Trevor Findlay Professor, Norman Paterson School of International - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Trevor Findlay Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa Senior Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School

 why a cultural approach?  organizational culture theory  defining safeguards culture  creators, purveyors & guardians  cultural context―IAEA, UN, national  cultural change: IAEA safeguards culture

before and after Iraq (1991)

 safeguards sub-cultures  conclusions/recommendations

 ‘safeguards culture’ used by IAEA, government

• fficials, experts

 no IAEA study or documents or academic or other

research

 no agreed international definition (unlike nuclear

safety & security)

 advances in safety and security cultures suggest

need for attention to safeguards culture

 IAEA set out to change safeguards culture along

with strengthened safeguards

 the cultural approach is revealing

↑↓ ↑↓

Artifacts Visible organizational structures & processes Espoused values Strategies, goals, philosophies Basic underlying assumptions Unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, feelings, habits

• powerful, latent, often unconscious
• born of habit: ‘the way we do things around here’
• affects individual & collective behaviour
• dysfunctional culture may cause organizational failure
• hard to change
• change easiest after crisis
• forced change may have

unintended consequences

• leadership and incentives

are key

 Safety C

Cult lture re: ‘assembly of characteristics and attitudes in

• rganizations and individuals which establishes that, as an
• verriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the

attention warranted by their significance’ (IAEA Glossary)

 Securit

rity c cult lture re :‘assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security’ (IAEA Implementing Guide, 2008)

 Safeguards c

cult lture re: assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals and organizations which supports nuclear safeguards as a vital means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

IAEA

• General Conference, Board of

Governors, member states

• Director General and Deputy

DGs

• Departm

tment t of S f Safe feguards (policy, m man anag agement, an anal alys ysts, la labs bs, in inspe pectors)

• other departments (Legal,

Public Information)

states

• foreign ministries
• safeguards

authorities (State Systems of Accounting and Control)

• atomic energy

authorities and labs

• nuclear industry

regional l

• rgani

anizations ns

EURATOM, ABACC, nuclear weapon-free zone

• rganizations

non

• n-

gover ernme mental/ scie ientif ific ic communi unity

e.g. INMM, ESARDA, VERTIC, MTA

IAEA

 science and technology-based  in the UN system but not a UN body  interacts principally with member states, not with nuclear industry  ‘Spirit of Vienna’ (fading fast)  stove-piping versus One House

UN

 process-oriented (diplomatic procedures, conferences,

documentation, interpretation/translation)

 deferential to member states  geographical balance and political factors in recruitment  semi-permanent international civil service

National

 multinational individual cultures in a Western cultural framework

Pre re-1991 991 Now

• w

Legal artifacts IAEA Statute; NPT; INFCIRC/153 agreements; SQPs + Strengthened safeguards; Additional Protocols; revised SQPs Planning artifacts Programme and Budget + Strategic Plan Process artifacts inspectors reports; safeguards conclusion; special inspections + State-Level Concept; state evaluation groups; country

• fficers; integrated

safeguards; ‘broader conclusion’; open source information; intelligence

Pre re-1991 991 Now

• w

safeguards non-discriminatory; technically based; effective; efficient as possible no change diversion the most likely non- compliance scenario all acquisition paths worth considering emphasis on declared materials, activities and facilities emphasis on correctness and completeness; undeclared materials/activities/facilities important inspectors focused on nuclear accountancy; prescriptive, criteria-driven approach inspectors expected to be more inquisitive, investigatory, innovative

• nly declarations and inspection

information valid for drawing safeguards conclusions all sources of information useful to draw ‘broader conclusion’

Pre re-1991 991 now now safeguards can only do what states allow the Agency has more rights effectiveness depends on state cooperation states have increased obligations to provide information, access, effective SSACs effectiveness depends on adequate funding (zero real growth a constant refrain) no change safeguards personnel are professional, trained, dedicated safeguards personnel are better trained than ever special inspections a right in case

• f undeclared activities

special inspections reaffirmed as Agency right in special cases

Pre re-1991 991 now ( (de desir irable le) detecting undeclared material/facilities not part of the job (‘we don’t go on fishing expeditions’) correctness and completeness vital (‘still no expeditions, but we now worry about all types of fish’) inspectors dominate data collection, analysis, planning & management close collaboration between inspectors, analysts, planners, labs & managers; all make valuable contribution tick the boxes, replace the batteries and go; be deferential to states; ‘don’t rock the boat’ inquisitiveness, resourcefulness, initiative will be rewarded safeguards findings not always taken into account ‘upstairs’ all safeguards findings taken seriously inspectors not always well recruited, trained or dedicated inspectors well recruited, trained and imbued with new culture

 how strong and pervasive is the culture?

what do people think of as right, proper, moral, and fair?

 what do the mission, strategy, goals, and

rewards mean to people?

 what subcultures exist across groups or

between managers and workers?

 what are the consistencies and contradictions

in work practices, norms, rituals, role models, symbols, stories, training programs, rules, incentive plans?

Inspe pectors tra radit ditio ional ‘s l ‘star r pe perf rform rmers’ scie ientif ific ic/technic ical, f l, fact-orie iented, d, in indiv dividu idualis listic ic ‘pro ‘professio ionali lism m mark rked by d by tenacity a and d re respe pect’ ’ (ElBaradei) clo losely ly-knit it du due to share red e d expe periences & & membe ber s r states’ ’ crit ritic icis ism wis ish t to pre preserve s status and d be benefit its Analysts relatively new in safeguards; injecting themselves into a 50-year old culture also technical and fact-oriented, but desk-bound and with varied backgrounds (political science, intelligence, IT), more accustomed to collaborative work value all information, not just inspection data, including qualitative (subjective?)

Manager gers ma may not not ha have s safeguards/inspector

• r b

backgrou

• unds, b

but ut ma mana nagerial or

• r othe
• ther

conc

• ncerned w

with e th effectiveness, e efficiency and nd str trate tegic pla plannin ing mus must ta t take a all factor tors i into nto accoun

• unt i

in n assessing complia pliance ope pera ratio ional div l divis isio ions m may have t their ir own cult ltures, a , as may Concepts & Planning; Information Management and Technical l & Scie ientif ific ic Serv rvic ices management le leade ders rship ( p (pe pers rsonalit lity) k key t to cult ltura ral l for

• rma

mati tion

• n/change

 IAEA safeguards culture is robust  cultural change has undoubtedly occurred in

artifacts and espoused values since 1991

 current artifacts and espoused values

generally consistent

 but are underlying assumptions consistent

with artifacts and espoused values?

 different effects of cultural change on sub-

cultures: management, analysts, inspectors

 seek agreement on definition of safeguards

culture

 commission baseline study of state of the

culture, including interaction of sub-cultures

 monitor health of the culture periodically (as

in nuclear safety and security fields)

 ensure artifacts, espoused values and

underlying assumptions are in line