Entrapping Nature Elham Kashefi University of Edinburgh UK - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Entrapping Nature Elham Kashefi University of Edinburgh UK - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dec 01, 2023 277 likes •1.17k views

Entrapping Nature Elham Kashefi University of Edinburgh UK Networked Quantum Information Technologies Hub CNRS, Pierre and Marie Curie University Paris Centre for Quantum Computing Profile of a Quantum Person Profile of a Quantum Person

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Elham Kashefi

University of Edinburgh UK Networked Quantum Information Technologies Hub CNRS, Pierre and Marie Curie University Paris Centre for Quantum Computing

Entrapping Nature

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Profile of a Quantum Person

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Profile of a Quantum Person

Mathematics

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Profile of a Quantum Person

Mathematics ComputerScience

Track

A

Track

B

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SLIDE 5

Profile of a Quantum Person

Mathematics Physics ComputerScience

Track

A

Track

B

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Profile of a Quantum Person

Mathematics Physics Experiment ComputerScience

Track

A

Track

B

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Profile of a Quantum Person

Mathematics Physics Experiment Industry ComputerScience

Track

A

Track

B

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Profile of a Quantum Person

Mathematics Physics Experiment Industry ComputerScience

Track

A

Track

B Chemistry Engineering Philosophy

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Feynman Vision - 82

Quantum Computing as the technology for simulating quantum systems

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Feynman Vision - 82

Quantum Computing as the technology for simulating quantum systems from complexity theory to cryptography from simulation to sampling from tomography to implementation from foundation to interpretation

Spectacular Progress

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Hardware

QSoft Vision of Quantum Technology

Hardware

Communication Network Computing Device

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Hardware Interface

Verification/Benchmarking Abstraction/Modeling/Encoding

QSoft Vision of Quantum Technology

Hardware

Communication Network Computing Device

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Hardware Interface

Verification/Benchmarking Abstraction/Modeling/Encoding Secrecy Speed

Application

QSoft Vision of Quantum Technology

Hardware

Communication Network Computing Device

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SLIDE 14

National Investments Europe 1bn€ UK 270M £ Netherlands 80M $ China Billions ! US, Singapore,Canada

Quantum Era

Quantum Machines

Private Investments Google, IBM, Intel,ATOS,Alibaba Big VC founds Startups Companies

5

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National Investments Europe 1bn€ UK 270M £ Netherlands 80M $ China Billions ! US, Singapore,Canada

Quantum Era

Quantum Machines

Private Investments Google, IBM, Intel,ATOS,Alibaba Big VC founds Startups Companies

5

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National Investments Europe 1bn€ UK 270M £ Netherlands 80M $ China Billions ! US, Singapore,Canada

Quantum Era

Quantum Machines

Private Investments Google, IBM, Intel,ATOS,Alibaba Big VC founds Startups Companies

Target: > 50 qubits Device

5

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SLIDE 17

National Investments Europe 1bn€ UK 270M £ Netherlands 80M $ China Billions ! US, Singapore,Canada

Quantum Era

Quantum Machines

Private Investments Google, IBM, Intel,ATOS,Alibaba Big VC founds Startups Companies

Target: > 50 qubits Device Feature: Not Simulatable Classically

5

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National Investments Europe 1bn€ UK 270M £ Netherlands 80M $ China Billions ! US, Singapore,Canada

Quantum Era

Quantum Machines

Private Investments Google, IBM, Intel,ATOS,Alibaba Big VC founds Startups Companies

Target: > 50 qubits Device Feature: Not Simulatable Classically Problem: Testing, Validation, BenchMarking, Certification, Verification …

5

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National Investments Europe 1bn€ UK 270M £ Netherlands 80M $ China Billions ! US, Singapore,Canada

Quantum Era

Quantum Machines

Private Investments Google, IBM, Intel,ATOS,Alibaba Big VC founds Startups Companies

Target: > 50 qubits Device Feature: Not Simulatable Classically Problem: Testing, Validation, BenchMarking, Certification, Verification …

5

Can we BOOTSTRAP a smaller quantum device to test a bigger one?

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Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices

Quantum Verification

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Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices

Quantum Verification

  • Correctness of the outcome
  • Operation monitoring
  • Quantum property testing
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Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices

Quantum Verification

  • Correctness of the outcome
  • Operation monitoring
  • Quantum property testing
  • Architectural constraints
  • Experimental imperfections
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Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices

Quantum Verification

  • Correctness of the outcome
  • Operation monitoring
  • Quantum property testing
  • Architectural constraints
  • Experimental imperfections

Non-universal: D-Wave machine Quantum Simulator Current Q2020 architecture

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Efficient verification methods for realistic quantum devices

Quantum Verification

  • Correctness of the outcome
  • Operation monitoring
  • Quantum property testing
  • Architectural constraints
  • Experimental imperfections

Non-universal: D-Wave machine Quantum Simulator Current Q2020 architecture

Goal Criteria to test emerging quantum devices

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What is Verification

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What is Verification

A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is good

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What is Verification

A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is not bad A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is good

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What is Verification

A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is not bad A mechanism that probability of witness is accepted and the outcome is bad is bounded A mechanism that when witness is accepted the outcome is good

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What is Verification

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

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What is Verification

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

. . .

Prover/Device/Eve/Noise Verifier

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What is Verification

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

ν

random parameters

. . .

Prover/Device/Eve/Noise Verifier

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What is Verification

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

ν

random parameters

. . .

Prover/Device/Eve/Noise Verifier

B(⌫)

density operator of classical and quantum output

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What is Verification

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

ν

random parameters

. . .

Prover/Device/Eve/Noise Verifier

B(⌫)

density operator of classical and quantum output

Abort/Acc

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What is Verification

prover verifier

ν

. . .

B(⌫)

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

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What is Verification

prover verifier

ν

. . .

B(⌫)

P ν

incorrect := P⊥ ⌦ |accihacc|

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

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What is Verification

P ν

incorrect := P⊥ ⌦ |accihacc|

prover verifier

ν

. . .

B(⌫)

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

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What is Verification

P ν

incorrect := P⊥ ⌦ |accihacc|

P

ν p(⌫) Tr (P ν incorrect B(⌫)) ≤ ✏

prover verifier

ν

. . .

B(⌫)

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

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What is the challenge

P ν

incorrect := P⊥ ⌦ |accihacc|

P

ν p(⌫) Tr (P ν incorrect B(⌫)) ≤ ✏

prover verifier

ν

. . .

B(⌫)

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

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What is the challenge

P ν

incorrect := P⊥ ⌦ |accihacc|

P

ν p(⌫) Tr (P ν incorrect B(⌫)) ≤ ✏

prover verifier

ν

. . .

B(⌫) Ω

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

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What is the challenge

P ν

incorrect := P⊥ ⌦ |accihacc|

P

ν p(⌫) Tr (P ν incorrect B(⌫)) ≤ ✏

prover verifier

ν

. . .

B(⌫)

Ω

A mechanism that prob of witness is acc and outcome is bad is bounded

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How to deal with deviation

P

ν p(⌫) Tr (P ν incorrect B(⌫)) ≤ ✏

Ω

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How to deal with deviation

P

ν p(⌫) Tr (P ν incorrect B(⌫)) ≤ ✏

Ω

Different toolkits / Different tasks / Different witness / Different properties / Different assumptions / …..

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How to deal with deviation

P

ν p(⌫) Tr (P ν incorrect B(⌫)) ≤ ✏

Ω

Different toolkits / Different tasks / Different witness / Different properties / Different assumptions / …..

Hypothesis Test, Certification, Self Testing, Entanglement detection, Quantum signature, Proof System, Hardware Testing, Post-hoc verification, Randomised benchmarking, Authentication, Blind Verification

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Most General Deviation

Quantum Hiding

ΩEve,system

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Most General Deviation

Quantum Hiding

ΩEve,system σtestsubspace

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Most General Deviation

Practical Protocols with No assumptions whatsoever

Quantum Hiding

ΩEve,system σtestsubspace

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Most General Deviation

Practical Protocols with No assumptions whatsoever

Quantum Hiding

ΩEve,system σtestsubspace

Classically Impossible

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Entrapping Nature

Falsifiable via

Untrusted Quantum Theory Trusted Quantum Measurement

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Entrapping Nature

Falsifiable via

Untrusted Relativistic Quantum Theory Trusted Wave Packet

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Global Directions on Verification

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Global Directions on Verification

via Hiding : Cloud-based Crypto App Distributed Network

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Global Directions on Verification

via Hiding : Cloud-based Crypto App Distributed Network

  • Test Run

Computation Computation Computation Computation Computation Test Run

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Global Directions on Verification

via Hiding : Cloud-based Crypto App Distributed Network

  • Test Run

Computation Computation Computation Computation Computation Test Run

Blind Quantum Computing

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Global Directions on Verification

via Hiding : Cloud-based Crypto App Distributed Network

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Global Directions on Verification

via Hiding : Cloud-based Crypto App Distributed Network via Proof System : Quantum Simulation

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Global Directions on Verification

via Hiding : Cloud-based Crypto App Distributed Network via Proof System : Quantum Simulation via Hypothesis Testing : Bench Marking Quantum Supremacy

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Global Directions on Verification

via Hiding : Cloud-based Crypto App Distributed Network via Proof System : Quantum Simulation via Hypothesis Testing : Bench Marking Quantum Supremacy

  • EPSRC UK
  • NRF Singapore
  • USAirforce
  • EU QFlagship
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Global Directions on Verification

via Hiding : Cloud-based Crypto App Distributed Network via Proof System : Quantum Simulation via Hypothesis Testing : Bench Marking Quantum Supremacy

  • EPSRC UK
  • NRF Singapore
  • USAirforce
  • EU QFlagship
  • Number Crunching
  • Noise Handling
  • Architecture Adaptation
  • New Methods Development
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Verification Status

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Verification Status

Trust Worthy Quantum Information TyQi17 Paris

  • It exists
  • It is expanding
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Verification Status

Trust Worthy Quantum Information TyQi17 Paris

  • It exists
  • It is expanding
  • The overhead depends on the level of trust

aaaaaaaaaa a

Measurements Entanglement Trusted Semi-trusted (i.i.d.) Untrusted

Trusted O(N) O(N4logN) O(N13log(N)) Untrusted O(N4logN) O(N4logN) O(N64)

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Verification Status

Trust Worthy Quantum Information TyQi17 Paris

  • It exists
  • It is expanding
  • The overhead depends on the level of trust

aaaaaaaaaa a

Measurements Entanglement Trusted Semi-trusted (i.i.d.) Untrusted

Trusted O(N) O(N4logN) O(N13log(N)) Untrusted O(N4logN) O(N4logN) O(N64)

arXiv:1709.06984 Verification of quantum computation: An overview of existing approaches Alexandru Gheorghiu, Theodoros Kapourniotis, Elham Kashefi

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Verification Challenge

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Verification Challenge

Standardisation ??? Given the unknown nature of the emerging devices

  • uniform platform versus tailored made
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Verification Challenge

Standardisation ??? Given the unknown nature of the emerging devices

  • uniform platform versus tailored made
  • Academic versus Industry’s need

??? Objective improvements

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Quantum Era

Target: > 50 qubits Device Feature: Noisy Qubits Problem: What are they useful for Do we need to wait till error correcting codes became feasible

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Classical - Quantum Collaboration Landscape

Quantum Tech Cyber Security

Efficient Certification Enhanced-Security

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Protocols for hybrid classical-quantum communication network

Quantum Cryptography

  • Electronic voting
  • Fingerprinting
  • Digital currency
  • Secure cloud
  • Blockchain
  • Secure multi-party computing
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Protocols for hybrid classical-quantum communication network

Quantum Cryptography

  • Practical Security Analysis
  • Electronic voting
  • Fingerprinting
  • Digital currency
  • Secure cloud
  • Blockchain
  • Secure multi-party computing
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Protocols for hybrid classical-quantum communication network

Quantum Cryptography

  • Practical Security Analysis
  • Standard telecom technology
  • Long distance
  • Long term stability
  • Silicon-integrated
  • Small scale devices
  • Electronic voting
  • Fingerprinting
  • Digital currency
  • Secure cloud
  • Blockchain
  • Secure multi-party computing
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Quantum Crypto Status

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Quantum Crypto Status

Quantum Cryptography QCrypt17 Cambridge

  • It exists
  • It is expanding
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Quantum Crypto Status

Quantum Cryptography QCrypt17 Cambridge

  • It exists
  • It is expanding
  • Quantum Protocols for Quantum Webs
  • Q Fingerprinting
  • Q Money
  • Q Secure cloud
  • Q Byzantine Agreement
  • Q Secure multi-party computing
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Quantum Crypto Status

Quantum Cryptography QCrypt17 Cambridge

  • It exists
  • It is expanding
  • Quantum Protocols for Quantum Webs
  • Q Fingerprinting
  • Q Money
  • Q Secure cloud
  • Q Byzantine Agreement
  • Q Secure multi-party computing

They need few qubits …. works with noisy one too

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Quantum Crypto Challenge

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Quantum Crypto Challenge

How to exploit them for Classical Web ?

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Quantum Crypto Challenge

How to exploit them for Classical Web ?

  • Academic versus Industry’s need

Objective improvements

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Quantum Crypto Challenge

How to exploit them for Classical Web ?

  • Academic versus Industry’s need

Objective improvements Performances / Cost / Added values

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Practical Classical SMPC

First large-scale practical experiment with SMPC to implement a secure auction 08 Recently: Efficient (low communication) computational SMPC Computation represented by a series of additions and multiplications of elements in Fp.
 easy Linear Verifiable Secret Sharing

r1 x1

|0>

CLIENT SIDE SERVER

r2 x2 r3 x3 r4 x4 ixed at 0° global XOR

  • pi/8

pi/4 pi/8

Wollaston

15m PM ibre 15m PM ibre

single photon source 1550nm

Half waveplates:

needs few qubits

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The Edinburgh-Paris Team

Development Deployment Q-enhanced Cloud In the lab Certification Multi-party QC Research Verification

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The Edinburgh-Paris Team

Development Deployment Q-enhanced Cloud In the lab Certification Multi-party QC Research Verification Alexandru Cojocaru Andru Gheorghiu Daniel Mills Luka Music Ulysse Chabaud Tom Douce

Interns: Ieva Cepaite Iskren Vankov Phivos Sofokleous Kelsey Horan Léo Colisson

Petros Wallden Ellen Derbyshire Brian Coyle

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Other collaborators

Theory Experiment Damian Markham (LIP6) Joe Fitzsimons (SUTD) Anna Pappa (UCL) Anne Broadbent (Ottawa) Vedran Dunjko (Innsbruck) Anthony Leverrier (INREA) Animesh Datta (Warwick) Theodoros Kapourniotis (Warwick) Stefanie Barz (Vienna,Oxford) Philip Walther (Vienna) Ian Walmsley (Oxford)

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Other collaborators

Theory Experiment Damian Markham (LIP6) Joe Fitzsimons (SUTD) Anna Pappa (UCL) Anne Broadbent (Ottawa) Vedran Dunjko (Innsbruck) Anthony Leverrier (INREA) Animesh Datta (Warwick) Theodoros Kapourniotis (Warwick) Stefanie Barz (Vienna,Oxford) Philip Walther (Vienna) Ian Walmsley (Oxford)

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A girl simple dream

28

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A girl simple dream

28

(b)

Quantum Devices

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A girl simple dream

28

QKD Network

(b)

Quantum Devices

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A girl simple dream

28

QKD Network

(b)

Quantum Devices Global Verifiable Secure Quantum Web