1
Understanding the Role of Registrars in DNSSEC Deployment Taejoong - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Understanding the Role of Registrars in DNSSEC Deployment Taejoong - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Understanding the Role of Registrars in DNSSEC Deployment Taejoong (tijay) Chung, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, David Choffnes, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs, Alan Mislove, Christo Wilson 1 DNSSEC 101 example.com's Authoritative DNS Resolver DNS
DNSSEC 101
DNS Resolver example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNSSEC 101
DNS Resolver example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNSSEC 101
DNS Resolver A records w/ DO bit example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNSSEC 101
DNS Resolver A records A records w/ DO bit example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
RRSIG
DNSSEC 101
DNS Resolver A records A records w/ DO bit example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
RRSIG
Previous work
DNSSEC deployment is very rare (~1%) but 30% of them tried (but failed to deploy correctly)
DNSSEC 101
DNS Resolver A records A records w/ DO bit example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
RRSIG
Previous work
DNSSEC deployment is very rare (~1%) but 30% of them tried (but failed to deploy correctly)
Why?
DNS Resolver
DNSSEC 101
3
example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNS Resolver
DNSSEC 101
3
example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNS Resolver
DNSSEC 101
3
A records w/ DO bit example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNS Resolver
DNSSEC 101
3
A records A records w/ DO bit example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
RRSIG
DNS Resolver
DNSSEC 101
3
A records A records w/ DO bit DNSKEY example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
RRSIG
DNS Resolver
DNSSEC 101
3
A records A records w/ DO bit DNSKEY example.com's Authoritative DNS Server . (root zone) .com
RRSIG
DNS Resolver DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101
3
A records A records w/ DO bit DNSKEY example.com's Authoritative DNS Server . (root zone) .com
RRSIG
DNS Resolver DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101
3
A records A records w/ DO bit DNSKEY example.com's Authoritative DNS Server . (root zone) .com
RRSIG
DNS Resolver DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101
3
A records A records w/ DO bit DNSKEY DNSKEY example.com's Authoritative DNS Server . (root zone) .com
RRSIG
DNS Resolver DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101
3
A records A records w/ DO bit DNSKEY DNSKEY example.com's Authoritative DNS Server . (root zone) .com
RRSIG
DNS Resolver DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101
3
A records A records w/ DO bit DNSKEY DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust example.com's Authoritative DNS Server . (root zone) .com
RRSIG
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
4
DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust DNSKEY DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
4
DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust DNSKEY DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
4
DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust DNSKEY DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
4
DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust DNSKEY
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
5
DNSKEY DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
5
DNSKEY DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust .com example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
5
DNSKEY DNSKEY DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust .com example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
5
DNSKEY DNSKEY DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust
=Hash( )
DNSKEY
DS Record .com example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
5
DNSKEY DNSKEY DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust
=Hash( )
DNSKEY
DS Record .com example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
5
RRSIG
DS Record DNSKEY DNSKEY DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust
=Hash( )
DNSKEY
DS Record .com example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
DNSSEC 101 Hierarchical Structure
5
RRSIG
DS Record DNSKEY DNSKEY DNSKEY Chain-of-Trust
~ 30% of domains w/ DNSKEY DO NOT DO THIS!
=Hash( )
DNSKEY
DS Record .com example.com's Authoritative DNS Server
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Buy example.com
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Owner Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Owner Buy example.com
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Owner Buy example.com
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
6
.COM (Verisign) Registry (TLD) GoDaddy Registrar Owner Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
7
.COM (Verisign) GoDaddy Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
7
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) GoDaddy Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
7
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) GoDaddy Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
7
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) GoDaddy Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
7
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) GoDaddy Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
7
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) GoDaddy Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
8
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) GoDaddy Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com
Registry, Registrar, and DNS Operator
8
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) GoDaddy Registry (TLD) Registrar
Registry, Registrar, Reseller, and DNS Operator
9
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) ASCIO Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com Antagonist Reseller
Registry, Registrar, Reseller, and DNS Operator
9
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) ASCIO Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com Antagonist Reseller
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, Reseller, and DNS Operator
9
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) ASCIO Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com Antagonist Reseller
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, Reseller, and DNS Operator
9
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) ASCIO Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com Antagonist Reseller
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, Reseller, and DNS Operator
9
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) ASCIO Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com Antagonist Reseller
DS Record
Registry, Registrar, Reseller, and DNS Operator
9
Delegate CloudFlare Third-Party DNS Operator .COM (Verisign) ASCIO Registry (TLD) Registrar Buy example.com Antagonist Reseller
Anecdotal Examples
10
Experiment Result
Anecdotal Examples
10
We saw the DNSKEY deployed (but not DS records) so asked why you don’t upload DS records. Experiment Result
Anecdotal Examples
10
We saw the DNSKEY deployed (but not DS records) so asked why you don’t upload DS records. [1] They removed a DNSSEC menu Experiment Result
Anecdotal Examples
10
We saw the DNSKEY deployed (but not DS records) so asked why you don’t upload DS records. [1] They removed a DNSSEC menu Experiment Result [2] “Most people do not understand DNS, so imagine the white faces when I mention DNSSEC”
Anecdotal Examples
10
We saw the DNSKEY deployed (but not DS records) so asked why you don’t upload DS records. [1] They removed a DNSSEC menu We asked a registrar to upload a DS record by email from the different email address than the one that registered Experiment Result [2] “Most people do not understand DNS, so imagine the white faces when I mention DNSSEC”
Anecdotal Examples
10
We saw the DNSKEY deployed (but not DS records) so asked why you don’t upload DS records. [1] They removed a DNSSEC menu We asked a registrar to upload a DS record by email from the different email address than the one that registered It was installed successfully Experiment Result [2] “Most people do not understand DNS, so imagine the white faces when I mention DNSSEC”
Anecdotal Examples
10
We saw the DNSKEY deployed (but not DS records) so asked why you don’t upload DS records. [1] They removed a DNSSEC menu We asked a registrar to upload a DS record to our domain via web live chat We asked a registrar to upload a DS record by email from the different email address than the one that registered It was installed successfully Experiment Result [2] “Most people do not understand DNS, so imagine the white faces when I mention DNSSEC”
Anecdotal Examples
10
We saw the DNSKEY deployed (but not DS records) so asked why you don’t upload DS records. [1] They removed a DNSSEC menu We asked a registrar to upload a DS record to our domain via web live chat It was installed on someone else’s domain due to a mistake by the customer service agent We asked a registrar to upload a DS record by email from the different email address than the one that registered It was installed successfully Experiment Result [2] “Most people do not understand DNS, so imagine the white faces when I mention DNSSEC”
Details of the Last Example
11
Details of the Last Example
11
3:45:32 PM tijay hg-dnssec.com 3600 IN DS 2371 13 2 129f34c04ac58ece5218b9894148304a736a63757f58ff0cddd9b8df4989
Details of the Last Example
11
3:45:32 PM tijay hg-dnssec.com 3600 IN DS 2371 13 2 129f34c04ac58ece5218b9894148304a736a63757f58ff0cddd9b8df4989 3:56:05 PM Jeniffer S Awesome! one moment
Details of the Last Example
11
3:45:32 PM tijay hg-dnssec.com 3600 IN DS 2371 13 2 129f34c04ac58ece5218b9894148304a736a63757f58ff0cddd9b8df4989 3:56:09 PM Jeniffer S I have now save the request information! Manage DNSSEC paananenmusic.com Record added
- successfully. It can take 4-8 hours for DNS to propagate
3:56:05 PM Jeniffer S Awesome! one moment
Details of the Last Example
11
3:45:32 PM tijay hg-dnssec.com 3600 IN DS 2371 13 2 129f34c04ac58ece5218b9894148304a736a63757f58ff0cddd9b8df4989 3:56:09 PM Jeniffer S I have now save the request information! Manage DNSSEC paananenmusic.com Record added
- successfully. It can take 4-8 hours for DNS to propagate
3:57:19 PM tijay paananenmusic.com? 3:57:28 PM tijay my domain is hg-dnssec.com? 3:56:05 PM Jeniffer S Awesome! one moment
Details of the Last Example
11
3:45:32 PM tijay hg-dnssec.com 3600 IN DS 2371 13 2 129f34c04ac58ece5218b9894148304a736a63757f58ff0cddd9b8df4989 3:56:09 PM Jeniffer S I have now save the request information! Manage DNSSEC paananenmusic.com Record added
- successfully. It can take 4-8 hours for DNS to propagate
3:57:19 PM tijay paananenmusic.com? 3:57:28 PM tijay my domain is hg-dnssec.com? 3:58:41 PM Jeniffer S I apologize, you are right, silly me,
- ne moment
3:56:05 PM Jeniffer S Awesome! one moment
Open Question
Open Question
Why is so hard to deploy DNSSEC?
Open Question
Why is so hard to deploy DNSSEC? How does registrar policy impact the deployment?
? ?
Outline
Why is so hard to deploy DNSSEC?
Outline
Why is so hard to deploy DNSSEC?
Popular registrar with lots of (1) domains and (2) DNSSEC-enabled domains
Checking Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
14
Registrar DNS Operator Registrar Supports DNSSEC?
Checking Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
14
Registrar DNS Operator Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Owner DNS Operator Registrar Supports DS upload?
Checking Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
14
Registrar DNS Operator Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Owner DNS Operator Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record?
Popular Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
15
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record?
Popular Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
15
Registrar
GoDaddy (domaincontrol.com) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com) OVH (ovh.net) HostGator (hostgator.com) Amazon (aws-dns) Google (googledomains.com) 123-reg (123-reg.co.uk) RightSide (name.com) eNom (name-services.com) NameBright (namebrightdns.com) DreamHost (dreamhost.com) The others (10 registrars)
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record?
Popular Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
15
Registrar
GoDaddy (domaincontrol.com) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com) OVH (ovh.net) HostGator (hostgator.com) Amazon (aws-dns) Google (googledomains.com) 123-reg (123-reg.co.uk) RightSide (name.com) eNom (name-services.com) NameBright (namebrightdns.com) DreamHost (dreamhost.com) The others (10 registrars)
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record?
Popular Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
15
Registrar
GoDaddy (domaincontrol.com) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com) OVH (ovh.net) HostGator (hostgator.com) Amazon (aws-dns) Google (googledomains.com) 123-reg (123-reg.co.uk) RightSide (name.com) eNom (name-services.com) NameBright (namebrightdns.com) DreamHost (dreamhost.com) The others (10 registrars)
Registrar DNS Operator
Some nameservers don’t support DNSSEC Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 2.5/20
Popular Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
16
Owner DNS Operator DS Upload Web Email
— — — — — — — —
Registrar
GoDaddy (domaincontrol.com) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com) OVH (ovh.net) HostGator (hostgator.com) Amazon (aws-dns) Google (googledomains.com) 123-reg (123-reg.co.uk) RightSide (name.com) eNom (name-services.com) NameBright (namebrightdns.com) DreamHost (dreamhost.com) The others (10 registrars)
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 2.5/20 11/20
Popular Registrar’s DNSSEC Policy
17
DS Validation Registrar
GoDaddy (domaincontrol.com) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com) OVH (ovh.net) HostGator (hostgator.com) Amazon (aws-dns) Google (googledomains.com) 123-reg (123-reg.co.uk) RightSide (name.com) eNom (name-services.com) NameBright (namebrightdns.com) DreamHost (dreamhost.com) The others (10 registrars) Owner DNS Operator DS Upload Web Email
— — — — — — — —
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 2/20 2.5/20 11/20
Popular Registrar
18
DNS Operator # of Registrar Support DNSSEC? Registrar 2.5/20 Owner 11/20 Check DS Validation Owner 2/11
Registrar DNSSEC Support for popular registrars is quite poor
Each registrar has different policy for supporting DNSSEC.
Popular DNSSEC Support Registrars
19
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record?
Registrar
OVH (ovh.net) Loopia (loopia.se) DomainNameShop (hyp.net) TransIP (transip.net) MeshDigital (domainmonster.com) OVH (anycast.me) TransIP (transip.nl) Binero (binero.se) KPN (is.nl) PCExtreme (pcextreme.nl) Antagonist (webhostingserver.nl) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com)
Registrar DNS Operator
20
Registrar DNS Operator
DNSSEC Default Publish DS Records?
Registrar
OVH (ovh.net) Loopia (loopia.se) DomainNameShop (hyp.net) TransIP (transip.net) MeshDigital (domainmonster.com) OVH (anycast.me) TransIP (transip.nl) Binero (binero.se) KPN (is.nl) PCExtreme (pcextreme.nl) Antagonist (webhostingserver.nl) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com)
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 10/12 Selective support
Owner DNS Operator
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 10/12
Registrar
OVH (ovh.net) Loopia (loopia.se) DomainNameShop (hyp.net) TransIP (transip.net) MeshDigital (domainmonster.com) OVH (anycast.me) TransIP (transip.nl) Binero (binero.se) KPN (is.nl) PCExtreme (pcextreme.nl) Antagonist (webhostingserver.nl) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com)
Owner DNS Operator
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 10/12
Owner DNS Operator
DS Upload
10/12
Registrar
OVH (ovh.net) Loopia (loopia.se) DomainNameShop (hyp.net) TransIP (transip.net) MeshDigital (domainmonster.com) OVH (anycast.me) TransIP (transip.nl) Binero (binero.se) KPN (is.nl) PCExtreme (pcextreme.nl) Antagonist (webhostingserver.nl) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com)
DS Validation
22
DS Validation
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 10/12 10/12 2/12
— — Registrar
OVH (ovh.net) Loopia (loopia.se) DomainNameShop (hyp.net) TransIP (transip.net) MeshDigital (domainmonster.com) OVH (anycast.me) TransIP (transip.nl) Binero (binero.se) KPN (is.nl) PCExtreme (pcextreme.nl) Antagonist (webhostingserver.nl) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com)
Fetches a DNSKEY from the nameserver
Owner DNS Operator
DS Upload
Other Security Issues
23
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 10/12 10/12 2/12
Registrar
OVH (ovh.net) Loopia (loopia.se) DomainNameShop (hyp.net) TransIP (transip.net) MeshDigital (domainmonster.com) OVH (anycast.me) TransIP (transip.nl) Binero (binero.se) KPN (is.nl) PCExtreme (pcextreme.nl) Antagonist (webhostingserver.nl) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com) DS Validation
Owner DNS Operator
DS Upload DS Upload Web Email
— — — — — — — —
Other Security Issues
23
Registrar Supports DNSSEC? Registrar Supports DS upload? Registrar Validates DS record? 10/12 10/12 2/12
Registrar
OVH (ovh.net) Loopia (loopia.se) DomainNameShop (hyp.net) TransIP (transip.net) MeshDigital (domainmonster.com) OVH (anycast.me) TransIP (transip.nl) Binero (binero.se) KPN (is.nl) PCExtreme (pcextreme.nl) Antagonist (webhostingserver.nl) NameCheap (registrar-servers.com) DS Validation
Owner DNS Operator
DS Upload DS Upload Web Email
— — — — — — — —
Outline
Why is DNSSEC deployment so rare? How does a registrar policy impact the deployment?
? ?
Outline
Why is DNSSEC deployment so rare? How does a registrar policy impact the deployment?
? ? We need historical dataset
Dataset
25
TLD Measurement Period (Daily Scan) Domains Total
Percent w/ DNSKEY
.com 2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31 118,147,199 0.7% .net 2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31 13,773,903 1.0% .org 2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31 9,682,750 1.1% .nl 2016/02/09 ~ 2016/12/31 5,674,208 51.6% .se 2016-06-07 ~ 2016/12/31 1,388,372 46.7%
Dataset
25
TLD Measurement Period (Daily Scan) Domains Total
Percent w/ DNSKEY
.com 2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31 118,147,199 0.7% .net 2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31 13,773,903 1.0% .org 2015/03/01 ~ 2016/12/31 9,682,750 1.1% .nl 2016/02/09 ~ 2016/12/31 5,674,208 51.6% .se 2016-06-07 ~ 2016/12/31 1,388,372 46.7%
Over 750 billion DNS Records
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Loopia (*.loopia.se) Percent of domains with DNSKEY and DS record Date .com .net .org .se .nl 20 40 60 80 100 KPN (*.is.nl) .com .net .org .se .nl
[1] Registry: Financial Incentive
26
KPN
.nl measurement begins here .se measurement begins here
Loopia
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Loopia (*.loopia.se) Percent of domains with DNSKEY and DS record Date .com .net .org .se .nl 20 40 60 80 100 KPN (*.is.nl) .com .net .org .se .nl
[1] Registry: Financial Incentive
26
KPN
.nl measurement begins here .se measurement begins here
Loopia
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Loopia (*.loopia.se) Percent of domains with DNSKEY and DS record Date .com .net .org .se .nl 20 40 60 80 100 KPN (*.is.nl) .com .net .org .se .nl
[1] Registry: Financial Incentive
26
KPN
.nl measurement begins here .se measurement begins here
Loopia
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Loopia (*.loopia.se) Percent of domains with DNSKEY and DS record Date .com .net .org .se .nl 20 40 60 80 100 KPN (*.is.nl) .com .net .org .se .nl
[1] Registry: Financial Incentive
26
KPN
.nl measurement begins here .se measurement begins here
Loopia
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Loopia (*.loopia.se) Percent of domains with DNSKEY and DS record Date .com .net .org .se .nl 20 40 60 80 100 KPN (*.is.nl) .com .net .org .se .nl
[1] Registry: Financial Incentive
26
KPN
.nl measurement begins here .se measurement begins here
Loopia
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Loopia (*.loopia.se) Percent of domains with DNSKEY and DS record Date .com .net .org .se .nl 20 40 60 80 100 KPN (*.is.nl) .com .net .org .se .nl
[1] Registry: Financial Incentive
26
KPN
Financial Incentive
Financial gain is a huge incentive for deploying DNSSEC
.nl measurement begins here .se measurement begins here
Loopia
[2] Registrar: Free vs. Paid
27
5 10 15 20 25 30 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS record Date OVH GoDaddy
[2] Registrar: Free vs. Paid
27
5 10 15 20 25 30 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS record Date OVH GoDaddy
[2] Registrar: Free vs. Paid
27
5 10 15 20 25 30 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS record Date OVH GoDaddy
[2] Registrar: Free vs. Paid
27
5 10 15 20 25 30 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS record Date OVH GoDaddy
Free vs. Paid
Free DNSSEC support encourages users to deploy DNSSEC
28
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS and DNSKEY record Date .com .net .org .nl 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 # of domains .com .net .org .nl
[3] Reseller (.com, .org, .net)
- vs. Registrar (.nl)
28
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS and DNSKEY record Date .com .net .org .nl 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 # of domains .com .net .org .nl
[3] Reseller (.com, .org, .net)
- vs. Registrar (.nl)
28
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS and DNSKEY record Date .com .net .org .nl 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 # of domains .com .net .org .nl
[3] Reseller (.com, .org, .net)
- vs. Registrar (.nl)
28
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS and DNSKEY record Date .com .net .org .nl 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 # of domains .com .net .org .nl
[3] Reseller (.com, .org, .net)
- vs. Registrar (.nl)
28
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS and DNSKEY record Date .com .net .org .nl 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 # of domains .com .net .org .nl
12/14
Changed their registrar to
- ne that supports DNSSEC
[3] Reseller (.com, .org, .net)
- vs. Registrar (.nl)
28
20 40 60 80 100 05/15 08/15 11/15 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DS and DNSKEY record Date .com .net .org .nl 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 # of domains .com .net .org .nl
Registrar
- vs. Reseller
Complex relationship between reseller and registrar also result in slow deployment of DNSSEC
12/14
Changed their registrar to
- ne that supports DNSSEC
[3] Reseller (.com, .org, .net)
- vs. Registrar (.nl)
DNS Operator
Third-Party
[4] Third-Party DNS Operator
29 29
Verisign Antagonist ASCIO Registry Registrar Reseller CloudFlare Owner Third-Party
DS Record DS Record DS Record DS Record DS Record
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DNSKEY record Date 20 40 60 80 100 Percent of domains with DNSKEY that has DS record
[4] Third-Party DNS Operator <Cloudflare>
30 30 DS DNSKEY DNSKEY
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DNSKEY record Date 20 40 60 80 100 Percent of domains with DNSKEY that has DS record
[4] Third-Party DNS Operator <Cloudflare>
30 30 DS DNSKEY DNSKEY
Cloudflare announced universal DNSSEC
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DNSKEY record Date 20 40 60 80 100 Percent of domains with DNSKEY that has DS record
[4] Third-Party DNS Operator <Cloudflare>
30 30 DS DNSKEY DNSKEY
Cloudflare announced universal DNSSEC
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DNSKEY record Date 20 40 60 80 100 Percent of domains with DNSKEY that has DS record
[4] Third-Party DNS Operator <Cloudflare>
30 30 DS DNSKEY DNSKEY
Cloudflare announced universal DNSSEC
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 02/16 05/16 08/16 11/16 Percent of domains with DNSKEY record Date 20 40 60 80 100 Percent of domains with DNSKEY that has DS record
[4] Third-Party DNS Operator <Cloudflare>
30 30 DS DNSKEY
Third-party DNS Operator
Deploying DNSSEC is even harder for users using third-party DNS Operators
DNSKEY
Cloudflare announced universal DNSSEC
Conclusion
31
Conclusion
- Registrars play a critical role in supporting DNSSEC today
- Only 3 out of 20 registrars support DNSSEC on their
authoritative nameservers
- Only 11 out of 20 registrars support uploading a custom DS
record
31
Conclusion
- Registrars play a critical role in supporting DNSSEC today
- Only 3 out of 20 registrars support DNSSEC on their
authoritative nameservers
- Only 11 out of 20 registrars support uploading a custom DS
record
31
- DNSSEC deployment depends on many policies
- Registrar: Free
- Registry: Financial incentive
- Reseller: Beware to choose a partner (i.e., registrar)
- Third-party: CDS/CDNSKEY
Thanks!
32