1
1
Investor Presentation
March 2019
Investor Presentation March 2019 1 1 Notice on Forward Looking - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Investor Presentation March 2019 1 1 Notice on Forward Looking Statements governmental regulations on Seaspans business; the financial condition of Seaspans customers, lenders, This presentation contains forward-looking statements (as
1
1
March 2019
2
2
This presentation contains forward-looking statements (as such term is defined in Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or the Exchange Act) concerning operations, cash flows, and financial position of Seaspan Corporation (“Seaspan”), including, in particular, the likelihood of its success in developing and expanding its business. Statements that are predictive in nature, that depend upon or refer to future events or conditions, or that include words such as “continue,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “plans,” “believes,” “estimates,” “projects,” “forecasts,” “will,” “may,” “potential,” “should,” “guidance,” and similar expressions are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements represent Seaspan’s estimates and assumptions only as of the date of this presentation and are not intended to give any assurance as to future results. As a result, you are cautioned not to rely on any forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements appear in a number of places in this presentation. Although these statements are based upon assumptions Seaspan believes to be reasonable based upon available information, they are subject to risks and uncertainties. These risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to: future growth prospects and ability to expand Seaspan’s business; Seaspan’s expectations as to impairments of its vessels, including the timing and amount of currently anticipated impairments; the future valuation of Seaspan’s vessels and goodwill; potential acquisitions, vessel financing arrangements and other investments, and Seaspan’s expected benefits from such transactions; future time charters and vessel deliveries, including future long-term charters for certain existing vessels as well as the likelihood of consummating any such transactions; estimated future capital expenditures needed to preserve the
expectations regarding future dry-docking and operating expenses, including ship operating expense and general and administrative expenses; Seaspan’s expectations about the availability of vessels to purchase, the time that it may take to construct new vessels, the delivery dates of new vessels, the commencement of service of new vessels under long-term time charter contracts and the useful lives of its vessels; availability
market trends, including charter rates, increased technological innovation in competing vessels and other factors affecting supply and demand; Seaspan’s financial condition and liquidity, including its ability to borrow and repay funds under its credit facilities, to refinance its existing facilities and to obtain additional financing in the future to fund capital expenditures, acquisitions and other general corporate activities; Seaspan’s continued ability to meet its current liabilities as they become due; Seaspan’s continued ability to maintain, enter into or renew primarily long-term, fixed-rate time charters with its existing customers or new customers; the potential for early termination of long-term contracts and Seaspan’s potential inability to enter into, renew
exchange rates and interest rate fluctuations; conditions inherent in the operation of ocean-going vessels, including acts of piracy; acts of terrorism or government requisition of Seaspan’s containership during periods of war or emergency; adequacy of Seaspan’s insurance to cover losses that result from the inherent
in its fleet; conditions in the public equity market and the price of Seaspan’s shares; Seaspan’s ability to leverage to its advantage its relationships and reputation in the containership industry; compliance with and changes in governmental rules and regulations or actions taken by regulatory authorities, and the effect of governmental regulations on Seaspan’s business; the financial condition of Seaspan’s customers, lenders, refund guarantors and other counterparties and their ability to perform their obligations under their agreements with us; Seaspan’s continued ability to meet specified restrictive covenants and other conditions in its financing and lease arrangements, its debt instruments and its preferred shares; any economic downturn in the global financial markets and export trade and increase in trade protectionism and potential negative effects of any recurrence of such disruptions on Seaspan’s customers’ ability to charter Seaspan’s vessels and pay for Seaspan’s services; some of Seaspan’s directors and investors may have separate interests which may conflict with those of its shareholders and they may be difficult to replace given the anti- takeover provisions in Seaspan’s organizational documents; taxation of Seaspan’s company and of distributions to its shareholders; Seaspan’s exemption from tax on U.S. source international transportation income; the ability to bring claims in China and the Marshall Islands, where the legal systems are not well- developed; potential liability from future litigation; and other factors detailed from time to time in Seaspan’s periodic reports. Forward-looking statements in this presentation are estimates and assumptions reflecting the judgment of senior management and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties. These forward-looking statements are based upon a number of assumptions and estimates that are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies, many of which are beyond Seaspan’s control. Actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Accordingly, these forward- looking statements should be considered in light of various important factors listed above and including, but not limited to, those set forth in “Item 3. Key Information—D. Risk Factors” in Seaspan’s Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 2018 on Form 20-F filed on March 26, 2019, and the “Risk Factors” in Reports
relating to our quarterly financial results. Seaspan does not intend to revise any forward-looking statements in order to reflect any change in Seaspan’s expectations or events or circumstances that may subsequently arise. Seaspan expressly disclaims any obligation to update or revise any of these forward-looking statements, whether because of future events, new information, a change in Seaspan’s views or expectations, or otherwise. You should carefully review and consider the various disclosures included in this Annual Report and in Seaspan’s other filings made with the SEC, that attempt to advise interested parties of the risks and factors that may affect Seaspan’s business, prospects and results of operations.
3
3
Shoe Store
Liners load and unload goods across ocean routes just as couriers operate routes through land and air
4
4
Manufactured goods for distribution Land transport to distribution centers Loading of cargo at port terminals Unloading of cargo at port terminals Land transport to destination warehouse Delivery to customer
Seller Buyer
End buyer of shipments (importers / exporters)
Shipper Destination Warehouse Destination Port Consignee Origin Warehouse Origin Port
Shipping Line
Shipping voyage via container ships
Freight-Forwarder
5
5
Container Shipping’s first downturn since 1998 1.2% 1.6%
2000-2007 2011-2019F
2001: China joins WTO 2011: China becomes 2nd largest global economy
Container shipping accounts for 17% of global shipping by weight but 60% by value (over $12 trillion of goods in 2017)3
Global TEU Trade CAGR: 9.9% Global GDP2 CAGR: 3.4% TEU to GDP Multiple: 2.9x 3.9% 2.8% 1.3x 1.4x 1978: China Economic Reforms 1990: Social Market Economy of China (TEU, millions1)
1. Clarkson’s Research – March 2019 2. GDP Source: World Bank 3. Statista Container Shipping Statistics & Facts
4 12 67 70 76 84 95 105 117 129 135 122 139 150 155 163 171 175 182 193 196 204 '73 '83 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19F
6
6
Average Utilization Since IPO3
4,600 employees
4,300 Seafarers 300 Corporate
Independent Containership Owner / Operator
~6 years
Average Age
~4.5 years
Average Remaining Charter Period
$4.8bn
Contracted Future Revenue2 Long-term Charters with
Leading Liners
$484mn
Cash Flow from Operations1
Integrated with Global Trade Modern Fleet Strong Financial Profile
1. Based on fiscal year ended December 31, 2018 2. Minimum future revenues to be received on committed time charter party agreements and interest income from direct financing leases as of December 31, 2018. Minimum future revenues are based on 100% utilization, relate to committed time charter party agreements currently in effect, and assume no renewals or extensions 3. Average fleet utilization from 4Q05 to 4Q18
$1.1bn
Revenue1
7
7 Issued $345mn unsecured listed bond
13 # Vessels 23 29 35 42 55 65 69 71 77 85 87 89 112
SCLL, predecessor of Seaspan Corp, founded by Kyle Washington and two others Issued $250mn Series C Preferred Equity (1st U.S. listed preferred by containership lessor) Containership JV with The Carlyle Group Acquired Seaspan Management Services $600mn SSW IPO (largest ship leasing) Washington Family invested $180mn Completed $1.6bn GCI acquisition Secured $1.0bn investment from Fairfax
2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Utilization 100% 99% 99% 99% 100% 99% 99% 99% 98% 99% 99% 96% 96% 98%
51 64 108 143 158 187 265 353 405 414 474 578 621 666 906 IPO 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 4Q18 > 10,000 TEU 8,500 - 9,600 TEU 4,250 - 5,100 TEU < 3,500 TEU
8
8
New Leadership Team
Fairfax Investments
(leading Canadian insurance company) – $250mn debt investment funded in February 2018 and $250mn equity investment funded in July 2018 – Funded an additional $250mn equity investment and an additional $250mn of debt in January 2019
Acquisition of GCI
China Intermodal Investments LLC (GCI) in March 2018
and a ~$50mn issuance of Seaspan Series D preferred shares
customer base, and enhanced our fleet composition
David Sokol Bing Chen Ryan Courson Tina Lai Torsten Pedersen
9
9
rail transport, mining, and aviation
investment in 2009 during the recession
company with $64bn in assets2
Initial investment of $500mn ($250mn debt/$250mn equity) Additional 25mn warrants issued with strike price of $8.05 Second investment of $500mn in January 2019 ($250mn
debt/$250mn equity)
Current Shareholder Base1
New Chairman, CEO, and CFO have accessed new capital sources and strengthened commercial position with the acquisition of GCI
1. As of January 15, 2019 2. As of December 31, 2018
Washington Family 28% Fairfax 36% Others 36%
10
10
Selected Global Lenders Diversified Sources of Capital1
($ millions)
1. As at December 31, 2018, adjusted for $500mn Fairfax investment in January 2019. Corporate Revolver is undrawn and committed in the amount of $150mn. Secure debt, unsecured debt, and capital lease amounts based on principal 2. Includes 3 vessels securing debt which was repaid in March 2019, and for which collateral release documentation is pending
Significant Unencumbered Asset Pool
40+ global lenders, including North American, European, and Asian financial institutions 37 unencumbered vessels2
TEU Class Vessel Count2 2,500 12 3,500 2 4,250 17 8,500 2 9,600 2 10,000 2 Total 37
Secured Debt $2,947 Capital Leases $648 Unsecured Debt $900 Perpetual Preferred Stock $881 Common Equity $1,877 Corporate Revolver $150
11
11
Liner Companies
Liner Responsibilities:
Fleet of 112 Containerships Operating Lessor
Lessor Responsibilities:
Charter Rate + Term
Fixed-Rate Charter Contract
Charter Rate Vessel & Crew + Services
12
12
2,500 TEU 12 Vessels 3,500–4,250 TEU 26 Vessels 4,500–5,100 TEU 9 Vessels 8,500–9,600 TEU 12 Vessels 10,000–11,000TEU 30 Vessels 13,000–14,000 TEU 23 Vessels Regional Trades Workhorses of Global Fleet Operating Scale and Efficiency For Long- Haul Trades
68% of fleet is >10,000 TEU in size with an average age of approximately four years1
1. Weighted by TEU
13
13
Feeder Class Mid-Sized VLCS / ULCS
TEU 2,500 3,500 4,250 5,100 8,500 9,600 10,000 13,100 14,000 Intra‐Asia
Africa
Australia—NZ
Latin America
Europe—NA
Far East—ME
Far East—NA
Far East—Europe
The ideal ship size varies by route, port capacity, and charter needs
Seaspan’s Vessel Trading Activity
14
14 906 784 556 528 469 450 398 391 354 350 279 229 220 215 203 199 199 199 182 179 Shoei Kisen Costamare Zodiac Maritime BoCom Leasing Eastern Pacific Shg (EPS) Offen, Claus Peter Peter Döhle/Hammonia Danaos Minsheng Financial Leasing Ship Finance International Norddeutsche R.H. Schuldt Zeaborn MPC Group Schulte Group China Merchants Bank Navios Group Global Ship Lease SinOceanic Nissen Kaiun
Barriers to Entry Top 20 Containership Lessors1
TEU (000s)
Customer Relationships Operational Track Record and Experience Scale of Service Increasing Regulation Access to Financing
Scale creates meaningful barriers to entry
Primarily a financial lessor (i.e. limited/no vessel management services)
2
1. Alphaliner Monthly Monitor – February 2019. Chart of top 20 containership lessors includes current vessels and vessels under construction 2. Shipowning arm of Imabari Shipbuilding
15
15
VESSEL DESIGN VESSEL UPGRADES VESSEL OPERATIONS VESSEL MANAGEMENT
Enhanced cargo care practices to safely carry more containers Trim optimization to
and fuel efficiency
In-House Design & Engineering Teams
strong relationships with leading shipyards
construction, conversions and marine engineering
Fleet Utilization Rates
Impact of Hanjin bankruptcy and drydock
Fleet Management Commercial Services
maintenance
300
Corporate & Operations
4,600
People Employed Globally
>7,900
2018 Port Calls
4,300
Seafarers
charter profile drives high utilization rates
several recent awards
99% 100% 99% 99% 99% 98% 99% 99% 96% 96% 98% FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18
16
16 100% 89% 77% 63% 43% 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Cash flow stability from future contracted charter payments of ~$4.8 billion1 with an average remaining contract duration of ~4.5 Years
Percentage of Contracted Revenue by Year1
Majority of charter expirations post 2022 are modern 10,000+ TEU vessels
1. Minimum future revenues to be received on committed time charter party agreements and interest income from direct financing leases as of December 31, 2018. Minimum future revenues are based on 100% utilization, relate to committed time charter party agreements currently in effect, and assume no renewals or extensions. Illustrated as a percentage of 2018 revenue
17
17
1. Rank based on market share per Alphaliner as of February 2019 2. Number of Seaspan’s vessels and TEU of vessels chartered to each liner as of December 31, 2018 3. Credit ratings represent MOL and K-Line, respectively
Seaspan works with a select group of leading liner companies with a focus on long-term charters
(by % of total TEU)
Other
Charterer World Ranking1
Vessels² Total TEU² Major Shareholders Credit Rating COSCO 3 35 253,000 Government chAAA / Lianhe Yang Ming 8 16 220,000 Government twBBB / Taiwan CR ONE3 6 22 152,150 Widely-held (Ba1 / NR) / (BBB / NR) CMA CGM 4 10 71,250 Family-owned B1 / B+ MSC 2 6 63,500 Family-owned (N/A) Hapag Lloyd 5 8 62,750 Widely-held B2 / B+ Maersk 1 7 49,250 Widely-held Baa2 / BBB Evergreen 7 1 4,250 Widely-held NR Other
29,750 – – Total 112 905,900
28% 24% 17% 8% 7% 7% 5% 3% 1%
18
18
Fully Integrated Operating Platform Long-Term, Fixed- Rate Charters Creditworthy Customers
stable, predictable cash flows
Seaspan’s differentiated business model allows it to capitalize on challenges currently facing the containership leasing industry and provide best-in-class service
Commoditization Short-Term Focus Weak Credit Profiles Challenges to Containership Industry
Seaspan’s Model
Size & Scale
savings
Fragmentation
19
19
Market Share 20191 Top 8 Liners Grew Market Share from 55% to ~85% in 5 Years1
APM‐Maersk, 18% MSC, 15% CMA CGM, 10% Evergreen, 5% COSCON, 5% Hapag‐Lloyd, 4% APL, 4% Hanjin Shg, 4% CSCL, 4% MOL, 4% OOCL, 3% Hamburg Süd, 3% NYK, 3% Yang Ming, 2% K Line, 2% Hyundai M.M., 2% Others, 11%
1. Alphaliner Monthly Monitor – February 2019
Market Share 2013
Maersk+H.Sud, 20% MSC, 16% COSCO + OOCL, 13% CMA CGM, 13% Hapag+UAS C, 8% ONE, 7% Evergreen, 6% Yang Ming, 3% HMM, 2% Others, 12%
20
20
The fragmented landscape leaves significant room and benefit for consolidation
scale and barriers to entry
benefits
and reduced cost of capital , 8%
1. Alphaliner Monthly Monitor – February 2019
Opportunity for Consolidation Containership Lessor Market Share1
Shoei Kisen, 7% Costamare, 5% Zodiac Maritime, 4% BoCom Leasing, 4% Eastern Pacific Shg (EPS), 4% Offen, Claus Peter, 3% Peter Döhle/Hammonia, 3% Danaos Shg, 3% Minsheng Financial Leasing, 3% Norddeutsche R.H. Schuldt, 2% Other, 54%
21
21
(50%) – 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Jan-19 2,500 TEU 3,500 TEU 4,400 TEU 9,000 TEU
increasing rates for larger vessel sizes
2019, and continuing restraint on newbuild ordering
~4% for 2019; containership fleet growth stands at ~3%
Charter Rate Improvement1 Historical Containership Asset Value1
sale and purchase activity to pick up
(1) Clarksons Research – April 2019
1Q17 2Q17 3Q17 4Q17 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19 (50%) – 50% 100% 150% Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18 Jan-19 2,600 - 2,900 TEU 3,200 - 3,600 TEU 8,500 - 9,100 TEU 1Q17 2Q17 3Q17 4Q17 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19
22
22
(15%) (10%) (5%) – 5% 10% 15% 20% – 5 10 15 20 25 30 TEU (mllions) Fleet Capacity (TEU) Throughput Growth Capacity Growth
(1) Alphaliner Monthly Monitor – April 2019; global port throughput includes empty container and transshipment cargo (2) Clarksons Research – Container Intelligence Quarterly Q1 2019
supporting trade growth in developing economies
uncertainty
positive in OECD regions
2019 Growth Rates by Region2
rates
2019 and 2020
to scrubber retrofits
Annual Capacity and Throughput Growth1
– – Capacity Growth 2.2% 2.8% 0.9% 4.2% 5.2% 10.5% 4.1% 6.4% 3.5% 5.2% 5.0% Transpacific FE-Europe Other ME/ISC-Asia ME/ISC-Europe ME/ISC-N.Am Latin America Africa Oceania Intra-Asia Other Mainlane East-West Non-Mainlane East- West North-South Intra-Regional
23
23
Idle Fleet Continues to Decline (% TEU)1,2 Orderbook at Historically Low Levels1,2
driving idle fleet reduction and supporting time charter rate improvement
(primarily < 3,000 TEU); proportion of idle tonnage owned by lessors among the lowest since 2012
declining and average TEU size increasing
Historical Demolition Volumes2
(1) Clarksons Research – April 2019 (2) Alphaliner Monthly Monitor – April 2019
providers continues to temper supply growth
0% 25% 50% 75% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 11.7% 18 22 26 30 200 400 600
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 YTD
Average Age (yrs) TEU (000's) TEU Scrapped Other Deletions Average Age (Scrapped Units) 2.1% 0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 450 900 1,350 1,800 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Idle % TEU (000's) Total Idle TEU Idle Fleet as % of Total Fleet
24
24
Focus on Capital Allocation
business, and have strong risk-adjusted returns on capital
Seaspan Well-Positioned for the Future
consolidation in the containership industry
Other Capital Allocation Opportunities
adjusted returns
Improving Industry Dynamics
25
25
1
Operational Excellence
Customer Partnerships
Financial Strength and Stability
Pursuit of Growth Opportunities
Capital Allocation
2 3 4 5
26
26
27
27 $83 $119 $133 $134 $344 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19
Cash Flow from Operations Revenue
(US$ Millions)
Utilization Rate Operating Earnings
(US$ Millions) (US$ Millions)
$225 $282 $295 $295 $285 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19 96.8% 98.6% 98.4% 97.3% 98.1% 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19 $70 $113 $142 $149 $123 1Q18 2Q18 3Q18 4Q18 1Q19
Includes $227mn charter modification payment
28
28 $351 $7 $303 $470 $731 2015 2016 2017 2018 LTM
Cash Flow from Operations1 Revenue1
(US$ Millions)
Utilization Rate1 Operating Earnings1
(US$ Millions) (US$ Millions)
$819 $878 $831 $1,096 $1,157 2015 2016 2017 2018 LTM 98.5% 96.0% 95.7% 97.8% 98.1% 2015 2016 2017 2018 LTM $336 $311 $323 $484 $527 2015 2016 2017 2018 LTM
Includes $227mn charter modification payment
$285mn impairment charge2
(1) LTM based on 12 months ended March 31, 2019 (2) $285mn vessel impairment charge incurred in 2016
29
29
Appointed CEO of Seaspan in January 2018 25 years of executive experience in building multiple businesses across industries,
including finance and asset leasing businesses, in US, Europe and Asia
Previously CEO of BNP Paribas (China) Ltd.
Bing Chen President and Chief Executive Officer Ryan Courson Chief Financial Officer
Appointed CFO of Seaspan in May 2018 Former Senior Vice President of Corporate Development Previous experience at Falcon Edge Capital, Teton Capital and Berkshire Hathaway
David Sokol Chairman
Appointed Director of Seaspan in April 2017 and Chairman in July 2017 Currently serves as a director of The Washington Companies Over 38-year business career, founded three companies, took three companies
public and sold MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co. to Berkshire Hathaway in 2000 Peter Curtis Executive VP and Chief Commercial & Technical Officer
Appointed Executive Vice President in July 2017 and Chief Commercial and Technical
Officer in March 2018
30+ years of experience in shipbuilding, fleet management, engineering, naval design,
and operations
30
30
Industry Players
Companies that transport goods through regular transit routes on fixed schedules. Container shipping liners use large containerships to transport goods from one location to another.
Vessels Measurements
Ship owners who lease their assets to liners, providing the latter with an attractive alternative to full ownership of their operating fleet. A third party that sources and consolidates cargoes from various beneficial cargo owners and negotiates with liners to arrange the shipment. Freight forwarders can also arrange the crucial connection services and formalities on behalf of a shipper.
Beneficial Cargo Owners (BCO)
Owner of the goods, who takes full control of their cargo at point of entry in the country of importation. Small ships that often distribute cargo between large hub ports and smaller regional ones. These ships were the standard in container shipping for many years, until more recent advances in shipbuilding provided the means to maximize economies of scale. Acronym for “very large container ships.” A segment which entered the market in 2006, and have a capacity of 8-14K TEU.
ULCS
Acronym for “ultra large container ships.” The most recent player to enter the market, with a capacity of more than 14K TEU. These ships can only call the largest and deepest ports in the world. Acronym for “twenty-foot-equivalent” unit. This is the unit used to measure the capacity of containerships and terminals. The average long cargo box you see measures 2 TEU. Price lessors charge to lease their ships. The actual box rates Liners charge the end customer
CO2 Emissions
The carbon dioxide emissions produced when using fuel to drive an engine. The more fuel-efficient or “green” a ship is, the lower its CO2 emissions will be.
Liners Feeder Class TEU Charter Rates Charter Providers / Owners Freight Rates Mid-Sized VLCS Freight Forwarders