Why it Wasnt Carmageddon The Behavioral Side of Adaptive Capacity in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Why it Wasn’t Carmageddon

The Behavioral Side of Adaptive Capacity in Transportation Networks

Martin Wachs

Carmageddon 1 July 2012 Carmageddon 2 September 2013 How did people respond to Carmageddon? What can we do to minimize congestion associated with future events? How did behavioral responses change in the second event?

Framing the Issue

Carmageddon I: Messaging

• Caltrans posted electronic signs on dozens of

surface streets

• Changeable message signs alerting freeway

drivers to the impending closure for weeks in advance of the event

• Radio and TV broadcast from the California-
• Oregon border to San Diego
• Metro used Facebook, Twitter, and regular web

sites leveraging star power of celebrities Ashton Kutcher and Kim Kardashian

Carmageddon I: Mixed Messages

SCARE TACTICS

• Supervisor Zev Yaroslovsky:

“The best alternative route is to totally avoid the 405 area, completely avoid it, don't come anywhere near it, don't even think about coming to it. Stay the heck out of here”

• Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa :

“There’s gridlock on the 405 virtually any time of the day, particularly during the rush hour. And if you think it's bad now, let me just make something absolutely clear: On July 16th and 17th, it will be an absolute nightmare”

• Councilman Paul Koretz:

“Avoid the area like the plague”

Carmageddon I: Mixed Messages

Appeals to Civic Pride & Voluntary Participation

• Doug Failing, METRO Executive Director of Highway Programs:

“The idea of staying home and shopping locally isn't just for the Westside and San Fernando Valley. It's really going to take all of us Angelenos working together by staying home and shopping locally to keep our region moving. Some of us can't stay home but most of us can. We should.”

• Michael Miles, Caltrans District 7 Director :

"You're going to be surprised what you discover in your neighborhood if you take that opportunity"

Research Questions

• 1. Time shift: Did people travel before/after the

closure period?

• 2. Mode shift: Did people take transit?
• 3. Route shift: Did people detour?
• 4. Region-wide effect: How did traffic change

throughout the region?

• 5. Was the messaging effective & influential?

Research Method: Compare to Baseline

Averaged traffic volume/ridership

• n two weekends

before/after each closure Established baseline of expected traffic volume/ridership Compared expectations to actual travel

Findings

Time Shift Mode Shift Route Shift Regional Effects

Time Shift: Weeks/Days Before/After

Question: Did people defer trips to before or after the closure period? Findings:

• Carmageddon I
• People did not shift trips before/after closure
• Carmageddon II
• People did not shift trips before/after closure

Question: Did people change their mode of travel during the closure period?

Findings:

• Carmageddon I
• Large decreases in bus ridership despite

increased service

• Increases in Metrolink ridership
• Carmageddon II
• No clear pattern of ridership changes
• Increases in Metrolink ridership

Mode Shift: Did Travelers Take Transit?

Metro Buses

• 80%
• 60%
• 40%
• 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 40 45 204 210 233 260 740 745 754 761

Metro Bus Routes, Northbound

• 80%
• 60%
• 40%
• 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 40 45 204 210 233 260 740 745 754 761

Metro Bus Routes, Southbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

Metro Buses

• 80%
• 60%
• 40%
• 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2 4 20 33 150 704 720 733

Metro Bus Routes, Eastbound

• 80%
• 60%
• 40%
• 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2 4 20 33 150 704 720 733

Metro Bus Routes, Westbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

Metrolink

• 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 2AV 3SB 5OC 6IE

Percent Change in Metrolink Ridership, Inbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

• 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 2AV 3SB 5OC 6IE

Percent Change in Metrolink Ridership, Outbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

Route Shift: Did Travelers Detour?

• Metro buses
• Metrolink

Question: Did people detour? Findings:

• Carmageddon I
• Decrease in travel along

highway & arterial detour routes

• Carmageddon II
• Increase in travel along highway

& arterial detour routes

• 35%
• 30%
• 25%
• 20%
• 15%
• 10%
• 5%

0% 5% 10% 15%

I-105E at Node 4 I-110N at Node 7 SR-55N at Node 9 I-5N Node 10

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

Change in Traffic Volumes on Northbound Highway Detours Intersecting I-405

• 35%
• 30%
• 25%
• 20%
• 15%
• 10%
• 5%

0% 5% 10% 15%

SR-118E at Node 11 I-5S at Node 13

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

Change in Traffic Volumes on Southbound Highway Detours Intersecting I-405

• 35%
• 30%
• 25%
• 20%
• 15%
• 10%
• 5%

0% 5% 10% 15%

US-101N at Node 3 SR-170N at Node 3 US-101N at Node 6

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

Change in Traffic Volumes on Northbound Highway Detours Not Intersecting I-405

Change in Traffic Volumes on Southbound Highway Detours Not Intersecting I-405

• 35%
• 30%
• 25%
• 20%
• 15%
• 10%
• 5%

0% 5% 10% 15%

US-101S at Node 3 I-5S at Node 12 I-210E at Node 14

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

• Examined N/S/E/W traffic volumes in the San

Fernando Valley and Westside near the closure

Route Shift: Arterial Analysis

• 50%
• 30%
• 10%

10% 30% 50% 70% 90%

Sepulveda/Ventura Reseda/Burbank

Northbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

• 50%
• 30%
• 10%

10% 30% 50% 70% 90%

Sepulveda/Ventura Reseda/Burbank

Southbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

• 50%
• 30%
• 10%

10% 30% 50% 70% 90%

Sepulveda/Ventura Reseda/Burbank

Eastbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

• 50%
• 30%
• 10%

10% 30% 50% 70% 90%

Sepulveda/Ventura Reseda/Burbank

Westbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

San Fernando Valley

• 50%
• 30%
• 10%

10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 110% 130% 150%

Northbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

The Westside

• 50%
• 30%
• 10%

10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 110% 130% 150%

Southbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

The Westside

• 50%
• 30%
• 10%

10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 110% 130% 150%

Eastbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

• 50%
• 30%
• 10%

10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 110% 130% 150%

Westbound

Carmageddon I Carmageddon II

Route Shift: Arterial Analysis

Key Points

• Sepulveda Blvd. and the Westside saw a larger

increase in traffic the second than the first time, but still not enough to account for missing traffic.

• Possibly more local trips

Question: How did travel throughout the region change? Findings:

• Carmageddon I
• Significant decreases on I-405, I-10, I-5
• Decreased traffic as far away as 50 miles from

closure

• Carmageddon II
• Smaller regional effect than Carmageddon I

Regional Effects

I-405

South

I-405

North

I-10

East

I-5

North

I-5

South

Conclusions

Forecasts of extreme traffic congestion were completely unfulfilled By and large, advanced information strongly impacted travel behavior; and information continued to influence behavior in “real time” as the events unfolded Because the events were scheduled on weekends when a high proportion of trips are “discretionary,” the trips were largely cancelled and alternative modes, routes, & times were not dramatically overused in relation to their capacity Fewer trips were cancelled for the second closure than the first, again demonstrating that travelers learn & adapted.

Conclusions

Fewer trips were cancelled the second time around. Mode Shift

• Carmageddon I
• Large decrease in bus ridership
• Small increase in Metrolink ridership
• Carmageddon II
• No discernable pattern of bus ridership change
• Small increase in Metrolink ridership

Conclusions

Fewer trips were cancelled the second time around. Route Shift

• Carmageddon I
• Highway: decrease in traffic
• Arterial: no consistent pattern
• Carmageddon II
• Highway: decreases and increases in traffic
• Arterial: consistent increase on Sepulveda and

Westside

Conclusions

Fewer trips were cancelled the second time around. Regional Effects

• Carmageddon I
• Widespread regional decrease in traffic
• Decrease persisted through weekend
• Carmageddon II
• Decreases near closure, less of effect felt region-

wide

• Sunday: normal traffic patterns observed

Take Home Points

• Strong power of messaging for infrequent,

extraordinary events

• Effects of advanced messaging waned over

time

• Effects of “real time” information grew over

time

• Difficult to rely on threats of disaster in the

face of this experience

Project Team – Thanks to all

Anne Brown, Research Assistant Master of Urban and Regional Planning (2014) Tim Black, Research Assistant Master of Urban and Regional Planning (2014) Zodin del Rosario, Research Assistant Master of Urban and Regional Planning (2013) Earl Kaing, Research Assistant Master of Urban and Regional Planning (2013) Brian Taylor, Professor of Urban Planning University of California, Los Angeles Martin Wachs, Professor Emeritus of Urban Planning University of California, Los Angeles