We dont know more about the biological weapons threat than we did - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

“We don’t know more about the biological weapons threat than we did five years ago, and five years from now, we will know even less.”

Senior CIA official, Counterproliferation Division

“… with regard to biological weapons intelligence, ‘there’s still a sense that it’s too hard to do.’”

Senior National Security Council official

Quotations from: The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005.

“THE GREATEST EXISTENTIAL THREAT WE HAVE IN THE WORLD TODAY IS BIOLOGICAL.”

US Senate Majority Leader William Frist Davos, January 27, 2005

“THIS [BIOTERRORISM] IS ONE OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS WE HAVE ON THE PLANET TODAY.”

• Dr. Tara O’Toole, Director, Center for Biosecurity,

University of Pittsburgh Davos, January 27, 2005

WE HEARD THE SAME KEY ELEMENTS IN THE MID-1980s: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM, MAY 1986: RE “THE USE OF POTENT, PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (TOXINS)… THEY ARE INCREASINGLY EASIER TO PRODUCE AND VARY THROUGH THE USE OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY – … THEY ARE VERY ATTRACTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS” THIS WAS AT A TIME WHEN THERE WERE NO KNOWN “INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS” KNOWN TO BE WORKING WITH ANY BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, AND THE ONLY KNOWN EVENTS TO THAT DATE HAD BEEN BY THE RAJNEESH GROUP IN THE US IN 1984. RECALL, TOO, THAT THE SECOND STATED PURPOSE IN 1990 OF THE US IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR THE BWC WAS TO “PROTECT THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM.”

DOUGLAS FEITH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATIONS POLICY, AUGUST 8, 1986, TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE: “…NEW BIOLOGICAL AGENTS ARE SO ‘SIMPLE’ TO MAKE, AND CAN BE MANUFACTURED ‘IN HOURS’.”

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2006

• “...we must exercise caution and not confuse the

capabilities of bioterrorists with state-level BW programs. There is no doubt that the knowledge and technologies today exist to create and manipulate bio-threat agents; however, the capability of terrorists to embark on this path in the near- to mid-term is judged to be low. Just because the technology is available does not mean terrorists can or will use it.”

• “In general, terrorist capabilities in the area of bioterrorism

are crude and relatively unsophisticated, and we do not see any indication of a rapid evolution of capability. It is, therefore, unclear how advancements in high-end biotechnology will impact the future threat of bioterrorism, if at all.”

• “With respect to the evolution of bioterrorism, we would

expect to see use of traditional biological agents (anthrax, plague, tularemia, and others) before the appearance of advanced BW agents.”

THE WORLD THAT WE EXIST IN: ONE

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: Food crop growth cycles, food production OCEAN QUALITY DETERIORATION, DEFORESTATION, DEPLETION OF FRESH WATER AQUIFERS, DESERTIFICATION GLOBAL POPULATION GROWTH, FOOD PRODUCTION, RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS (ENERGY, RAW MATERIALS), PRODCUTION OF WASTE PRODUCTS (SOLID, LIQUID, GASEOUS) MILLENNIUM PROJECT “15 GLOBAL CHALLENGES”: Only one relates to pathogens, increase in incidence of antibiotic resistance DEATHS IN WARS AND CONFLICTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY: ~230 million DEATHS DUE TO POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (“STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE”): 20,000 per day; 7.3 million per year, ~75 million over ten years

• POTENTIAL FOR CYBERTERRORISM: Currently occurring daily

TWO: MAJOR INFECTIOUS HUMAN DISEASES

TB, MALARIA, AIDS: 5 million deaths annually; 50 million deaths in 10 years MALARIA: 515 million people infected globally TB: 1 billion people infected; 1 billion new cases by 2020; 35 million will die MEASLES: 1999 annual mortality, 873,000; 2003, 530,000; 3.6 million children dead in past 5 years US FLU MORTALITY: 1977-1999, 788,000 people or 36,000/year; 360,000 deaths in the next decade EXPECTATION OF PANDEMIC FLU

• TOBACCO-RELATED MORTALITY: 13,500/day globally; 5

million/year; 50 million every 10 years

Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat

• 1. The evolution of state biological weapons

programs.

• 2. The evolution of non-state actors

(“terrorist”) biological weapon capabilities.

• 3. Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda
• f public perceptions and policy

prescriptions.

• 4. Costs of the US biodefense R&D program.

The evolution of state biological weapons programs

July 2001: US government states 13 offensive national BW programs

• SOUTH AFRICA: TERMINATED 1995

CUBA: US WITHDRAWS CLAIM, 2004 LIBYA: US WITHDRAWS CLAIM, 2004 IRAQ: TERMINATED, 1990s RUSSIA: ? Reduction, certainly ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ US “reducing” nature of public descriptions of other

• stensibly offensive BW programs

BW PROLIFERATION FROM TERMINATED STATE PROGRAMS

SOUTH AFRICA: NONE IRAQ: APPARENTLY NONE USSR/RUSSIA: APPROXIMATELY 12 INDIVIDUALS TO IRAN RUSSIA: VAST MAJORITY OF EMIGRES TO US, GERMANY, UK, SWEDEN, FINLAND, ISRAEL, AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS

The Requirements to Produce Biological Agents by Non-State Groups

There are five essential requirements that must be mastered in

• rder to produce biological agents:
• One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease pathogen.
• One must know how to handle the organism correctly.
• One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the

appropriate characteristics.

• One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up

production properly.

• One must know how to disperse the product properly.
• “Most of the agents are not readily available,
• most of the agents are not easy to make, and
• most of the agents are not easy to disperse.”

The years between 1995 and 2000 were characterized by:

• spurious statistics (hoaxes counted as “biological”

events)

• unknowable predictions
• greatly exaggerated consequence estimates
• gross exaggeration of the feasibility of successfully

producing biological agents by non-state actors, except in the case of recruitment of highly experienced professionals, for which there still was no evidence as of 2000

• the apparent continued absence of a thorough threat

assessment

• thoughtless, ill-considered, counterproductive, and

extravagant rhetoric

The Evolution of non-state actors (“terrorist”) biological weapon capabilities

1984: Rajneesh, The Dalles, Oregon Salmonella 1990-1994: Aum Shinrikyo, Tokyo Botulinum toxin and Anthrax – Failed 1998-9 to November 2001: al Queda, Afghanistan, Anthrax and ? – Failed October – November 2001: United States, “Amerithrax”/Anthrax Outlier: Significance re: anticipation of technical proficiency by “terrorists” 2004: al-Queda affiliates, NO ricin

Non-state actors (cont’d)

Jonathan Tucker, Toxic Terror (1999) John Parachini, Motive, Means and Mayhem (forthcoming) Together the two books cover some 25 case studies of individuals and groups Official US threat presentations, February 16, 2005 and March 17, 2005. Greatly reduced depiction of BW threat from non-state actors The relevance of the Amerithrax outlier No evidence to date of state BW assistance to non-state actors/terrorist groups.

US BIOTERRORISM EXERCISE SCENARIOS

1. 1988, Mexico-Texas border: “Alibek” smallpox chimeric viral agent 2. TOPOFF1, May 2000: aerosolized pneumonic plague, FEMA, and US Department of Justice 3. [Unnamed], July 2000: aerosolized plague, US Department of Justice and DOD/DTRA 4. Dark Winter, June 2001: aerosolized smallpox, Johns Hopkins Center for Biosecurity and 3 collaborating groups 5. Sooner Spring, April 2002: smallpox, National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Oklahoma 6. TOPOFF2, May 2003: aerosolized pneumonic plague, US Department of Homeland Security and US Department of State 7. Atlantic Storm, January 2004: aerosolized dry powder smallpox, Center for Biosecurity (now affiliated with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center) 8. TOPOFF3, April 2005: aerosolized pneumonic plague, US Department of Homeland Security

RICHARD DANZIG, CATASTROPHIC BIOTERRORISM, 2003 Case 1: a large-scale outdoor aerosol anthrax attack Case 2: a large-scale outdoor aerosol smallpox attack Case 3: an attack that disseminates botulinum toxin in cold drinks. Case 4: an attack that spreads foot and mouth disease among cattle, sheep and pigs.

National Planning Scenarios Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Council)

• Scenario #2: Biological Attack, aerosolized

anthrax, 5 cities in sequence

• Scenario #4: Biological Attack, aerosolized

plague in three areas of a single city

• Scenario #13: Biological Attack, liquid anthrax

placed in ground beef in a factory – producing intestinal anthrax; mortality in low hundreds

• Scenario #14: Biological Attack, foot and mouth
• disease. Economic loss; no human mortality

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (Iraq Survey Group Report) Initial failure of the Iraqi State CW program to produce a chemical weapon, 1971-1974 and 1974-1978 From UNSCOM reports, initial failure of the Iraqi BW program, “early 1970s” and “1974-1978” Late 2003 – early 2004, Iraq Al- Abud/Jaysh Mahammed insurgent group: fails to produce chemical agent

Critique of Atlantic Storm Exercise

1. Group definition 2. Source of smallpox (and anthrax, Ebola, glanders) 3. Source of knowledge to produce dry-powder preparations of all 4. Location of the group’s work place 5. Means of releasing dry-powder smallpox 6. Scenario smallpox transmission rate versus previous Dark Winter smallpox scenario by the same group 7. Addition of anthrax

Unsuccessful effort to get a critique of Dr. Wein’s paper and of his New York Times Op-Ed column printed by:

1. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), as a companion article along with Dr. Wein’s paper 2. The New York Times, as an Op-Ed, following the one by Dr. Wein that they printed 3. Nature, as a Letter to the Editor, following their own lead editorial about the PNAS and publication issue, and two news stories they carried about the Wein paper 4. The Washington Post, as an Op-Ed, after a long one that they also printed about the PNAS publication question. In the Washington Post case, after two weeks, they offered us 300 words in the “Free for All” section of their Saturday paper as a letter to the editor (our original submission had been 1700 words), and then on the Friday before publication they dropped it, and we have never been able to get a reply from their editor as to why they did that.

“… FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SHARES YOUR PERSPECTIVE OF TERRORIST CAPABILITIES WHICH HAS BEEN FED TO SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.” [Sent to me in late July 2005]

Costs of the US Biodefense Program

• 1. Direct financial costs
• 2. Trade-off in reduced US public health

efforts

• 3. BW proliferation/arms control: stimulation
• f BW “arms race” with other state

programs – “Tucker modified”

• 4. BW proliferation/arms control: Risk of US

non-compliance with the BWC

THIS QUESTION HAS ARISEN BEFORE: IN FISCAL YEAR 1985, THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, ASKED THE US DEPT OF DEFENSE TO SUBMIT A REPORT REGARDING THE US ARMY’S PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF AN AEROSOL TEST FACILITY AT THE DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, UTAH. THE COMMITTEE’S REQUEST NOTED THAT CONCERNS HAD BEEN RAISED “…THAT CERTAIN PROPOSED ACTIVITIES MAY UNDERCUT THE UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.” THE COMMITTEE ASKED THE DEPT OF DEFENSE TO SUMIT A REPORT WHICH ANSWERED SEVEN POINTS, THE LAST OF WHICH REQUESTED “A THOROUGH EVAULATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED AEROSOL TESTING ON THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION INCLUDING:

• A. THE POSSIBILITY THAT SAID TESTING WILL BE VIEWED AS OFFENSIVE,

RATHER THAN DEFENSIVE, AND THUS, A VIOLATION OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

• B. THE LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE PROLIFERATION OF BIOLOGICAL

WEAPONS AROUND THE WORLD.”

Article 1 of the Biological Weapons Convention

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict

Nine of the sixteen elements of the prospective research program for the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures (NBACC), Biothreat Characterization Center (BTCC)

• Genetic engineering;
• Susceptibility to current therapeutics;
• Host-range studies;
• Environmental stability;
• Aerosol animal-model development;
• Aerosol dynamics;
• Novel packaging;
• Novel delivery of threat;
• Bioregulators and immunomodulators; and
• “Red Teaming,” which is to say duplication of threat

scenarios.

NBACC/BTCC (cont’d)

In addition, task areas for biothreat-agent (BTA) analysis and technical-threat assessment were summarizes as “Acquire, Grow, Modify, Store, Stabilize, Package, and Disperse.” Classical, emerging, and genetically engineered pathogens were to be characterized for their BTA potential. Aerobiology, aerosol physics, and environmental stability will be studied in wet-laboratory and computer-laboratory settings. “Computational modeling of feasibility, methods, and scale of production” would be undertaken, and “Red Team”

• perational scenarios and capabilities will be assessed. BTA

use and countermeasure effectiveness will be studied “across the spectrum of potential attack scenarios” through “high- fidelity modeling and simulation.”

THE MAIN ISSUES

1. US BW Treaty Compliance: Does the announced NBACC/BTCC [Biothreat Characterization Center] program of work violate the BWC: viz. is it “development” (particular portions of it)?

• “Threat analysis” as a proxy for “anything goes.”
• US undermining the BWC further. (That is, after destruction of the

Verification Protocol in 2001-2002.)

2. Who in the US government is overseeing ALL of “Biodefense” R&D – including classified programs – to be certain that the US government is in compliance with its treaty obligations?

• Total inadequacy of the NSABB (National Science Advisory Board for

Biosecurity): Its basic mandate, and it remains unstaffed and inoperative.

• And IF there are questions in some Administration legal office, is the

word “draft a justification for it irrespective of what it may be” comparable to other current Administration practices?

3. Secrecy versus transparency, publication:

• Secrecy: Effects on major competitors, are they likely to

suspect that the US is overstepping boundaries? The more aggressive US programs are, the more likely to stimulate their

• wn.
• Publication: Given the parameters of the program, publication

would provide BW-relevant information to all. The US as a Johnny Appleseed/global provider of sophisticated technological BW-relevant information. 4. US as driver of international process spurring on BW developments in the name of anticipating threat.

• Precisely the opposite of Meselson’s 1969 NSC

argumentation: providing others with the rope to hang the US.

THE MAIN ISSUES, cont’d

Has a review been undertaken of compliance issues for the NBACC research program?

• US failure to report in its BWC/CBM submission in

previous years the existence of several large dynamic aerosol test chambers. NOT a treaty or CBM violation, since the CBMs do not stipulate any quantitative volumetric thresholds for test chambers, only that they are understood to be major pieces of research equipment to be reported within a biodefense program. (Had the Verification Protocol been approved, their size far surpasses two separate size criteria that existed for reporting aerosol test chambers.)

• Portions of the BTCC at NBACC are currently funded:

but work is probably taking place only in contractor facilities; no reference to the BTCC was included in the US 2003 BTW/CBM posted in 2004 by the US DOS.

• Whether a specific compliance review of NBACC

projects was made or not, a functional, gradual, incremental equivalent, eroding the boundary, may already have been in place for a half dozen years. Justified by “the doctrine of necessity,” arguing that any suggested element of the biodefense program is necessary to “save the country from bioterrorism.”

SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY

• DR. RONALD ATLAS (UNITED STATES) AT

OECD MEETING, SEPTEMBER 2004

“Defining the risk. Where do the risks lie – in government biodefense research… in information found in the published literature, or elsewhere?” “Relationship to the BWC. What is the relationship of the BWC negotiations to our discussions? How can we coordinate approaches for reducing the threat of bioterrorism without raising concerns of hidden national bioweapons programs? What is the consequence of extending biodefense research into the full scope of civilian infectious disease research? What is the role of classified research in biodefense and protecting against the misuse of science?”

From Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat

From Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat

From Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=639