Bismark Owusu Tawiah University of LAquila -Italy OVERVIEW - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Bismark Owusu Tawiah University of LAquila -Italy OVERVIEW - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Bismark Owusu Tawiah University of LAquila -Italy OVERVIEW Introduction Competitive Model between Farmers and Agro- Companies Competitive Model with External Regulator Discussion INTRODUCTION The paper present a first
OVERVIEW
Introduction
Competitive Model between Farmers and Agro-
Companies
Competitive Model with External Regulator Discussion
INTRODUCTION
The paper present a first non-cooperative model between
agro-Companies and farmers where a poverty trap is
- identified. Starting from a non-innovative economy,
innovative agro-Companies cannot support their strategy, since their incomes are discouraging. The main characteristic of this model is that the poverty trap is a Nash equilibria, stable in an evolutionary viewpoint and Pareto-in efficient.
The goal is to mathematically understand and fully characterize poverty traps, find alternative global
- ptimum in the overall strategy-space and promote the
economy such that all the three players farmers, Agro- Companies and the external regulator maximizes income The external regulator, in a Two-phase process (loans, taxes) achieves a common wealth, with a prosperous economy, with innovative and skilled Cocoa farmers
Poverty Trap
Definition : A poverty trap is any self-reinforcing
mechanism that endures poverty.
Poverty Trap
Crucial questions
Why is the poverty trap recurrent despite production
each year?
And is there any scenario in which greater income can
be attained by all players enhancing the growth of the economy which is consistent with poverty reduction?
Competitive model between Farmers and Agro-Companies
Game in normal form : Players : Farmers Strategies: Companies Strategies:
Economic parameters
Economic parameters
Assumptions
Incomes
Incomes
Constraints
Nash Equilibrium
Mixed Strategies & Expected Income
Pareto Equilibrium
Mixed Strategies
Competitive model with external regulator
Game with external :
Income
Expected Income
Dynamics under Normal Game
Dynamics under Loan for Game(E)
Dynamics under Tax for Game(E)
Conclusion
References
[1]. Models of Poverty and Planned Change: A Framework for Synthesis, Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, Vol. V, No. 3 (May 1976), 316-325. [2] E. Accinelli, S. London, L. F. Punzo and E. J. S. Carrera, Poverty traps, rationality and evolution, Dynamics, Games and Science I , 1 (2011),3752. [3] ] E. Accinelli, S. London and E. Sanchez, A model of imitative behavior in the population of firms and workers, Technical Report, Department of Economics, University of Siena, 2009. [4] C. Azariadis and J. Stachurski, Chapter 5 poverty traps, in Handbook
- f Economic Growth, Vol. 1 (eds. P. Aghion and S. Durlauf), 2005, 295384.
.