Altruistic behavior and social signaling: a study of an extreme - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Altruistic behavior and social signaling: a study of an extreme - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Altruistic behavior and social signaling: a study of an extreme example DIG Seminar De Caro (XVIIth), Sansom Destroying the https://www.shareicon.net House of Philistines ; from wikigallery.org Intern: Julien Panis-Lie Internship director:


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Altruistic behavior and social signaling: a study of an extreme example

DIG Seminar

Intern: Julien Panis-Lie Internship director: Jean-Louis Dessalles

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https://www.shareicon.net

De Caro (XVIIth), Sansom Destroying the House of Philistines; from wikigallery.org

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Presentation structure

Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory Internship: altruistic suicide Preliminary results and two-tier model Perspectives

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Presentation structure

Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory Internship: altruistic suicide Preliminary results and two-tier model Perspectives

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Research question

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How can (online) altruistic behavior be explained from a theoretical standpoint?

Images extracted from https://www.shareicon.net

Online altruistic behavior:

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Research question

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Theoretical puzzle:

  • Economic angle: tragedy of the commons

(Hardin, 1968)

  • Biological angle: evolution and maintenance of

prosocial behaviors?

How can (online) altruistic behavior be explained from a theoretical standpoint?

Images extracted from https://www.shareicon.net

Online altruistic behavior:

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Presentation structure

Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory

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Internship: altruistic suicide Perspectives Preliminary results and two-tier model

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Costly signal theory

Immediate benefits Costly behavior Honest signal Quality? Delayed benefits

Audience Individual (sender)

  • Th. biology: Zahavi (1975), Grafen (1990)
  • Economics: Veblen (1899), Spence (1974)
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Springbok stotting

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Costly signal theory

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Immediate benefits Costly behavior Honest signal Quality? Delayed benefits

Audience Individual (sender)

  • Th. biology: Zahavi (1975), Grafen (1990)
  • Economics: Veblen (1899), Spence (1974)

=>

Images extracted from Wikipedia; icon from https://www.iconsdb.com

Competition Honest signal

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Helping others on Stack Overflow

Contributions (top 0.01%) Elected moderator

Profile: first moderator by alphabetical order

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Helping others on Stack Overflow

Contributions (top 0.01%) Elected moderator

Profile: first moderator by alphabetical order

Social benefits

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Social signal Contributions (top 0.01%) Audience: regular contributors Expertise Elected moderator Form social bonds Social benefits

Profile: first moderator by alphabetical order

Helping others on Stack Overflow

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Social signal Contributions (top 0.01%) Audience: regular contributors Expertise Elected moderator Form social bonds Social benefits

Profile: first moderator by alphabetical order

How can (online) altruistic behavior be explained from the standpoint

  • f social signaling theory?

Helping others on Stack Overflow

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Presentation structure

Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory

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Internship: altruistic suicide Perspectives Preliminary results and two-tier model

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Altruistic suicide

Definition Results in death Voluntary behavior For the sake of a group

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Altruistic suicide

Definition Results in death Voluntary behavior For the sake of a group

De Caro (XVIIth), Sansom Destroying the House of Philistines; from wikigallery.org Advertising poster for the movie 300; from imdb.com Flag of Imperial Japan; from wikipedia.org

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Altruistic suicide

Definition Context Results in death Voluntary behavior For the sake of a group For diverse groups Recurrent in history

Advertising poster for the movie 300; from imdb.com

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Altruistic suicide

Definition “Martyrs” are often revered Context Outcome Results in death Voluntary behavior For the sake of a group For diverse groups Recurrent in history Seems tied to intergroup conflict This may benefit their family Whitehouse (2018) Durkheim (1897) Blackwell (2008)

Advertising poster for the movie 300; from imdb.com

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Altruistic suicide as social signal?

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Costly behavior Honest signal Quality? Delayed benefits

Audience Individual (sender)

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Costly behavior Honest signal Patriotism Delayed benefits

Audience Individual (sender)

Altruistic suicide as social signal?

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“Exogenous” model

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Costly behavior Honest signal Patriotism Posthumous glory Benefits to kin

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“Exogenous” model

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Costly behavior Honest signal Patriotism Posthumous glory Benefits to kin

Hypotheses Altruistic suicide may emerge as a signal of one’s patriotism Conjecture Social status is in part heritable (Service, 1971) During intergroup conflict “martyrs” are revered

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Presentation structure

Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory

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Internship: altruistic suicide Perspectives Preliminary results and two-tier model

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“Exogenous” model: results

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Gene: propensity to self-sacrifice

Hypotheses Altruistic suicide may emerge as a signal of one’s patriotism Conjecture Social status is in part heritable (Service, 1971) During intergroup conflict “martyrs” are revered Admiration parameter Admiration for a “hero” spills

  • ver to children
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“Exogenous” model: results

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Gene: propensity to self-sacrifice

Hypotheses Altruistic suicide may emerge as a signal of one’s patriotism Conjecture Social status is in part heritable (Service, 1971) During intergroup conflict “martyrs” are revered Admiration parameter Admiration for a “hero” spills

  • ver to children
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“Exogenous” model: results

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Under simplifying assumptions, a non-trivial Nash equilibrium exists, with:

Gene: propensity to self-sacrifice

Hypotheses Altruistic suicide may emerge as a signal of one’s patriotism Conjecture Social status is in part heritable (Service, 1971) During intergroup conflict “martyrs” are revered Admiration parameter Admiration for a “hero” spills

  • ver to children
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“Endogenous” model: ideas

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Hypotheses Possible social signals Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal by friends

Indiv 1 Group A Indiv 2 Group = ?

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?

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“Endogenous” model: ideas

28 Images taken from https://clipartxtras.com

Hypotheses Possible social signals Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal by friends

Indiv 1 Group A Indiv 2 Group = ?

Honor martyrs and their children to signal patriotism

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?

… = hero

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“Endogenous” model: ideas

29 Images taken from https://clipartxtras.com

Hypotheses Possible social signals Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal by friends

Indiv 1 Group A Indiv 2 Group = ?

Honor martyrs and their children to signal patriotism

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… = hero 2 = patriot Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’

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“Endogenous” model: ideas

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Hypotheses Possible social signals Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal by friends Honor martyrs and their children to signal patriotism Self-sacrifice as first-order signal

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… = hero 2 = patriot Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’ During intergroup conflict, honoring and self-sacrifice may co-emerge, notably depending on expected cost of betrayal Conjecture

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“Endogenous” model: results

Hypotheses Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’ Parameter

Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Gene3: Demand

Proportion t/2, cost DC Cap MO Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Honoring martyrs and their kin

Gene2b: Non-Patriot

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“Endogenous” model: results

Hypotheses Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’ Parameter

Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Gene3: Demand

Proportion t/2, cost DC Cap MO Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Honoring martyrs and their kin

Gene2b: Non-Patriot

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“Endogenous” model: results

Hypotheses Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’ Parameter

Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Gene3: Demand

Proportion t/2, cost DC Cap MO Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Honoring martyrs and their kin

Gene2b: Non-Patriot

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“Endogenous” model: results

Hypotheses Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’ Parameter

Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Gene3: Demand

Proportion t/2, cost DC Cap MO Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Honoring martyrs and their kin

Gene2b: Non-Patriot

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“Endogenous” model: results

t = 25% t = 75%

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“Endogenous” model: results

Hypotheses Intergroup conflict: risk of betrayal Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’ Parameter

Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Gene3: Demand

Proportion t/2, cost DC Cap MO Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Honoring martyrs and their kin

Gene2b: Non-Patriot

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Presentation structure

Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory

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Internship: altruistic suicide Perspectives Preliminary results and two-tier model

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Conclusion

Generalized signaling; radicalization? Social Benefits Posthumous glory Prediction First-order signal A small fraction of “martyrs” emerges Friendship Second-

  • rder

signal Both levels are mutually reinforcing

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Perspectives

Generalized signaling, at a low intensity Social Benefits Asymmetrical, global bonds Prediction First-order signal An elite emerges, visible + intense signals Symmetrical, local bonds Second-

  • rder

signal Both levels are mutually reinforcing

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Perspectives

Generalized signaling, at a low intensity Social Benefits Asymmetrical, global bonds Prediction First-order signal An elite emerges, visible + intense signals Symmetrical, local bonds Second-

  • rder

signal Both levels are mutually reinforcing

  • Gp. of “friends”
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Informational bubbles and (fake) news

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Fake news ?

“Friends”

“Pro-climate” information “Anti-climate” information

ReTweet (positive) Criticism https://www.iconsdb.com

“Pro-climate” information “Anti-climate” information

Legend

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References

Blackwell, A. D. (2008). Middle-class martyrs: Modeling the inclusive fitness outcomes of Palestinian suicide attack. PhD Thesis. Dessalles, J.-L. (2014). Optimal investment in social signals. Evolution, 68 (6), 1640-1650. Durkheim, E. (1897/2007). Le suicide: étude de sociologie. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. (OCLC: 611895470) Grafen, A. (1990). Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 144(4), 517‑546. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162 (3859), 1243-1248. Spence, M. (1974). Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution. Journal of Economic theory, 7(3), 296-332. Veblen, T. (1899). The theory of the leisure class. Macmillan. Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection—A selection for a handicap. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 53(1), 205‑214.

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