-Brazil trade is still mainly north-south and asymmetric despite Brazil’s growth
Other alternative outlets for Brazilian exports: rising importance of of China
Small progress in agriculture liberalization from the EU on export subsidies but not enough for Brazil. No EU consenus (Lagarde vs Mandelson)
Engaged in a flurry of competitive liberalization schemes especially after 2003: EPAs
Re-launching of the EU-Mercosur talks because of the crisis in order to avoid an increase of protectionism?
EU-Brazil asymmetrical trade
Source: EU Commission DG Trade 2012
EU-Brazil asymmetrical trade
Source: EU Commission DG Trade 2012
EU-Brazil north-south trade EU-Brazil asymmetrical trade
EU-Brazil north-south trade
Source: EU Commission DG Trade 2012