US involvement in Mid-East wars: How can it end? The US has been in - - PDF document

US involvement in Mid-East wars: How can it end?

The US has been in a state of perpetual war in the Middle East since 1991. Most of the presidential candidates in both major parties support continuing the perpetual war. Some would expand it to Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia and/or Yemen. Is there any escape for the US from perpetual Mid-East war? Rediscovering our own traditions, experience and collective wisdom can show us a way.

A presentation by

David Grappo, J.D.

To the Academy for Lifelong Learning March 10, 2016

1: Introduction: How I got here

• 2. Credentials
• 3. Usefulness of independent observers
• 4. George Washington’s view on foreign wars/treaties/and entanglements
• 5. Some major players involved in Middle East politics
• 5a. ISIS
• 5b. Turkey and Saudi Arabia
• 5c. Syria, Iran, and Russia
• 5d. Israel
• 5e. The Kurds
• 5f. Syrian “Moderates”
• 6. Historical overlay in Middle East
• 6a. Historical overlay: Shia and Sunni Muslims
• 6b. Historical overlay: the Crusades
• 7. Relevance of Washington’s foreign policy advice today
• 8. Washington’s advice modernized
• 9. Applying the modern approach to the US/ISIS conflict
• 10. The US lacks any strategy for dealing with ISIS
• 11. What military action should the US consider now with respect to ISIS and other Middle East hot spots?
• 12. Responding to the “fight there now or here later” argument for US military intervention
• 12a. “Fight there now or here later” argument has a history of failed uses in modern practice.
• 12b. Viet Nam
• 12c. Iraq
• 12d. Afghanistan
• 13. Immediate withdrawal from preemptive wars has been the most effective action the US could take.
• 13a. Viet Nam
• 13b. Lebanon
• 13c. Somalia
• 13d. Comparative effectiveness of intervention strategy and total withdrawal strategy
• 14. Abraham Lincoln’s advice: make friends not enemies. Four modern examples.
• 14a. Applying Lincoln’s advice
• 15. Summary

1 1: Introduction: How I got here Thank you Judy Ringle and thank you to the Academy of Lifelong Learning for inviting me to speak to you today. It is an honor for me to be here. It is also somewhat of a surprise to me that I am here. I need to tell you the story of how I got here today. That will help me explain to you the significance, or lack thereof, of what I am going to say to you today. Our topic today is United States involvement in Middle East wars. Is there a way out of these wars for the United States? Just over a year ago I wrote an “As I See It” column for the Gazette-Times on this topic. As many of you know, the Gazette-Times allows local people to write short columns of up to 600 words on any topic of interest to them. The GT hesitated at first, but finally decided to publish the column I had written. The GT editors were a little dubious because I couldn’t identify for them any credentials I had to address this topic. I think I finally convinced them to publish my article when I pointed out that they had run many pro-war articles by nationally syndicated columnists, but nothing by anybody who opposed US involvement in Middle East

• wars. My article was definitely opposed to US involvement in those wars. In fact, I

advocated immediate withdrawal of the US from those wars. So, possibly in the interest of presenting an opposing point of view, the GT published my article. Shortly after its publication I got a call from Judy Ringle who coordinates speakers for the Academy of Lifelong Learning. She asked me to expand on the column I wrote and give this talk today. I explained to her that I lack the traditional foreign policy credentials that speakers on this subject might be expected to have. She encouraged me anyway - and so here I am today.

• 2. Credentials

I want to talk a little bit more about the whole concept of credentials. And how, even with my apparent lack of credentials, I can still contribute to the debate on our important topic of today. So what do we mean when we say that someone has credentials? Credentials can be academic in nature. A professor who spends his or her life studying a subject would be someone who we would say has credentials in that subject matter. In our discussion about Middle East wars, someone who has been in the diplomatic corps would be someone who we would say has credentials. A person may have a lot of military, business, or travel experience in an area like the Middle East. That would be someone who we would say has credentials to speak out about Middle East affairs. Someone who has simply been a media pundit for years would also be someone who we might say has credentials to speak out about most anything they wanted to speak out about. Well, I don’t fit into any of those categories. I have no academic, or diplomatic, or military or business experience in the Middle East. I have never been there. Yet there is a special kind

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• f credential that has long been recognized as worth paying attention to that I may have to
• ffer.
• 3. Usefulness of independent observers

This special credential has an honored place in the history of English literature. In 1837 Hans Christian Anderson published his famous short story and fable entitled “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” In that story two con men approach an emperor and convince him that they can weave a fantastic set of new clothes for him, but only people who are smart and competent will be able to see the clothes. The new clothes will be invisible to anyone who is dumb or incompetent. The emperor falls for the con job and decides to parade about in his new clothes after letting everybody know what the weavers have told him. The weavers were frauds and con men, but surprisingly many people who saw the emperor were lavish in their praise of his new clothes. The emperor finally paraded past a young child who laughed and exclaimed that the emperor was not wearing any clothes at all. Then everyone realized how foolish they had been and all had a good laugh at the fact that the emperor was parading about without any clothes. There are two important lessons we can take away from this famous fable. The first lesson is that sometimes people who should know better can get persuaded to accept as true something they should easily recognize as false. The second important lesson is that in

• rder to get an honest opinion about something, sometimes you have to go completely
• utside the normal range of experts.

That is where I come in. I am not within the range of experts anybody would think to consult about Middle Eastern affairs. Think of me like the child in The Emperor’s New Clothes fable. I can be candid and honest about Middle East affairs because I don’t have anyone who I fear and must please. And so I can share with you today a set of thoughts, observations, and questions that can help you resist the strong tendencies now pushing our country toward new and bigger wars in the Middle East. We shouldn’t want to go there. So let’s start talking about the reasons why we should stay

• ut of Middle East wars.
• 4. George Washington’s view on foreign wars/treaties/and entanglements

The column I wrote for the Gazette-Times begins by referencing George Washington’s famous farewell address. I think that is a great place to begin any discussion of the proper United States role in the Middle East. Most of us are familiar with the most famous parts of Washington’s farewell address. Washington urged the country to avoid foreign entanglements and treaties and to avoid taking sides in Europe’s constant wars. He pointed

• ut that European politics were so complicated that the United States would find it

impossible to find a proper way to get involved in European wars. Picking any ally to support would surely offend some other ally. Picking any enemy to oppose would surely offend some other preexisting or potential ally. Europe has too many factions, intrigues and political undercurrents that the United States has no interest in supporting.

3 Washington’s advice did not specifically mention the Middle East. He spoke only of Europe. But that was only because no one at the time even imagined that the United States would get involved in Middle-East wars. Washington’s advice is as applicable to the Middle East now as it was to Europe in his time. As we will discuss later, Middle-East politics in our time is as complex as the politics of Europe in Washington’s time. There is no safe way for the United States to step into Middle- East wars. Our prudent course is simply to stay out of those wars. However before we look at the problems with getting involved in Mid-East wars, I want to talk a little bit about why we might want to look to George Washington as an advisor on our current war policies. For many years most everyone in the United States felt fondly towards George Washington and the entire group of men collectively known as our Founding Fathers. It was always common to include a few quotations from them in any speech about public affairs or about how government should operate. It is hard to underestimate what the American Revolution and the people who fought for it accomplished. Our Revolution was not a social revolution. The daily lives of people in the United States didn’t change because of our Revolution. Our Revolution was a revolution in the way people thought about their relationship to their

• government. Prior to our Revolution royalty governed most of Europe. Kings and queens

ruled under a theory known as “the divine right of kings.” Our revolution threw out that

• concept. Our Declaration of Independence proclaimed that governments derive their just

powers from the consent of the governed. It was our Revolution that established that concept in the minds of people. We all take that concept for granted now. Some of us can’t even imagine how anyone could ever have thought differently - the concept has become so ingrained in our way of thinking about government. But it was a radical and revolutionary thought when used to justify the American Revolution. George Washington unquestionably deserves our respect and a prominent place in history as the leader of our Revolution. He understood the profound significance of what he was doing though he may have been less prolific in his writing about it than others. Because of how George Washington performed in carrying out his pivotal role in our history, we can justifiably look to him for advice and wisdom on topics related to what he dealt with in hopes of finding inspiration for dealing with our own predicaments. It was George Santayana who warned, “Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.” Washington’s advice on dealing with the complexities of European politics and wars certainly has the appearance of a learned lesson about history. It is hard to find any fault with his argument. The consequences of ignoring him has produced failed military interventions by the US and the jumbled confusion we see in our Middle East policies today.

• 5. Some major players involved in Middle East politics

4 At this point I would like to go on sort of a condensed tour with you of some of the major players in the Middle East. Let’s look briefly at how the United States relates to each of these players. Let’s see if we can find the same kind of convoluted situation and relationships in the Middle East that George Washington saw in Europe. Are there a multitude of factions, intrigues, special interests and political undercurrents in the Middle East that make the area especially treacherous for any United States military intervention there? Well, of course, that is exactly what we will find.

• 5a. ISIS

Let’s start by looking briefly at ISIS, one of the newest players in the Middle East. In the past 2 years ISIS has grown from obscurity to become what the US government considers to be the greatest single foreign threat facing the nation. President Obama says we must “degrade and destroy” ISIS. No other nation gets such ferocious rhetoric thrown at it by the US as ISIS. ISIS is treated as more of a threat than Iran, North Korea, or Russia.

• 5b. Turkey and Saudi Arabia

The next two major players we should look at in the Middle East are Turkey and Saudi

• Arabia. The one thing these two countries have in common is that the United States

considers both of them to be allies or friends of the US. Yet these two countries are believed to be the earliest promoters of the rise of ISIS. Turkey allows free movement of personnel and supplies and Saudi Arabia provides financing. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia treat the Assad regime in Syria as hostile to them. Both would like to rid Syria of Assad. To do that both supported ISIS as ISIS forcefully expelled Assad from some northern sections of Syria. ISIS continues to fight him to this day. It is not known to what extent Turkey and Saudi Arabia still support ISIS. Both may be motivated to support ISIS because both are Sunni- Muslim majority countries and Syria is a branch of Shiite. I think it is worth noting that although ISIS controls territory that borders Turkey in Syria and Iraq, ISIS seems to fully respect Turkey’s territorial borders. I am not aware of any reports of ISIS trying to take over any territory from Turkey. Despite its sometimes grandiose rhetoric, even ISIS seems to recognize that some international borders must be respected.

• 5c. Syria, Iran, and Russia

The next group of three players we should look at is Syria, Iran, and Russia. I look at these three players together because they have one common goal: they support the Assad government in Syria. But even before ISIS became a major player, the United States had committed itself to removing the Assad government from Syria. Now that the US has elevated ISIS to its number one nemesis in the Middle East, US policy finds itself in a miserable quandary. If it fights ISIS, it indirectly helps support the Syrian government that has lost a lot of territory to ISIS. On the other hand, if it successfully removes Assad from Syria, ISIS and its supporters may fill the void and take over all of Syria.

5 How can the interventionist minded US policymakers deal with such a quandary? Well, before you try to answer that question, let’s complicate the situation a little more. Let’s talk about the role of Iran. The United States and Iran have been hostile ever since the takeover

• f the US embassy in Iran in 1979. Iran is predominantly a Shite-Muslim country, which may

explain its ongoing support for the Syrian government. US policymakers paint Iran as nefariously trying to upstage the US in influence throughout the Middle East. Getting rid of the Assad government has become a primary objective of US policy in order to counter Iran’s influence in the region. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, getting rid of Assad may promote ISIS as the next group to rule Syria. US policymakers certainly don’t want that. So what are they to do? Well, let’s complicate the situation even more. Let’s talk about the role of Russia in the Middle East. The US and Russia have been rivals for decades. Because of Russia’s military strength, the US has tried to constrict Russia’s influence everywhere in the world. Russia’s two biggest allies in the Middle East are Iran and Syria. Syria is particularly important to Russia because Syria is the site of Russia’s only military base in the Middle East, a naval facility at Tartus on the central coast of Syria. Russia has been a major supplier of military hardware to the Syrian government, in part, to protect its own base there. The US views getting rid of the Assad regime as a double objective because it could then hopefully restrict the influence of both Iran and Russia in the Middle East. The counterpoint is that the US has no way to know if a successor to Assad may be even a worse alternative if it were an entity in the ISIS mold. And any direct attempt by the United States to remove Assad may provoke a much bigger conflict with Russia or Iran. The US track record in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya does not provide any reason to believe that a US military intervention in Syria would produce a good result.

• 5d. Israel

In our survey of Middle East players, let’s shift now to a player unexpectedly quiet and absent from much of the current activity. That player is the nation of Israel. Israel is considered the most dependable US ally in the Middle East. Yet Israel contributed nothing to either Iraq war the US fought. Israel contributes nothing to the US efforts in Afghanistan. Israel did not provide any support to the Libya campaign. Israel provides nothing in the war effort against ISIS. What is going on here? How can the most dependable Mid-East ally of the US be absent in every instance that the US intervenes in the Mid East? The answer is simple. Both Israel and the US realize that Israel is the one country that is most hated by all the other countries in the Middle East. Both Israel and the US realize that no other Middle Eastern country would participate in any military coalition in which Israel was involved. As a result, the US does not ask Israel to become involved or to contribute supplies, manpower, or support of any kind. Similarly, Israel for the same reason does not

• ffer to help in any way. Both the US and Israel know that participation by Israel would make

it impossible for the US to get other Mid East nations to support its interventions. As a result, Israel escapes any participation in the US military interventions in the Mid East. In the complex world of Mid East politics, the United States is unable to call upon its strongest ally in the region for any support whatsoever when it comes to a military intervention.

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• 5e. The Kurds

Now let’s switch to another strange anomaly in Mid East relationships. Let’s consider the Kurds - the Kurdish people. The Kurdish people occupy land in both Southern Turkey and in Northern Iraq and Syria. The Kurds are regularly involved in fighting against ISIS. The US generally regards the Kurds as the most effective Middle Eastern group fighting against

• ISIS. Some US legislators have advocated arming the Kurds with sophisticated US military
• hardware. That isn’t going to happen. The reason is that the other major US ally in the

region, Turkey, objects to the US providing any support to the Kurds. The Kurds have at various times expressed an interest in forming an independent country. That new country would be formed from some territory currently occupied by ISIS in Syria, some territory currently occupied or claimed by Iraq, and some territory occupied by Turkey. Turkey regards the major active Kurdish group as terrorists that should be wiped out. Both Turkey and the current Iraqi government are opposed to giving up any territory to the Kurds. Both think problems with ISIS should be managed without involving or arming any Kurds. Their fear is that once armed the Kurds will keep fighting against both Turkey and Iraq until they get independence. So the US cannot give any assistance to the Kurdish people without enraging both Turkey and the Iraqi governments.

• 5f. Syrian “Moderates”

The last group I want to look at, and I will only do so briefly, is the fighting group the US government calls the Syrian “moderates.” I can’t talk about these people much because our government won’t tell us much about them either because it doesn’t know much about them

• r it doesn’t want us to know what it knows. By calling these fighting groups “moderates”,

the US government wants people to think that these people are politically middle-of-the-road people - much like simple Democrats or Republicans back home in the United States. That is not likely the case at all. Armed civilians who actively participate in insurrection or warfare are not “moderates.” “Moderates” don’t go around killing people, even for a good cause. The people our government politely labels as “moderates” are, at best, active revolutionaries. They may just be gangsters. We don’t know. Our government probably doesn’t know. It is simply too incredible to believe that there exists anywhere in the Middle East an armed civilian group that is supportive of Western values or sympathetic to the interests of the United States. Mislabeling such people as “moderates” doesn’t conceal the fact that such groups are likely to be very dangerous, highly unreliable in loyalties, and chronically unstable in leadership. Contrary to the exhortations of people like Senator John McCain, these are not people to whom modern weaponry can safely be entrusted. I am going to conclude here my discussion of the players in the Middle East wars. My survey has not been a comprehensive survey by any means. There are many other great and small players who have great and small roles in the region. What I have given you is enough to reach our necessary conclusions on the proper role of the United States in the region.

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• 6. Historical overlay in Middle East

But before we get there to talk about the role of the US, we need to identify two other what I call historical overlays of what is happening in the Mid-East. We will simply identify these

• verlays. As Westerners we are unable to fully appreciate the effect these historical forces

have on the lives of Islamic people in the Mid-East. We know the effect is profound, so we need to aware of them; but we are unlikely ever to fully understand or appreciate them. What are these historical overlays or historical forces?

• 6a. Historical overlay: Shia and Sunni Muslims

The first great historical overlay is the Islamic split between Shia and Sunni followers. As we Westerners observe modern wars and hostilities between Islamic people, nothing seems to better explain the alignment of groups or countries better that simply to point out whether

• ne side comes from primarily a Sunni or a Shite tradition. Within each of those traditions

there are multiple branches and divisions. But when it comes to hostilities and wars, the alignment of parties seems to follow the larger Shite/Sunni split. We in the West can compare what we see in the Middle East today with what happened in Europe after the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century. Much blood was spilled in the European wars between Catholic and Protestant countries. Those wars among Christians seem to have abated only recently with the end of Catholic/Protestant killings in Ireland - but we really can’t be sure of even that. Unfortunately for the adherents of Islam, their wars are not over. They seem to actually be increasing in intensity in the last few years as an unfortunate byproduct of the Arab Spring. And it is not apparent that those wars are going to end anytime soon. A fairly safe prediction would be that those wars are not going to end in

• ur lifetimes. Westerners can hardly understand those wars, let alone have it within their

power to stop them. The wisest policy for Westerners is simply to stay out of those wars.

• 6b. Historical overlay: the Crusades

The second great historical overlay on the Middle East is the enduring impact of the Crusades on Islamic people. Although the Crusaders from Europe stopped descending on the Middle East over 500 years ago, resentment over the destruction they caused is still

• strong. Every European looking person who appears in the Mid East toting lethal weapons

must overcome the suspicion of being seen as a returning Crusader. US military interventions in the Middle East during the past 25 years have done more to revive those old fears rather than to reduce them. The shadow of the Crusades still haunts any Western military intervention in the Middle East. So this completes my cursory survey of the current state of the Middle East as it presents itself to us. US policymakers must decide what, if anything, they are going to do now.

8 As I said before, I realize there are lots of other players involved here, and lots of other considerations and factors involved. But I have given you a snapshot of some of the biggest issues and concerns facing US policymakers. We could spend a lot of time talking about additional players and concerns. If we did that the entire situation would get even more complex than I have painted it. It would not get simpler. I don’t think we need to do that. I think we already have enough of a picture in order to say some sensible things about the best US policy in the Mid East going forward.

• 7. Relevance of Washington’s foreign policy advice today

So let’s go back to where we started. Let’s go back to what George Washington said about getting involved in Europe’s wars. He warned the country to stay out of entangling alliances. He pointed out that there are so many factions, intrigues and circumstances in Europe that there was no good way for the US to get involved in European politics or wars. Washington’s description of Europe in his day is a perfect description of the Middle East in

• ur day. The situation in the Middle East is so complex that any military action the US takes

is certain to have serious adverse consequences. There is no way to thread the needle there and come up with any plan of action that can produce a desired result. The best plan

• f action is simply to stay out of Middle East wars. I think it is pretty safe to say that with

respect to the Middle East, George Washington would advise us to follow the same advice he gave us about Europe. Stay out of Middle East wars. Many of us modern folks have a problem with looking to someone like George Washington for advice. Can what he said so many years ago still be relevant today? Haven’t we grown any smarter or wiser in all these years so that we don’t need advice from him anymore? I think these are fair questions.

• 8. Washington’s advice modernized

In my study on this topic I have found what I think is an updated and modern, but still Washingtonian approach to analyzing US war policy in the Middle East. The updated modern approach begins by asking this question: for any military intervention the United States undertakes against ISIS or anyone else, what is our endgame plan or exit strategy for concluding our involvement? You probably have heard this question asked many times: What is our endgame strategy? It represents a very succinct and focused way to help us modern folks analyze how to deal with a difficult situation. But I see this modern approach as really just the flip side of the same issue George Washington was addressing. George Washington advised us not to jump into what obviously is a dangerous snake pit. The modern analysis instead asks: how are you going to get out of that snake pit once you get into it? George Washington focused on the front end of the problem. He says, once you see a snake pit, avoid it if you can. The modern approach looks at the back end of the same problem and says, before jumping into a snake pit, first figure out how you can eventually and safely get out of it.

9 For purposes of analysis, either of these approaches will do. They should both lead you to the same conclusions. You can formulate the question either way you choose. I think it is worth knowing that Washington came up with an analytical tool that is as useful as anything else we have been able to come up with today. Let’s be careful about thinking that anything

• ld is also outdated. That’s not the case at all.
• 9. Applying the modern approach to the US/ISIS conflict

But let’s carry through with the modern analysis, apply it to the current US military intervention against ISIS, and see what results we get. According to President Obama, the US is committed to a campaign to “degrade and destroy” ISIS. That campaign consists of heavy bombing of ISIS controlled locations, some unspecified support for some “moderate” rebels opposing ISIS, and probably some other clandestine activities. That’s the campaign. But that campaign is not producing desired

• results. President Obama claims that the amount of territory ISIS controls in Iraq and Syria

has been reduced. But unfortunately, ISIS folks have reappeared in Libya, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Fighting ISIS is starting to look like the famous carnival game called “whack-a-mole.” In that game you try to swat any mole that appears in one of many holes on a tabletop. But each time you swat one mole, another appears in a different hole. Fighting ISIS is starting to look like a real life whack-a-mole game. ISIS reappears at some other location else every time you think you have it under control in one location. That doesn’t look like progress towards a goal. So it’s certainly time that we should hear from President Obama his answer to the basic question about any war: what is the endgame or exit strategy in the Middle East war against ISIS? President Obama has been remarkably candid in addressing that question. Unfortunately his response has also been remarkably distressing. He told the nation that fighting ISIS would be a long war. His successors will also have to fight this war. That is what President Obama told the nation. Essentially what he said was that there is no endgame or exit strategy for the war against ISIS. Like the wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, this war has no foreseeable end. It is becoming part of the perpetual war the United States has waged in the Middle East for the last 25 years.

• 10. The US lacks any strategy for dealing with ISIS

Just over a year ago, President Obama came under severe criticism for saying that he had “no strategy” for dealing with ISIS. I thought that what he said then was an accurate and honest statement and it continues to be an accurate statement. However, I thought President Obama could have expressed himself more artfully. What he should have said is this:

10 There is no military strategy involving the United States that has any hope of success in resolving Middle East conflicts. The best course of action for the United States is to get out

• f all involvement in Middle East wars. Anything we can imagine to do now will be as

ineffective as all the things we have been doing for years. We just don’t have any new ideas to bring to the table. What we are doing now isn’t working. It is time to stop. President Obama’s critics would have attacked him for saying anything so honest, but the American people would have recognized the truth in what he said. The American people would likely have supported him. When President Obama later announced his proposal to “degrade and destroy” ISIS, his congressional critics correctly pointed out that that was no kind of workable strategy. They demanded that he submit a new war powers resolution to Congress so that Congress could examine his proposal, rewrite it as deemed appropriate, and properly exercise its constitutional war powers. Obama’s critics thought he would be forced into submitting something they could criticize as wholly inadequate. At this point we all should have recognized the truth. Any United States war strategy in the Middle East is much like the fable of the emperor’s new clothes. It is hopeless to try to design a workable war strategy. There just is no strategy anyone can suggest that has any prospects of producing desirable results. I think President Obama recognizes that reality, even if he has not expressed it. So President Obama sent a proposal to Congress that basically said that with respect to ISIS and any other terrorists he should be authorized to exercise whatever war power he thought necessary, whenever he thought it necessary, and wherever he thought it

• necessary. He then asked the Congress to restrict this proposal in whatever way the

Congress saw fit. Obama’s critics thought that they had maneuvered him into proposing an unworkable war policy. Instead, Obama threw the responsibility back onto them. Obama’s Congressional critics quietly stopped talking about drafting of a war powers resolution. They too know that trying to draft a useful war strategy is a hopeless task. They were not about to make fools of themselves by trying to do the impossible. That Congressional exercise in brinkmanship with Obama is both illuminating and sad. It was illuminating because it vividly demonstrated that no one in Congress or the White House believes they have the ability to craft a workable Middle East war strategy for the United States. No one was even willing to try. That’s how hopeless the effort is. Sadly, however, neither Obama nor his critics used the fruitless exercise as a teaching moment for the pubic. The fact that there is not now and cannot be a coherent US Middle East war strategy remains a fact unspoken by any US government official. No US government official wants to be the first to admit that this emperor has no clothes.

• 11. What military action should the US consider now with respect to ISIS and other

Middle East hot spots?

11 So let’s talk for a little bit about what the US should be doing about ISIS now. Actually, it is not necessary that the US do anything about ISIS now. I think we should remember that the first time President Obama even mentioned ISIS, he called it the JV, or junior varsity team. By that he meant that as a military power, ISIS was definitely not a threat to the United

• States. It has no air force, no navy, no long-range missiles, and no known weapons of mass
• destruction. Some of its best weapons are American made, either captured from retreating

Iraqi forces, or purchased from arms dealers. ISIS practices and rhetoric are certainly gruesome and hateful, but that does not equate to a military threat. The US can certainly repel any actual threat that may develop from ISIS. In the meantime, we should let regional powers in the Middle East deal with ISIS as they see

• fit. They obviously aren’t as concerned about ISIS as people in the USA or Europe.

So that completes our cursory view of the major players and some historical influences the United States faces in the Middle East as it tries to create a war policy there. I think it is fair to say that anywhere that the United States tries to intervene in the Middle East, it will get seriously burned and worsen whatever situation it steps into. That summarizes its recent military history there. But it also summarizes any prospective military action the US may take. George Washington would have no hesitation in advising the US on its best course of action

• there. His advice would be simple. Stay out of any wars there. If instead we choose to use

an updated version of Washington’s advice, we can ask ourselves this famous question: what is our endgame or exit strategy there? There isn’t such a strategy. No one can think of

• ne. We have had years to come up with such a strategy and haven’t been able to do it. It’s

not there. As far as we can see into the future the Middle East wars have been and will be

• perpetual. Our best endgame and exit strategy is simply to get out now. Bring our troops,
• ur guns, our bombs and our boats home. We can’t stop the Middle East wars, but we can

stop our participation in them. That is what we can do and should do. And we should do it now.

• 12. Responding to the “fight there now or here later” argument for US military

intervention In doing the research for this presentation I tried to identify the arguments the United States uses to justify its ongoing Middle East interventions. I found many different ones. I am sure there are many more. I’ll briefly address what I think is the most significant justification now being used. The first and foremost argument to address in favor of military intervention is the one that says: if we don’t fight them over there, then we will eventually have to fight them over here. This theory says that in order to prevent war, you must start a war. As an initial observation, this theory sounds like classic doublethink straight out of George Orwell’s famous book “1984.” It tells us we should create the very evil we want to avoid. In some effort at fairness to the proponents of this theory, their belief can be characterized as saying that a small war

12 now can prevent a larger war later. This seems to me to be the primary justification the United States uses for its Middle East military interventions. This theory is sometimes named the “preventive war theory” or the “preemptive war theory.”

• 12a. “Fight there now or here later” argument has a history of failed uses in modern

practice. Regardless of how you identify it or try to soft-petal its brazenness, this theory has a terrible track record in practice by the United States. We will look at three examples: the Viet Nam War, the current war in Iraq, and the current war in Afghanistan.

• 12b. Viet Nam

The primary justification for the Viet Nam war was that if we don’t fight them there, we will eventually have to fight them on the beaches of California. The US government acted on the belief that the Communists were engaged in a worldwide effort to conquer the world. By stopping them in Viet Nam, we could avoid the inevitable defense of our own shores from

• invasion. Well, we lost the Viet Nam war. The Communists took over all of Viet Nam. What

became of the Communists march to take over the world? It didn’t happen. In fact, since that war Viet Nam has become a good trading partner of the United States. In 2006 President George W. Bush even visited Viet Nam on a goodwill tour. We now know that the entire Viet Nam war, the 50,000 US casualties, the enormous cost and horrendous domestic turmoil the US and Viet Nam went through were all unnecessary. The invocation of the preventive/preemptive war theory in Viet Nam was a terrible mistake.

• 12c. Iraq

In Iraq, the United States invoked the same theory because of its fear that Saddam Hussein had and would use weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors and us. After removing his government from power, we discovered that there were no weapons of mass destruction, as we had feared. But the instability the US created in Iraq has resulted in an estimated over 100,000 deaths, million of people driven into homelessness or refugee status, a successor government that cannot defend its own borders and appears likely to align itself with Iran, and the US has still not removed all its soldiers from the country. Iraq is certainly another great failure in how to apply the preventive/preemptive war theory.

• 12d. Afghanistan

In Afghanistan the United States invaded as a preventative war exercise in order to prevent the Taliban from letting Al Qaeda have a land base for its terrorist activities. Now over 14 years later the new Afghan government is unable to sustain itself without continued US troop presence. If the US troops should leave, it would be a toss-up as to whether the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or ISIS would come in and take over the country. For US policy makers it is sort of a moot issue anyway. ISIS and Al Qaeda are already establishing themselves in

• ther Middle East countries - so it really doesn’t matter much what happens in Afghanistan.

13 The entire Afghan war effort by the United State will achieve nothing. Afghanistan is another costly mistaken application by the United States of the preventive war theory. So we have three good examples of how US initiated preventive wars backfired on us. Two

• f our examples are very recent endeavors from the Middle East itself. Yet we regularly hear

US pundits and policymakers say we need a new preventive war against ISIS, Iran, or some

• ther faltering Middle East countries such as Yemen, Somalia, or Libya. It is pretty apparent

that the lessons from our own history are not being learned. Preventive wars can be long, costly, and pointless. For the United States, that seems always to be the case. It would be better if we had not engaged in any of those wars. Now, having gotten into them, our best course of action is to withdraw from them.

• 13. Immediate withdrawal from preemptive wars has been the most effective action

the US could take. When I tell people I advocate immediate withdrawal from all Mid East wars, I am often met with surprised and shocked looks. But there are good precedents for an immediate

• withdrawal. The United States has totally withdrawn from mistaken military interventions in

the recent past. In each instance it was wise to have done so. Let’s look at three examples: Viet Nam, Lebanon, and Somalia.

• 13a. Viet Nam

In Viet Nam the United States withdrew all its forces after nearly a decade of fighting. At the time of withdrawal, the US knew that the government of South Viet Nam, which we had fought so long to protect, would collapse. That is exactly what happened. Everything the United States had fought for was lost. We now know that the United States should not only have withdrawn sooner, but also that it should never have intervened in Viet Nam in the first place.

• 13b. Lebanon

Our second example is Lebanon. When President Reagan was confronted with the bombing

• f our troops in Lebanon, in February of 1984 he wisely decided to withdraw all troops

instead of escalading the fight. Lebanon has never had a very stable government since then, but no one has ever suggested that the United States could have accomplished anything by staying there. Immediate withdrawal was an effective strategy.

• 13c. Somalia

Our third example is Somalia. The United States sent troops there to try to stabilize a seriously deteriorating situation. When our troops were attacked President Clinton decided in 1995 to withdraw them completely. Like Lebanon, Somalia has never had a very stable government since then, but no one has ever suggested that the United States could have accomplished anything by staying there. Immediate withdrawal was an effective strategy.

14

• 13d. Comparative effectiveness of intervention strategy and total withdrawal strategy

For the past 50 years, immediate and/or complete withdrawal of US troops from combat has repeatedly been an effective military strategy for the United States. In comparison, preemptive wars resulting in long-term military interventions have all been failures. So let’s stop using a military strategy that has no modern track record of success. Let’s use the strategy that has worked for us. Let’s go back to a foreign policy that is as old and effective as George Washington himself. Let’s stay out of optional wars, or so-called preemptive wars. We know where those wars lead us. Preemptive wars morph into perpetual wars. We don’t want to go there.

• 14. Abraham Lincoln’s advice: make friends not enemies. Four modern examples.

At this point in my argument my interventionist friends get exasperated with me. They say the circumstances now are different. We are now dealing with ISIS. Those people hate us. They want to kill us. They are our enemies. Can’t I see that? Actually what I see with ISIS is a very challenging situation. But I think there is a better approach to the situation than starting a war. Another great US president, Abraham Lincoln,

• nce reportedly said: “the best way to destroy an enemy is to make him a friend.”

Does this stunning maxim have any relevance to the modern world? Of course it does. Let me give you four modern examples of former bitter enemies who have successfully followed this maxim. Our first example is the United States and Vietnam. These two countries were at war with each other for nearly a decade in the 1960’s and early 1970’s. The US effectively lost that

• war. The end of the war did not bring about any harmony between these adversaries. Now,

however, forty years later, these two countries are at peace with each other and are good trading partners in spite of their hostile history. No one foresaw this back when the war was

• raging. The US would have been much wiser to have just skipped the war and become

friends much sooner with the Vietnamese. Our second example is Israel and Egypt. These two countries fought wars in 1967 and

• 1973. But by 1978 these two countries renounced further hostilities and became good

neighbors to each other. Our third example is Israel and Jordan. These two countries also fought each other in the wars of 1967 and 1973. But by 1994 these two countries renounced further hostilities and became peaceful neighbors to each other. Our fourth example is the United States and China. You have to be my age to remember that for the first 23 years of its existence Communist China was treated like an outlaw

• nation. It wasn’t even allowed to have a seat in the United Nations. The United States had

virtually no working relationship with China during those years. Most political pundits

15 expected that the US and China would eventually go to war with each other. Richard Nixon was thought to be the most unlikely president to change that dynamic, but change it he did when he announced his surprise visit to China in 1972. The US and China still have many issues to work through, but the icy hostility is a thing of the past, and both nations are able to engage amicably with each other. These are four modern examples where once bitter enemies have become friends, or at least relatively friendly. As Lincoln’s observed, enemies can be eliminated by making them friends.

• 14a. Applying Lincoln’s advice

Well, if the United States and Viet Nam can become friends, and if Israel and Egypt can become friends, and if Israel and Jordan can become friends, and if the United States and China can become friendly, then there really is no limit on the ability of hostile countries to change their relationships to each other. I wonder what a friendly relationship between the United States and ISIS would look like. I am not exactly certain about how we would get there, but I am certain that a step in that process would be for the United States to stop its bombing campaign and other war activities against ISIS. We may find that just as Turkey seems to be able to co-exist peaceably with ISIS, the United States can do so also. It would certainly take a major change in mindset for the US to engage peaceably with ISIS, but the United States and

• ther countries have shown that such unexpected things like that can happen in the modern

world.

• 15. Summary

So, let’s review what we have covered today. First we looked at what it means to have credentials to talk about our subject today. I don’t claim to have the traditional credentials related to this topic. Instead, I hope to provide the kind of unique perspective that an independent outside observer can give. It is up to you to decide whether I have actually provided you with any useful new thoughts. Next, we looked at George Washington’s views on getting engaged in foreign wars, and whether his advice has any relevance to the modern world. His advice was pretty clear. He said to stay out of complicated foreign wars, and he was specifically addressing the situation in Europe at that time. Next we looked at the tangled maze of relationships in the Middle East today. Is it comparable to what Washington saw in Europe in his day? I don’t think there can be any doubt about that. Next we saw that neither President Obama nor his opponents in Congress have been able to articulate any sort of war strategy for the Middle East. The preemptive war theory used to

16 justify interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan is leading us into perpetual wars from which we cannot find a way to extract ourselves. Next we looked at three modern examples where the United States chose to completely withdraw its military forces from foreign engagement in spite of ongoing hostilities. In each case complete military withdrawal created the best available outcome for the United States. Today’s political pundits and government policy makers never acknowledge the success achieved by the complete withdrawal option. As citizens, it is up to us to remind our government officials of what military strategies have worked in the past and what strategies continue to fail. Lastly we looked at four modern and extremely hostile international relationships where seemingly implacable foes have reestablished diplomatic relationships and now constructively engage with one another to resolve their differences. Lincoln’s thought that you can eliminate enemies by making them friends has it own history of success that we need to understand and adopt. The world is now and always has been a difficult place to live in peace. If we in the United States look to our own traditions, experience and history, we can find examples of effective ways to create the kind of peace we want. Thank you for listening today.