Discussion of The Limits of Forward Guidance by Jeffrey R. Campbell, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

discussion of the limits of forward guidance by jeffrey r
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Discussion of The Limits of Forward Guidance by Jeffrey R. Campbell, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Discussion of The Limits of Forward Guidance by Jeffrey R. Campbell, Filippo Ferroni, Jonas D. M. Fisher and Leonardo Melosi Christina Patterson Bank of Finland and CEPR Conference October 12, 2019 Christina Patterson (Northwestern)


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Discussion of “The Limits of Forward Guidance” by Jeffrey R. Campbell, Filippo Ferroni, Jonas D.

  • M. Fisher and Leonardo Melosi

Christina Patterson

Bank of Finland and CEPR Conference

October 12, 2019

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 0 / 10

slide-2
SLIDE 2

The Forward Guidance Puzzle

The puzzle: the effects of a commitment to maintain an interest rate peg for an additional period increases without bound with the horizon of the peg

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 1 / 10

slide-3
SLIDE 3

The Forward Guidance Puzzle

The puzzle: the effects of a commitment to maintain an interest rate peg for an additional period increases without bound with the horizon of the peg 3 broad categories of solutions

1

Deviations from representative agent

Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2015), McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2015), Werning (2015), Bilbiie (2017), Hagerdon et al (2019)

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 1 / 10

slide-4
SLIDE 4

The Forward Guidance Puzzle

The puzzle: the effects of a commitment to maintain an interest rate peg for an additional period increases without bound with the horizon of the peg 3 broad categories of solutions

1

Deviations from representative agent

Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2015), McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2015), Werning (2015), Bilbiie (2017), Hagerdon et al (2019)

2

Deviations from rational expectations

Gabaix (2016), Garcia-Schmidt, Woodford (2015), Angeletos and Lian (2018)

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 1 / 10

slide-5
SLIDE 5

The Forward Guidance Puzzle

The puzzle: the effects of a commitment to maintain an interest rate peg for an additional period increases without bound with the horizon of the peg 3 broad categories of solutions

1

Deviations from representative agent

Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2015), McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2015), Werning (2015), Bilbiie (2017), Hagerdon et al (2019)

2

Deviations from rational expectations

Gabaix (2016), Garcia-Schmidt, Woodford (2015), Angeletos and Lian (2018)

3

Structural factors

Multiple interest rates: Campbell et al (2017), Piazzesi, Rogers and Schnieder (2019) Limited communication: Woodford (2003), This paper

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 1 / 10

slide-6
SLIDE 6

Summary of this paper

It’s a simple and intuitive point – work is in quantification

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 2 / 10

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Summary of this paper

It’s a simple and intuitive point – work is in quantification Framework: add imperfect communication to a medium-scale NK model.

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 2 / 10

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Summary of this paper

It’s a simple and intuitive point – work is in quantification Framework: add imperfect communication to a medium-scale NK model. This builds closely on Campbell et al (2017), who estimate NK model using information on interest rate expectations

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 2 / 10

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Summary of this paper

It’s a simple and intuitive point – work is in quantification Framework: add imperfect communication to a medium-scale NK model. This builds closely on Campbell et al (2017), who estimate NK model using information on interest rate expectations In their model, the Fed’s ability to affect expectations far in the future is limited

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 2 / 10

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Summary of this paper

It’s a simple and intuitive point – work is in quantification Framework: add imperfect communication to a medium-scale NK model. This builds closely on Campbell et al (2017), who estimate NK model using information on interest rate expectations In their model, the Fed’s ability to affect expectations far in the future is limited They show that imperfect communication delays and amplifies the response to monetary shocks (Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016))

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 2 / 10

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Comment 1: Identification of Limited Communication

Identification of noise: degree to which households anticipate the future deviation from the monetary rule

The data on interest rate expectations gives you the degree to which agents anticipate the change in the interest rate Rh,obs

t

= R∗ + Et[ˆ Rt+h]

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 3 / 10

slide-12
SLIDE 12

Comment 1: Identification of Limited Communication

Identification of noise: degree to which households anticipate the future deviation from the monetary rule

The data on interest rate expectations gives you the degree to which agents anticipate the change in the interest rate Rh,obs

t

= R∗ + Et[ˆ Rt+h] But news (ǫ) is about θ not R – model estimation

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 3 / 10

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Comment 1: Identification of Limited Communication

Identification of noise: degree to which households anticipate the future deviation from the monetary rule

The data on interest rate expectations gives you the degree to which agents anticipate the change in the interest rate Rh,obs

t

= R∗ + Et[ˆ Rt+h] But news (ǫ) is about θ not R – model estimation The structure of the news shocks and model of communication identify the noise

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 3 / 10

slide-14
SLIDE 14

Comment 1: Identification of Limited Communication

Identification of noise: degree to which households anticipate the future deviation from the monetary rule

The data on interest rate expectations gives you the degree to which agents anticipate the change in the interest rate Rh,obs

t

= R∗ + Et[ˆ Rt+h] But news (ǫ) is about θ not R – model estimation The structure of the news shocks and model of communication identify the noise

This is not identified off of particular forward guidance incidents

Question 1: What about all the periods in which there is no signal?

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 3 / 10

slide-15
SLIDE 15

Comment 1: Identification of Limited Communication

Identification of noise: degree to which households anticipate the future deviation from the monetary rule

The data on interest rate expectations gives you the degree to which agents anticipate the change in the interest rate Rh,obs

t

= R∗ + Et[ˆ Rt+h] But news (ǫ) is about θ not R – model estimation The structure of the news shocks and model of communication identify the noise

This is not identified off of particular forward guidance incidents

Question 1: What about all the periods in which there is no signal? Question 2: How does this relate to estimation based on particular episodes?

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 3 / 10

slide-16
SLIDE 16

Comment 2: Reduced-Form Estimates of Expectations and Forward Guidance

Data: Blue Chip Professional Forecasters from June 2008- February 2015 of variable y at horizon h ∆f(y, h)i.t = γ0 + γ′

1(Macro news and Asset Price Changes )+

β(FOMC Dummy) + ǫi,t Identification strategy:

1

Control for all economic news released between forecasts

2

FOMC Dummy: residual variation attributable to the FOMC announcement

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 4 / 10

slide-17
SLIDE 17

Comment 2: Case study of August 2011 Annoucement

Forecast of 3-month TBill (i.e. Et[θt] − Et−1θt)

1 2 3 4 5 6

  • 1
  • 0.5

0.5

Source: Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2015), coefficient on dummy for August

  • 2011. Data from 6/2008-2/2015.

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 5 / 10

slide-18
SLIDE 18

Comment 2: Controlling for news about fundamentals

Data: Blue Chip Professional Forecasters from June 2008- February 2015 of variable y at horizon h ∆f(y, h)i.t = γ0 + γ′

1(Macro news and Asset Price Changes )+

β(FOMC description dummies) + ǫi,t Identification strategy:

1

Control for all economic news released between forecasts

2

Dummies for tone of language, QE announcements, etc. → residual variation in the forecasts attributable to calendar-based forward guidance

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 6 / 10

slide-19
SLIDE 19

Comment 2: Calendar-based forward guidance affects interest rate expectations

Forecast of 3-month TBill (i.e. Et[θt] − Et−1θt)

1 2 3 4

  • 0.5
  • 0.4
  • 0.3
  • 0.2
  • 0.1

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

Source: Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2015), coefficient on calendar-based forward guidance. 6/2008-2/2015.

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 7 / 10

slide-20
SLIDE 20

Comment 2: Calendar-based forward guidance affects GDP and inflation

Forecast of Output Forecast of Inflation

1 2 3 4

  • 1
  • 0.8
  • 0.6
  • 0.4
  • 0.2

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1 2 3 4

  • 1
  • 0.8
  • 0.6
  • 0.4
  • 0.2

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Source: Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2015), coefficient on calendar-based forward guidance. 6/2008-2/2015.

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 8 / 10

slide-21
SLIDE 21

Comment 2: Would this model produce similar estimates?

Do these interest rate expectations look like the model’s news shocks for the calendar-based forward guidance episodes?

I suspect the model will produce similar results

What happens to expectations if they implement an experiment like the extension of the peg in 2012Q3?

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 9 / 10

slide-22
SLIDE 22

Comment 3: What does this mean for the puzzle?

Does this solve the puzzle?

Can this be distinguished from other mechanisms affecting expectations? (e.g. rational inattention) This mechanism implies that if the Fed could communicate perfectly, forward guidance would be very effective Other solutions involving discounting in the Euler equation imply

  • therwise

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 10 / 10

slide-23
SLIDE 23

Concluding Remarks

Ambitious paper! It’s an intuitive and plausible mechanism that they have gotten traction on Very policy relevant – important implications for central bank communications

Christina Patterson (Northwestern) Discussion October 12, 2019 10 / 10