Multi- -Disciplinary Convergence in Life Sciences: Disciplinary - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Bio-Chemical security 2030 - towards improved science-based multilevel governance University of Bath University of Bath 30 September 30 September -

• 01 October 2013, Bath, UK

01 October 2013, Bath, UK

Dana Perkins, PhD Dana Perkins, PhD 1540 Committee Expert 1540 Committee Expert

Multi-Disciplinary Convergence in Life Sciences: Is the Overarching CBRN Security Culture the Answer to Governance ? Multi Multi-

• Disciplinary Convergence in Life Sciences:

Disciplinary Convergence in Life Sciences: Is the Overarching CBRN Security Culture Is the Overarching CBRN Security Culture the Answer to Governance the Answer to Governance ?

Unless otherwise specified, the opinions presented here are those of the presenter and may not necessarily reflect the views of the 1540 Committee, its Group of Experts, or the UN Security Council

Multi Multi-

• Disciplinary & Multi

Disciplinary & Multi-

• Technology Convergence

Technology Convergence

• Convergence in life

sciences is a “fact of life”

• A typical life sciences /

biotechnology lab may include inter alia microbiologists, molecular biologists, chemists, clinicians, engineers, and computational scientists

• Reciprocal compatibility

and synergism of different disciplines and technologies is achieved by integrating application of knowledge at all complexity levels

http://biox.stanford.edu/biox/PDF/white_paper.pdf

“Bio-X research is guided by four

• verarching goals:
• To image and simulate life from

molecules to mind

• To restore the health of cells and

tissues

• To decode the genetics of health

and disease

• To design therapeutic devices and

molecular machines In its first decade of existence, Bio-X has shown how powerful its interdisciplinary approach to the life sciences can be…”

http://www.ncbl.egicore.com

• Biology-inspired technologies
• Bio-batteries
• Bio-remediation
• Bio-computing
• Enabling technologies
• Genome sequencing tools and resources
• Molecular tools: PCR, micro-arrays
• Emerging technologies convergence
• DNA sequencing and nanotechnology
• Q-dots
• Microbes: friends and foes

 Health  “Green” factories for chemicals, recombinant proteins and fuels  Decomposition of organic waste  Biopesticides, neutralizers of harmful substances  Biosensors  Agriculture/soil microbiome/ecosystem

• The “enemy of my enemy”: phage therapy

Convergence of Technologies in Convergence of Technologies in Harnessing the Power of the Microbe Harnessing the Power of the Microbe

Scientific American Karry Mullis, inventor

• f PCR

and 1983 Nobel prize winner Stanley Cohen, co-inventor of recombinant DNA technology (DNA cloning) and 1986 Nobel prize winner

Synthetic Organisms Synthetic Organisms

Poliovirus synthesis from scratch and recovery of Poliovirus synthesis from scratch and recovery of infectious virus infectious virus

Cello J et al. 2002. Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural

• template. Science 297: 1016 -8

Molecular engineering of Molecular engineering of Vaccinia Vaccinia virus gene (VCP) virus gene (VCP) into the into the Variola Variola gene (SPICE) gene (SPICE) through targeted through targeted mutations mutations

VCP and SPICE differ genetically by only 0.4 % but Variola’s SPICE is 100 % more active in inhibiting human immunity/C3b

Will this technique be applicable to full genomes ? Will this technique be applicable to full genomes ?

Rosengard AM et al. 2002 Variola virus immune evasion design: Expression of a highly efficient inhibitor of human complement. Proc Natl Acad Sci 99: 8808-13

Meet Synthia Meet Synthia

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1279988/Artificial-life-created-Craig-Venter--wipe-humanity.html

Bio Bio-

• hacking, iGEM

hacking, iGEM-

• style

style

• Escherichia coli "computer" flipped

genetic material to tackle a mathematical puzzle called the Hamiltonian Path Problem with 3 nodes and 3 edges; has 48 possible

• rderings
• The manipulated DNA of E. coli

bacteria created a "machine" that fluoresced red and green when it detected a viable Hamiltonian path

• rder in a bacterium
• Davidson's first-generation bacterial

computer could evolve into an unbeatable chess playing machine.

DIY Biology DIY Biology

• Grassroots movement
• f amateur and

professional biologists,

• est. 2008
• Online network &

collaborations to share knowledge, build camaraderie, cut costs; community labs came next

• They use home-built

(or refurbished second hand) lab equipment, write their own code (software and genetic), engineer tissue, purify proteins, extract nucleic acids, and design their

• wn bio-systems, all on

a hobbyist‘s budget

http://www.diybio.org http://www.diybio.org http://www.genspace.org http://www.genspace.org

http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Citizen_Science

Gamers Succeed Where Scientists Fail: Gamers Succeed Where Scientists Fail: Molecular Structure of Retrovirus Enzyme Solved, Molecular Structure of Retrovirus Enzyme Solved, Doors Open to New AIDS Drug Design Doors Open to New AIDS Drug Design

ScienceDaily (Sep. 18, 2011) — Gamers have solved the structure of a retrovirus enzyme whose configuration had stumped scientists for more than a decade. The gamers achieved their discovery by playing Foldit, an

• nline game that allows players to

collaborate and compete in predicting the structure of protein molecules.

Quo vadis, Biotech ? Quo vadis, Biotech ?

"For the most part, genetic engineering is done by taking components, like genes, from nature and using them. But nature designed them for a different purpose, so the point of synthetic biology is to have well-characterized components that we can easily assemble to engineer biology and do genetic manipulation in a much easier way."

• Jay Keasling , Director, Joint BioEnergy Institute -

A future when:

 Food is plenty and healthy

 En Energy is clean and sustainable  The good health of people, animals, plants and the environment is the norm

• Bio-medicine
• Complex molecular devices for tissue repair
• Smart therapeutics
• Novel delivery systems
• Personalized genomic medicine
• In vivo drug synthesis by microbiome manipulation
• Environment and energy
• Bioremediation
• “Green” energy microbial production
• Safe GMOs
• In vitro synthesis of complex biopharmaceuticals
• Sustainable “green” chemical (microbial) industry
• Production of smart (bio)materials

http://www.physorg.com/news184310039.html

Convergence of Technologies in Convergence of Technologies in Harnessing the Power of the Nano Harnessing the Power of the Nano

• Nano-medicine
• Enhanced prostethics
• Nano-structured implants/

scaffolds for tissue regeneration

• In vivo nano-sensors
• Q-dot single protein label
• Nano-manufacturing /liquid glass
• Dx/Rx nano-shells/

dendrimers/bots

• Nano-enhanced physical

and cognitive performance

• Exploiting quantum effects

for smart nano-materials, bionics, biomimetics, neuromorphic engineering, brain-machine interface

“In the near future, nanotech-enabled technologies intended for use in the body will erase any remaining distinction between “therapy” and “enhancement” and could change, quite literally, the definition of what it means to be human…Homo sapiens 2.0 Homo sapiens 2.0…”- ETC Group

http://www.ngm.com

The Borg Hive The Borg Hive

http://www.nanotech-now.com

Nano Nano-

• Armageddon

Armageddon

• the

the “ “grey goo grey goo” ” scenario scenario -

• Grey Goo – a term coined

by Eric Drexler

• Hypothetical end-of-the-

world scenario involving

• ut-of-control, rapidly self-

replicating nano-robots that consume all organic matter

• n Earth

Shane Hope’s representation of the “grey goo armageddon”, part of the artist’s show on trans- humanism, called "Your Mom Is Open Source” at the Winkelman Gallery, NYC

Q: Will robots inherit the earth? Q: Will robots inherit the earth? A: Yes, but they will be our children A: Yes, but they will be our children… …

• Marvin Minsky -

Bio Bio-

• Armageddon

Armageddon

• the

the “ “green goo green goo” ” scenario scenario -

Somewhere in the Galaxy Somewhere in the Galaxy between the between the “ “green goo green goo” ” and an uncertain future and an uncertain future… …

• Ability of individuals to harness the microbe power for

nefarious purposes

• Environmental and ethical challenges posed by emerging

technologies and the ensuing public debate

• Human augmentation systems
• Pace of changing the traditional institutional and regulatory

frameworks to keep up with technological advances and science dynamics such as the convergence of nano-, bio-, information and materials technology

• Ability to develop countermeasures to threats as a measure
• f deterrence
• Omnipresence of insecurity, including terrorism

• Health, safety, environment
• Social and ethical issues
• Bio-/Chem-preparedness
• Risk posed by open

source biology?

• Threats due to terrorism

and criminal intent

1975 Asilomar conference marked the beginning of an era of public discussion of policy addressing the (laboratory, environmental safety) challenges of emerging technologies

The Good, the Bad, and the Unthinkable The Good, the Bad, and the Unthinkable… …

“ “Dual Dual-

• use

use” ” Dilemma Dilemma

“Biotechnology represents a ‘dual use’ dilemma in which the same technologies can be used legitimately for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism.” US National Academy of Sciences “…research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health, agriculture, plants, animals, the environment, or materiel.” US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)

Media and Public Debate Media and Public Debate

http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/sci_tech/highlights/010117_mousepox.shtml

http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/containing-super-flus-controversy-brews-over-scientists-creation-of-killer-viruses-a-815782.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3031488.stm

Dual Concerns Dual Concerns

• Where is the

problem?

• “Red tape” and

restraints on research impede the progress of science

• Restricting the

communication of any research results is paramount to censorship

• Need more

effective

• versight of dual

use research

• Laws and

regulations may be necessary

• What is the

government doing to mitigate the risk?

Public / Media / Legislators Scientific community

United States: Policy and Regulatory Measures United States: Policy and Regulatory Measures

• - Illustrative Example

Illustrative Example --

• 29 March 2012

Gain Gain-

• of
• f-
• Function Research on H5N1 and

Function Research on H5N1 and resolution 1540 (2004) resolution 1540 (2004)

http://www.nature.com/news/specials/mutantflu/index.html

“ The court argued that, more broadly, decisions on what is and what is not research with potential consequences for international proliferation cannot be left to individual researchers without compromising states’ obligations under UN resolution 1540 passed in 2004, which requires states to adopt legislation to counter the proliferation

• f nuclear, chemical and biological

weapons…”

http://blogs.nature.com/news/2013/09/court-upholds-need-for-export-permits-for-risky-flu-research.html

Refrain from providing any form

• f support to non-State actors

that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical nuclear, chemical

• r biological weapons and their
• r biological weapons and their

means of delivery means of delivery Adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws prohibiting activities involving the proliferation

• f

such weapons and their means of delivery to non non-

• State actors, in particular for

State actors, in particular for terrorist purposes terrorist purposes, as well any attempts to engage in such activities, assist or finance them

Legally binding obligations on all States under Resolution 1540 Legally binding obligations on all States under Resolution 1540 (2004), to: (2004), to:

Implement and enforce appropriate controls

• ver related materials

related materials in order to:  Account for and secure Account for and secure items in production, use, storage or transport;  Physically protect; Physically protect;  Detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit Detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit trafficking and brokering trafficking and brokering through effective border controls an law enforcement efforts;  Control the export, transit, trans Control the export, transit, trans-

• shipment

shipment and re and re-

• export and the provision of funds

export and the provision of funds and services and services related to such export and trans-shipment that would contribute to proliferation;  Penalize violations Penalize violations.

Resolution 1540 (2004): A Response to Threats Resolution 1540 (2004): A Response to Threats to International Peace and Security to International Peace and Security

• Means of delivery:

Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other

unmanned systems unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use

• Non

Non-

• State actor:

State actor: individual or entity

individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution

• Related materials:

Related materials: materials, equipment and technology

covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or , or included on national control lists included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery

Definitions for the purpose of resolution 1540 (2004) Definitions for the purpose of resolution 1540 (2004)

Visit of 1540 expert at the Volpenpest HAMMER Training and Education Center, 5-7 Feb 2013, Richland, USA US NIH Biosafety and Bicocontainment Training Program- Dana Perkins personal photo

Illustrative Example Illustrative Example

http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/29B727532FECBE96C12571860035A6DB?OpenDocument Anthrax Leahy Letter Powder: FBI (public domain) Gruinard Island: Site of British anthrax experiment during World War II Source: http://www.gifte.de/gruinard_island_bild01.htm “Two R-400A bombs photographed by UNSCOM inspectors at Murasana Airfield near the Al Walid Airbase in late 1991 bearing the markings indicating they were to be filled with botulinum toxin…”- http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/Iraq_Oct_2002.pdf Anthrax cultures: CDC/Dr. James Feeley, Public Health Image Library #1165

“[Security Council] calls upon States to renew and calls upon States to renew and fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes… [and] promote the universal adoption and full promote the universal adoption and full i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , an d, w h e r e ne c e s s a r y , i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , an d, w h e r e ne c e s s a r y , strengthening of multilateral treaties strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation

• f nuclear, biological or chemical weapons”

– Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

Security Council Meets on Non Security Council Meets on Non-

• Proliferation of WMDs

Proliferation of WMDs UN Photo: Eskinder Debebe, 28 April 2004 UN Photo: Eskinder Debebe, 28 April 2004

Non Non-

• proliferation Regimes and resolution 1540 (2004)

proliferation Regimes and resolution 1540 (2004) are Mutually Reinforcing are Mutually Reinforcing



The 1540 Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is a subsidiary body of the Security Council



The current Group of Experts Group of Experts was established per resolutions 1977 (2011) and 2055 (2012) “ “to assist the Committee to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate in carrying out its mandate…” …”

1540 Committee Chair (ROK) 1540 Committee Member 1540 Group of Experts Member

“[The Security Council] expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end”- Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

“ “[ [The Security Council]

The Security Council] decides that Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore”- Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013)

The 1540 Committee and its experts The 1540 Committee and its experts

The The 1540 Architecture 1540 Architecture

UN Security Council UN Security Council

Monitoring & national implementation Assistance

Cooperation with international

• rganizations, including the Security

Council committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001)

Transparency & media outreach

1540 Committee 1540 Committee

Group of Experts Group of Experts

UN Office for UN Office for Disarmament Disarmament Affairs Affairs UN UN Department Department

• f Political
• f Political

Affairs Affairs

Regional and sub-regional seminars and workshops

The 1540 Architecture The 1540 Architecture

Monitoring national Monitoring national implementation implementation

• States

States’ ’ national national reports and reports and updates updates

• States

States’ ’ national national points of contact points of contact

• States

States’ ’ voluntary voluntary national action national action plans plans

• Visits to States

Visits to States at their invitation at their invitation

• Country

Country-

• specific

specific activities and activities and dialogue dialogue

• Committee

Committee’ ’s s 1540 matrix 1540 matrix

Assistance and Assistance and cooperation cooperation Transparency and Transparency and

• utreach
• utreach

Reporting to the Reporting to the Security Council Security Council

The Group of Experts supports the process The Group of Experts supports the process

• Matchmaking of

Matchmaking of requests and offers of requests and offers of assistance assistance

• Cooperation with SC

Cooperation with SC committees 1267 & 1373 committees 1267 & 1373 and international/ and international/ regional organizations regional organizations

• Committee members

Committee members and experts and experts’ ’ participation in participation in

• utreach events
• utreach events
• 1540 Committee

1540 Committee website website

• 1540 Compass journal

1540 Compass journal

• Committee

Committee’ ’s annual s annual Program of Work Program of Work

• Annual review on the

Annual review on the implementation of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) resolution 1540 (2004)

• Biannual briefing on

Biannual briefing on cooperation between the cooperation between the SC committees 1267, SC committees 1267, 1373, and 1540 1373, and 1540

The 1540 Process The 1540 Process

• A “1540 Matrix” is prepared by the

1540 Committee for each State

• A matrix has 389 “fields” covering

activities related to the operative paragraphs (OP) of the resolution

• When completed, the matrix links

the obligations of resolution 1540 (2004) with national implementation measures for all Member States

The 1540 Matrix The 1540 Matrix

Committee Committee-

• approved matrices are posted online (all matrices are currently

approved matrices are posted online (all matrices are currently being updated) being updated)

http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/1540-matrix/committee-approved-matrices.shtml

Is There Still a Clear and Present Threat? Is There Still a Clear and Present Threat?

• Al Qaeda’s core was destroyed

but “Al Qaeda-ism” as an ideology still lives on

• Defining what constitutes

“terrorism” or “for terrorist purposes” is a state’s prerogative

• Whether pursued for terrorist or

criminal purposes, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons constitutes a threat to the international peace and security

Fall 2010: Al Fall 2010: Al-

• Qaeda

Qaeda’ ’s s Inspire Inspire Magazine Magazine calls on calls on “ “those those mujahid brothers with mujahid brothers with degrees in microbiology or degrees in microbiology or chemistry chemistry… …to develop a to develop a weapon of mass destruction weapon of mass destruction” ”

Select Bio Terrorism/Crimes Perpetrated by Bio Select Bio Terrorism/Crimes Perpetrated by Bio-

• Medical (or Allied Medical) Professionals

Medical (or Allied Medical) Professionals

http://www.selectagents.gov/resources/Addressing%20Biosecurity-%20Roles%20and%20Responsibilities%20of%20the%20Science%20and%20Security%20Communities.pdf

“The [Lyon] lab was located in a spare bedroom that doubled by day as a sewing

• room. French police say Benchellali, fresh

from training camp in the Pankisi Gorge, would lock himself in the room and work through the night on his mysterious projects, the nature of which he kept to himself. In fact, French police say, he was experimenting with a variation of one of the recipes he learned abroad: a ricin

concoction laced with the toxin that causes botulism”.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2159-2004May4_2.html

“Like the nuclear threat, the specter of biological warfare presents a multifactorial problem, and it will call for multifactorial solutions multifactorial solutions… … like the nuclear genie released from the bottle, the newfound power unleashed by advances in the newfound power unleashed by advances in biotechnology will not be tamed by merely wishing it biotechnology will not be tamed by merely wishing it— —

• r legislating it
• r legislating it—

—away. away. Once knowledge is attained, there is no going back” –

The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological & Chemical Weapons (Chap. 2, Steven M. Block)

Societal vigilance Societal vigilance Codes of conduct Codes of conduct Building a CBRN Building a CBRN security culture and security culture and responsible conduct responsible conduct

• f science
• f science

Biochemical Security 2030: Food for Thought Biochemical Security 2030: Food for Thought

• A comprehensive biochemical security framework

requires both “governing” and “governance” measures

• In order to address the whole spectrum of risk,

states may choose to holistically implement legislative/regulatory and enforcement measures AND governance initiatives as “appropriate domestic controls” over BW- & CW-related materials under resolution 1540 (2004)

• Internationally harmonized codes of conduct

(i.e. HCOC-like agreements) and/ or UNSCRs, SC Presidential Statements, or UNGA resolutions

• n the value of promoting a global security

culture and responsible conduct of science, may help States identify identify “ “soft soft” ” security measures security measures toward complementing the legislative/ toward complementing the legislative/ enforcement framework required by resolution enforcement framework required by resolution 1540 (2004), for its effective implementation 1540 (2004), for its effective implementation

Dana Perkins, PhD Dana Perkins, PhD

1540 Committee Expert 1540 Committee Expert United Nations United Nations 300 East 42 300 East 42nd

nd St., Suite IN

St., Suite IN-

• 03074H

03074H New York, NY 10017 New York, NY 10017 Tel: +1 (917) 367 6023 (office) Tel: +1 (917) 367 6023 (office) E E-

• mail:

mail: PerkinsD@un.org erkinsD@un.org

Collective e Collective e-

• mail: 1540experts@un.org

mail: 1540experts@un.org Website: http://www.un.org/sc/1540 Website: http://www.un.org/sc/1540